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This dissertation is comprised of four essays. It develops statistical models of decision making
in the presence of risk with applications to economics and finance. The methodology draws upon
economics, finance, psychology, mathematics and statistics. Each essay contributes to the literature
by either introducing new theories and empirical predictions or extending old ones with novel
approaches.
The first essay (Chapter II) includes, to the best of our knowledge, the first known limit dis-
tribution of the myopic loss aversion (MLA) index derived from micro-foundations of behavioural
economics. That discovery predicts several new results. We prove that the MLA index is in the
class ofα-stable distributions. This striking prediction is upheld empirically with data from a
published meta-study on loss aversion; published data on cross-country loss aversion indexes; and
macroeconomic loss aversion index data for US and South Africa. The latter results provide con-
trast to Hofstede’s cross-cultural uncertainty avoidance index for risk perception. We apply the
theory to information based asset pricing and show how the MLA index mimics information flows
in credit risk models. We embed the MLA index in the pricing kernel of a behavioural consump-
tion based capital asset pricing model (B-CCAPM) and resolve the equity premium puzzle. Our
theory predicts: (1) stochastic dominance of good states in the B-CCAPM Markov matrix induce
excess volatility; and (2) a countercyclical fourfold pattern of risk attitudes.
The second essay (Chapter III) introduces a probability model of “irrational exuberance”
and financial market instability implied by index option prices. It is based on a behavioural em-
pirical local Lyapunov exponent (BELLE) process we construct from micro-foundations of be-
havioural finance. It characterizes stochastic stability of financial markets, with risk attitude fac-
tors, in fixed point neighbourhoods of the probability weighting functions implied by index option
prices. It provides a robust early warning system for market crash across different credit risk
sources. We show how the model would have predicted the Great Recession of 2008. The BELLE
process characterizes Minskys financial instability hypothesis that financial markets transit from
financial relations that make them stable to those that make them unstable.
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The third essay (Chapter IV) introduces an outcome dependent harmonic probability weight-
ing function (HPWF) based on an information theory of stochastic choice. We use the HPWF to
resolve the preference reversal (PR) puzzle–which is observed in economics and psychology ex-
periments when a decision makers (DMs) preferences over the same items change depending upon
how she is subsequently asked to construct a preference. We use the principle of maximum entropy
to synthesize information processing, probabilistic choice, and momentary fluctuation hypotheses
proposed by various researchers to explain intransitivity implied by PR phenomenon. The HPWF
theory is illustrated via simulation. Additionally, we show how the HPWF decomposes regret the-
ory, and rank dependent utility (RDU), into core expected utility theory (EUT) plus functionally
equivalent stochastic error addends. This theoretical prediction finds support inHey and Orme
(1994) seminal experiments on the difference between generalizedEUT and core EUT models.
We also prove that experimenter interference with the probability cycle of DMs HPWF causes
them to observe preference reversal in stochastic choice experiments even though the true state is
transitive and there is no violation of procedure invariance.
The fourth essay (Chapter V) shows thatBernoulli (1738) original utility function is alive
and well. For example, several papers reexamineBernoulli (1738) expected utility resolution of
the St Petersburg Paradox in the context of cumulative prospect theory (CPT). We go a step further.
We reexamine the geometry of Bernoulli’s original sketch of his utility function. We prove that
contrary to received literature, which alleges that Bernoulli’s utility function is unable to generate
a loss aversion index (ULA), the geometry of Bernoulli’s original sketch accommodates a ULA
index with smooth reference dependent utility functions. In fact, it provides a solution to the open
problem of closed form global ULA index formula in prospect theory. Like in the first essay, the
ULA index predicted by Bernoulli’s utility function isα-stable. Under fairly mild assumptions,
we show how it supports a Fisher z-transform statistical test for the loss aversion index and we
show how the test can be applied.
ii
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Chapter 1
In troduction
The Great Recession of 2008 highlighted a failure of neoclassical economic models, predicated on
rational economic theories, to anticipate the consequences of seemingly “irrational exuberance” as-
sociated with risk attitudes that precipitated the crisis. This led to a clarion call for new modelling
paradigms and creation of organizations such as the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET),
and market monitoring research units in major central banks. For example, the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) publishes the biannual Global Financial Stability Report which “provides an
assessment of the global financial system and markets”. The Financial Policy Committee, Bank of
England; Financial Stability Committee, Federal Reserve Board, and Center for Financial Stability
in the US are some of the newly formed entities tasked with monitoring financial stability.
One approach to new economic thinking that has traction, and the one taken in this disserta-
tion, is the synthesis of neoclassical economics paradigms with behavioural assumptions (Shefrin,
2014, 2015a). At its core this dissertation develops statistical modelsof decision making in the
presence of risk, and rigorous theoretical models that extend to several applications. Its highly
interdisciplinary nature draws upon the fields of economics, finance, psychology, mathematics and
statistics. It applies probability theory to microfoundations of behavioural economics and finance
in an ambient topological space, and it derives consequential structural models. This approach
contributes to the literature by extending the solution space of economics and finance with several
new results. Many of which are important in their own right as indicated in the chapters that follow.
In Chapter II, we introduce an asymptotic theory of and statistical distribution for the my-
opic loss aversion (MLA) index. To the best of our knowledge this theory is new to the literature,1
1We note thatStott(2006) conducted a metastudy on functional forms of CPT value functio s and probability weighting func-
tions. Zeisberger et al.(2012) and references therein examined the stability of CPT parameter es imates over time. AndBaucells
and Heukamp(2012) studied time varying probability weighting functions.Booij et al. (2010) study presents heterogeneity and
large disparities in loss aversion index estimates. However, none of those studies represented the MLA index as a random variable
drawn from a statistical distribution. Our novelty claim rests on representation of the loss aversion index as a random variable
1
and it leads to a groundswell of new results. The loss aversion concept in economics was intro-
duced inKahneman and Tversky(1979). Whereas the loss aversion index was first introduced
to behavioural economics byTversky and Kahneman(1991) as a deterministic parameter under
riskless choice, subsequently presented in the context of risky choice inTversky and Kahneman
(1992), and axiomatized byWakker and Tversky(1993). The MLA concept was popularized by
Benartzi and Thaler(1995) in their simulated solution of the equity premium puzzle.
First, we prove that the loss aversion index is an independent and identically distributed
Cauchy random variable. This striking result implies that any positive value of the loss aversion
index is admissible. So the oft reported statement “loss aversion index median value around 2.0”
(e.g.,Bowman et al.(1999); De Neve et al.(2015)) may be superfluous. We tested the theory
by fitting the distribution to four different data sets of loss aversion indexes estimated in different
contexts: a metastudy, loss aversion indexes estimated from hypothetical choices in survey based
experiments conducted in 45 countries, and our own cross-country macroeconomic loss aversion
index estimates for US and South Africa income and consumption data. The distribution theory
was upheld in each case.
Second, we introduce a simple empirical strategy for computing a macroeconomic loss
aversion index by a method of moments estimator which asymptotic distribution is in the Cauchy
class ofα-stable distributions. This permits cross-country risk attitude comparison. It provides
a “hard data” alternative toHofstede(1980, 1983) survey driven cross-cultural anticipative un-
certainty avoidance index (UAI) of risk perception, popularized in the international business and
cross-cultural psychology literatures. For example, whereas Hofstede’s UAI posits that attitudes
towards uncertainty in the US and South Africa are similar, our macroeconomic loss aversion index
estimator shows that they are dissimilar: South Africans tend to be gain seeking relative to their
US counterparts. South Africa’s risk attitude is sensitive to political uncertainty, whereas US risk
attitude is sensitive to natural disasters and financial market instability.
Third, we show how the Cauchy random variable prediction for the MLA index performs
in asset pricing contexts. Specifically, we show that the MLA index mimics information flows in
a Cauchy bridge process in the credit risk model employed byHoyle (2010); Hoyle et al.(2011);
drawn from a specific family of statistical distributions.
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Ikpe et al.(2014). Furthermore, we show thatMehra and Prescott(1985) neoclassical consump-
tion based asset pricing model (CCAPM) is unable to explain the equity premium because risk
attitudes in their model are misspecified. Their model depends on risk aversion and volatility of
consumption growth to explain the equity premium puzzle.Köbberling and Wakker(2005, p. 128)
presented stylized arguments which show how risk aversion is tied to loss aversion by and through
a utility function they devise.Charles-Cadogan(2016b, Appendix A.2) provides an explicit rela-
tionship between the loss aversion index and Arrow-Pratt risk aversion indexes over gain and loss
domains. We extend that result by deriving a cross-sectional specification for risk aversion as a
function of loss aversion. The Cauchy random variable MLA index in that specification is a miss-
ing variable in the Mehra-Prescott model. It accommodates the impact of rare disasters on asset
prices. And it admits large countercyclical swings in the equity premium that neoclassical models
do not pick up. Furthermore, our behavioural asset pricing approach also predicts that investor
response to stochastic dominance of preferred states induce excess volatility in equity prices.
Chapter III examines behavioural dynamics in fixed point neighbourhoods of probability
weighting functions (pwfs) with applications to financial markets. Even thoughPrelec(1998) and
subsequentlyLuce (2001) axiomatized a fixed point probability for pwfs, their models focused
on the stable (concave-convex) shape. We show that pwfs come in stable and unstable (convex-
concave) vintages that have the same fixed point probability. This implies that fixed point dynamics
inform pwfs shapes and phase transitions in pwfs.
First, we derive a behavioural empirical local Lyapunov exponent (BELLE) process from
neuronal noise in fixed point neighbourhoods. This introduces a behavioural stochastic differential
equation that is important in its own right. We examine stochastic stability criteria for the BELLE
process and verify how they control pwfs shapes in a simple Monte Carlo experiment.
Second, the theory is uphelda fortiori by the pwfs implied by index option prices in
Polkovnichenko and Zhao(2013). We find that the shapes of pwfs reflect probabilistic risk at-
titudes towards credit risk sources. This result lends credence to the source function theory of pwfs
in the Abdellaoui et al.(2011) study. We calibrate our BELLE theory with parameter estimates
for the pwfs implied by index option prices inPolkovnichenko and Zhao(2013)). We show how
that exercise supports an early warning system for financial market instability. In fact, we show
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how our model would have anticipated the Great Recession of 2008. The shape of the pwf implied
by index option prices, when the market crashed in 2008, mimics the shapes of the pwf predicted
by our Monte Carlo experiment on market crash. Thus, we prove that the pwf source functions
predicted by the BELLE theory are sufficient statistics for Hyman Minskys financial instability
hypothesis: An economy has stable and unstable regimes, and it transits from financial relations
that make it stable to those that make it unstable.
Chapter IV employs the principle of maximum entropy to derive a coherent harmonic
probability weighting function (HPWF) that extendsHogarth and Einhorn(1990) descriptive ven-
ture theory probability weighting model. The HPWF resolves the preference reversal (PR) phe-
nomenon first observed in experiments conducted by psychologistsLichtenstein and Slovic(1971)
and Lindman(1971). The phenomenon is observed when the choice decision makers (DMs) make,
between two alternatives, are inconsistent with the price they are willing to accept (or pay) for the
given choice when it is presented later as part of the same two alternatives. Assuming preferences
are invariant to elicitation method, e.g., procedure invariance, PR presents a dilemma for deci-
sion theory because it implies intransitive preferences–even though axiomatic decision theories
in economics and psychology often feature transitive preferences as a building block. Preference
reversal implies cyclic behaviour that leaves decision makers vulnerable to money pumps. It has
policy implications for cost-benefit analysis and environment studies where the phenomenon has
been reported. For example, imputed values for non-tradeable items may be elicited from surveys
and policymakers may use the responses to inform resource allocation. If the preference rank-
ing extrapolated from survey responses do not reflect the choices that respondents would actually
make, then the survey elicited valuation is unreliable and policy is misinformed.
Seidl(2002) identified four determinants of PR in his literature review:(1) mode of elicita-
tion of certainty equivalents, (2) intransitivity of preferences, (3) overpricing and/or underpricing
of lotteries, and (4) nonlinear probabilities. We introduce an outcome dependent HPWF which
resolves the PR puzzle in the context of (2) and (4). We impose procedure invariance and transi-
tivity of choice on the model, and show how observers can still be misled into reporting PR when
there is none. According to our theory, the HPWF is controlled by probability cycles that are
disturbed or broken by observers who interpret the observation as PR. This is a manifestation of
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the uncertainty principle or observer effect explained at length in Von Neumann(1955, Ch. VI).
However, the phenomenon vanishes when probability cycles are completed. In the neuroeconomics
and psychophysics literature,Takahashi(2006) proposed a stylized outcome dependent probability
weighting function based on the difference between perceived probability and Claude Shannon’s
entropy measure of probability uncertainty. Several other authors have proposed outcome depen-
dent probability weighting functions, e.g.,Pfanzagl(1967); Fellner(1961); Schneeweiss(1974);
Hogarth and Einhorn(1990); Dillenberger et al.(2013) to name a few. To the best of our knowledge
our model is the first to employ maximum entropy analysis and identify behavioural harmonics in
outcome dependent probability weighting functions. Our model addresses the open issue of seem-
ingly intransitive preferences identified bySeidl (2002, p. 637). We reiterate here that our model
proves that PR can be reported by an observer even when procedure invariance is not violated, and
true preference is transitive, if the probability weighting function is harmonic. Specifically, we
identify an observer effect for PR. For application, we show how the HPWF decomposes regret
theory and rank dependent utility (RDU) into core expected utility theory (EUT) plus functionally
equivalent stochastic error addends. Thus, the HPWF provides a theoretical explanation for why
Hey and Orme(1994) found no statistically significant difference between core EUT and general-
ized EUT models in their seminal economic experiments.
Chapter V re-examinesBernoulli (1738) original utility function, in the context of cumula-
tive prospect theory (CPT), to evaluate the claim made by some proponents of prospect theory that
Bernoulli’s utility function cannot accommodate a loss aversion index. This exercise is reminis-
cent ofBlavatskyy(2005); Rieger and Wang(2006); Pfiffelmann(2011) who reexaminedBernoulli
(1738) “resolution” of the St Petersburg Paradox in the context of CPT. We go one step further by
examining CPT loss aversion index in the context ofBernoulli (1738) sketch of his utility function.
Cursory inspection of the geometry of Bernoulli’s original utility function shows that it accommo-
dates relative wealth or a reference point where it cuts the horizontal axis. So that points to the
left of the reference point support “disutility of losses” and points to the right support “utility of
gains”. We show how a loss aversion index can be constructed from that observation. Further-
more, we show how one can develop a statistical test for the loss aversion index derived from that
process. Thus, we refute claims alleging that Bernoulli’s utility function is unable to accommodate
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a loss aversion index. It should be noted in passing thatCharles-Cadogan(2016b) introduced an
EUT based model that also generates a loss aversion index.
In conclusion, the instant dissertation provides several new results that impact decision
theory, behavioural finance, and behavioural economics going forward. Perhaps the most promis-
ing areas for future research, motivated by the instant dissertation, lie in applications of (1) the
family of statistical distributions supported by MLA indexes, (2) the BELLE process identified
in fixed point neighbourhoods generated by probability weighting functions, and (3) the HPWF.
For example, there is a nascent asset pricing literature in which loss aversion is synthesized with
exotic preferences to (a) resolve the equity premium puzzle, and (b) account for excess volatility.
The results in this thesis imply that theα-stable feature of the MLA index makes the latter a suf-
ficient statistic that (1) resolves the equity premium puzzle, (2) explains excess volatility, and (3)
explains rare disaster effects on asset prices in the context of standard preferences. Future research
also includes axiomatization of financial structures identified in Minsky’s financial instability hy-
pothesis in the context of the BELLE process. The path properties of the BELLE process are
also important in their own right. For example, one can analyze the escape time of the BELLE
path from a set, and extend the BELLE process solution space with different background driving
stochastic processes. Another avenue for further research contemplates a matrix operator theory
of loss aversion motivated by the empirical gain-loss topology we introduce. That theory would
tie a time varying Arrow-Pratt risk aversion index to a CRRA index and the loss aversion index
generated by our gain-loss topological basis set. Finally, the HPWF decomposition of regret theory
and RDEU into core EUT plus functionally equivalent addends, introduced in this thesis, shows
promise as a methodology that can be axiomatized and applied to decompose other generalized
EUT specifications into a core EUT theory plus stochastic error.
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Chapter 2
Asymptotic Theory Of Myopic Loss
Aversion with Applications To Asset Pricing
2.1 Introduction
This chapter contributes to the literature by introducing an asymptotic theory of the myopic loss
aversion (MLA) index which show that it is drawn from a specific family ofα-stable distributions.
Thus, the MLA index is not constant or deterministic as is often portrayed in extant literature. One
implication of our result is that several papers that assume constant or deterministic MLA index
can now be reexamined to see if the results they reported are robust toα-stable MLA.
The loss aversion concept, first introduced inKahneman and Tversky(1979) original ver-
sion of prospect theory (OPT), is a pillar of behavioural economics and finance (Shefrin, 2009;
Hirshleifer, 2015). It reflects investor psychology and risk perception (Hirschleifer, 2001). It
posits that losses loom larger than gains when a decision maker (DM) chooses in a mixed lottery
or gamble, i.e., one that is comprised of gains and losses. That is, a DM is more sensitive to losses
than she is to gains of the same absolute size. That risk attitude concept was subsequently refined
to include MLA which involves a decision maker’s (DM’s) response to and evaluation of losses in-
curred over short periods, together with a mental accounting process (B nartzi and Thaler, 1995).1
Moreover, the MLA phenomenon has been affirmed in economic experiments, e.g.,Gneezy and
Potters(1997); Thaler et al.(1997); Benartzi and Thaler(1999); Haigh and List(2005).
Gneezy and Potters(1997) illustrated the MLA concept with the following example mo-
tivated by (Samuelson, 1963). Suppose a decision maker (DM) is faced with a simple gamble
L where she stands to win $200 with probability 1/2 or loose -$100 with probability 1/2, i.e.,
L = (200, 1/2;−100, 1/2). Suppose further that the DM is characterized by loss aversion and
has a utility functionu(z) = z for z ≥ 0 andu(z) = 2.5z for z< 0, wherez is the change in
1The mental accounting concept introduced byThaler (1985, 1990) deals with the frequency of transactions evaluation, and
how they are aggregated or segregated. However, it is not the subject matter of this paper.
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wealth due to the gamble. Then, theexpected utilityof a single play of the gamble is negative:
1/2(200)+1/2(−250)< 0. Hence, the DM will reject the single play gamble, and also two single
play gambles-if each is evaluated separately. However, the DM would accept two gamblesL×L
if (s)he evaluates them in combination: 1/4(400)+1/2(100)+1/4(−500)> 0.2 Thus, rejecting
a single gamble while accepting two gambles is explained by the combined hypotheses of individ-
uals being more sensitive to losses than to gains and evaluating the outcomes of the sequence of
gambles in combination.
Benartzi and Thaler(1995, p. 75) used the MLA paradigm to resolve the equity premium
puzzle. The latter is based on the notion that the historic equity premium in financial markets
is too large to be explained by predictions of neoclassical models. Myopic investors concentrate
on short-term price movements. They frame financial decision making such that loss aversion
is the predominant risk attitude that motivate them to overweight short term price movements.
Consequently, they tend to be more conservative investors who demand higher equity premia to
hold stocks.
Thus far, the literature is silent on the statistical properties of the MLA index estimator
derived from foundations of behavioural economics. This paper fills that gap in the literature and
provides several independently important applications impacted by our novel derivation of the
statistical distribution of the MLA index.
The modern foundations of behavioural economics specifications were established inTv r-
sky and Kahneman(1992) who amended OPT with cumulative prospect theory (CPT) to address,
inter alia, OPT’s violation of stochastic dominance. “The key elements of [OPT] are 1) a value
function that is concave for gains, convex for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains, and
2) a nonlinear transformation of the probability scale, which overweighs small probabilities and
underweighs moderate and high probabilities,” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, pp. 297-298). “In
prospect theory, the carriers of value (meaning arguments of the utility function) are gains and
2Gneezy and Potters(1997) did not state which “mental accounting” rules were used. However, it appears that two wins (200
+ 200) were assigned compound probability 1/2×1/2= 1/4; two losses(−2.5×100+−2.5×100=−500) assigned compound
probability 1/2× 1/2 = 1/4; and “a win and a loss”(200+−100) assigned compound probability 1/2× 1/2 = 1/4 or “a loss
and a win” (−100+ 200) assigned compound probability 1/2× 1/2 = 1/4 were aggregated to get(200+−100) assigned the
probability 1/4+1/4=1/2. Evidently, the “loss factor” 2.5 was not consistently applied to the -100 loss in the aggregation in the
“mental accounting”.
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losses relative to a pre-specified reference point.” (Shefrin, 2009, p. 17). Key CPT amendments
include (i) introduction of a loss aversion index, and (ii) the incorporation of rank dependent util-
ity (RDU) (Quiggin, 1982) and the nonadditive feature of Choquet expected utility (CEU) theory
(Schmeilder, 1989).3
In the psychology literature, a set of papers byBirnbaum and Navarrete(1998); Birnbaum
et al. (1999); Birnbaum(2004, 2005, 2008) introduce competing models such as transfer attention
exchange (TAX), among others, and produce evidence that falsify aspects of OPT and CPT.Wu
(1994) conducted a study which revealed violation of ordinal independence, i.e., the notion that
substitution of a common right tail should not affect decision makers rank ordered preferences
(an important component of the “rank and sign dependent” (Luce, 2000) features of CPT).Wakker
et al. (1994) introduced a study which showed that comonotonic independence was also violated.
Studies byWu and Markle(2008); Por and Budescu(2013) implicate the gain-loss separability
theory of CPT which is crucial for construction of the loss aversion index in CPT (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992). However, no single model of decision making in the presence of risk is a
panacea and CPT is no exception. Despite its shortcomings, a recent review paper byBarberis
(2013, p. 173) asserts that “prospect theory is still widely viewed as the best available description
of how people evaluate risk in experimental settings”. Thus, our analysis in the sequel is motivated
by CPT.
More important for the subject matter of this paper,Tversky and Kahneman(1992) in-
troduced, specified, and estimated a utility based loss aversion index with data from controlled
experiments.4 They reported a median value of 2.25 for the loss aversion indexestimated in their
study. However, they were silent on the characteristics of the underlying statistical distribution
that led to the median value 2.25. It is known that the median is a consistent estimator of central
tendency for double exponential (Laplace) and Cauchy distributions. The mean and variance of
such distributions may not exist because they are susceptible to extreme values and they do not
adhere to the central limit theorem (Johnson et al., 1994; Kleiber and Kotz, 2003). Somewhat
3CEU is based on the non-additive “capacity measure” of a set introduced byChoquet(1954) as an alternative to probability
measure of a set.
4Schmidt and Zank(2008) introduced the concept of probabilistic loss aversion basedon curvature properties of the probability
weighting function over gain domain, and the probability weighting function over loss domain.Qu ggin(1993, p. 83) introduced a
probabilistic risk aversion measure he called “probability weighting coefficient”.
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surprisingly, the literature on decision theory is also silent on the statistical distribution of the loss
aversion index.5
This paper’s contribution to the literature lies in its introduction of an asymptotic theory of
the MLA index based on microfoundations of behavioural economics and finance. In particular,
microfoundations of the loss aversion index were axiomatized inWakker and Tversky(1993). We
exploit the Euclidean topology (Dugundji, 1966, p. 63) induced by reference point(s) popularized
by Kahneman and Tversky(1979); Tversky and Kahneman(1992); Kőszegi and Rabin(2006),
and we identify a simple estimator for the MLA index from generating sets. Whereupon we derive
statistical properties of the estimator. We prove that the statistical distribution of the MLA index is
α-stable.6 In particular, it admits a generalized Cauchy distribution characterized by extreme val-
ues. Thus, the narrow range of values for the loss aversion index induced by controlled laboratory
experiments is misleading.
The Euclidean topology supports a new proof of the symbiotic relationship between utility
functions and probability weighting functions (pwfs), as carriers of risk attitudes like loss aversion
and risk aversion.7 The proof is based on the utility transform of mollifiers8 in a neighbourhood
base of a reference point topology for ranked outcomes. This induces a skewed mixture distribution
which characterizes low ranked and high ranked outcomes that support inverted S-shaped pwfs for
risk aversion, and skewed S-shaped for risk seeking. This helps us to identify preference based
foundations of observed phenomena like stocks as lotteries, long shot bias, and preference for
skewness, and to interpret empirical results in this paper.
We tested the MLA index theory in a tournament by fitting and ranking a battery of dis-
5Lopes(1981) makes the case for the median value as a measure of central tendency in evaluating a gamble outside the context
of loss aversion. But she did not specify a statistical distribution function that drives the estimator. In the econophysics literature
Jensen et al.(2003) fitted statistical distributions for the first passage of returns over a given threshold for the Dow Jones Industrial
Average that revealed “gain-loss asymmetry”. However, they did not develop a micro-foundation theory that predicted their choice
of fitted distribution as we do here.
6Stable distributions are characterized by an index of stabilityα wherein 0< α ≤ 2. They are “stable” because they retain their
basic shape after certain transformations. For example, the well known normal distribution has an indexα = 2. The distribution
of a normalized sum of normal random variables is also normal. So it retains the shape of a normal distribution. “Whenα < 2,
the tails of the distributions decay like a power function. This means that a stable random variable exhibits much more variability
than a Gaussian one: it is much more likely to take values far away from the median. Stable distributions have been used to model
such diverse phenomena as gravitational fields of stars, temperature distributions in nuclear reactors, stresses in crystalline lattices,
stock market prices and annual rainfall.”Samoradnitsky and Taqqu(1994, pp. 1-2). This paper adds myopic loss aversion to the
pantheon of applications of stable distributions.
7The symbiotic relationship between utility and probability functions is known since at leastPf nzagl(1967) who axiomatized
the relationship. See alsoSchneeweiss(1974) who provides a review of this issue.
8These are also known as bump functions or test functions. See e.g.,Siddiqui(2004, §5.4) for further details on test functions.
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tribution functions to MLA index estimates from the loss aversion index data in theFishburn and
Kochenberger(1979) metastudy. We tested it on the distribution of loss aversion indexes around
the world reported in theRieger et al.(2011) study. We also tested the theory with income and
consumption time series data for the US and South Africa. In each case the theory is upheld. So it
is robust across domains.9
A comparative analysis of MLA index estimates for intoleranceto decline in standard
of living, based on income and consumption data for a developed economy like the US, and an
emerging economy like South Africa, show that the macroeconomic MLA index is leptokurtic. In
South Africa it is explosive during periods of political uncertainty. Vizly, the Soweto uprising in
1976, P.W. Bothas hardliner Rubicon speech in 1985, and transition to democracy talks with the
ANC in the early 1990s. However, in non-turbulent epochs the MLA index distribution for South
Africa data exhibit mostly gain seeking behaviour with only a couple years where the index was
not statistically different from the median value of 2.25 popularized by behavioural economics.
In contrast, for US data, the macroeconomic MLA index distribution has median value
close to 2.25, and it is less responsive to political uncertainty. It is explosive during periods of
financial market instability and natural disasters such as Hurricane Charlie and Ivan in 2004, and
Katrina in 2005, and financial disasters such the Great Recession of 2008. To the best of our
knowledge, the MLA index distributions for intolerance to decline in standard of living in the US
and South Africa are new to the literature. Moreover, our measure of macroeconomic uncertainty
implicates the Hofstede uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) which predicts similar risk attitudes in
the US and South Africa.10
One important implication of the findings in this paper is the MLA index is stochastic. It
constitutes independent and identically distributed jumps of a subordinate Lévy process. There-
fore, it should be modelled accordingly. For example, a seminal paper byBenartzi and Thaler
(1995) used a starting value of 2.25 in a simulation model to predict tha a MLA index value of
2.7 resolves the equity premium puzzle upon convergence of their algorithm. An important paper
by Bowman et al.(1999) assumed a constant loss aversion index value of 2.0 in their behavioural
9Details of the goodness of fit diagnostics for the statistical distribution are provided in Appendix2.D.
10Technically, Hofstede’s UAI is a riskless measure. It is based on questionnaire response and data reduction techniques like
cluster analysis and there are no probabilities involved.
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challenge to the permanent income hypothesis. More recent,Merkle (2015) used a ratio of slopes
method to “infer loss aversion”, and a Wald test to draw inference, in his study of investor subjec-
tive well-being relative to anticipated portfolio returns. The results in those papers are implicated
by theα-stable MLA index finding in this paper. For example, since the index is a random vari-
able, it is perhaps better specified as a random coefficient that accommodates large values, instead
of extant specification as a nonstochastic parameter.
We provide an application which shows how our model contributes to emergent literature
on information based asset pricing of defaultable bonds. Recent work byHoyle (2010); Hoyle
et al. (2011) model the filtration of information flow in binary bond pricingwith a Lévy random
bridge process. That model was recently extended byIkpe et al.(2014) to include more abstract
processes characterized by conditioning information. Our contribution extends the information
process with embedded myopic loss aversion to default. In our model the credit risk index is based
on a time changed Lévy process adapted to the natural filtration of a Cauchy bridge process to
default. Throughout the life of the default path each jump in the credit rate index mimics myopic
loss aversion to default. It signals market pessimism that is impounded in the price of the credit
instrument. The cumulative effect of market loss aversion coincides with the terminal default date.
We provide closed form expressions for the price of the defaultable credit instrument and examine
its ability to explain the results in a Monte Carlo experiment inHoyle (2010).
In an independently important application we resolve the equity premium puzzle with a
novel behavioural asset pricing approach which produced several new results. The “puzzle” in-
troduced byMehra and Prescott(1985) stems from the unrealistically high risk aversion index
required by their neoclassical model to explain the observed equity premium. We introduce a
CCAPM which embeds theα-stable MLA index in the pricing kernel.11 Grüne and Semm-
ler (2008); Yogo (2008); Hung and Wang(2011); Curatola(2015) also introduced behavioural
CCAPMs with loss aversion and consumption growth. An emerging class of models byAndries
(2014); Easley and Yang(2014) andGuo and He(2015) combine exoticEpstein and Zin(1989)
preferences with a MLA index in exposition of their asset pricing models. However, the loss aver-
sion index in the prior models is either constant or deterministic or it is based on past gains or
11We provide an illustration in Appendix2.A.1.
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losses. Our behavioural pricing kernel with embeddedα-stable MLA index does the following:
• predicts large equity premia;
• explains why the equity premium is counter-cyclical to business cycle peaks and troughs;
• identifies the source/cause of excess volatility in asset prices;
• identifies an endogenous fourfold ranking of asset prices;
• predicts large swings in the price of consumption risk.
According to our theory, the source of risk required to resolve the puzzle is not risk aversion
but loss aversion. However, unlikeBenartzi and Thaler(1995); Barberis et al.(2001) who used a
constant or deterministic loss aversion index to resolve equity premium issues in their models, the
MLA index in our model is an independent and identically distributed random variable. Since it is
in the domain of attraction of anα-stable distribution, it admits MLA index values that induce a
match with any observed equity premium. This feature of the model accommodates rare disaster
effects on the equity premium. Cf. (Rietz, 1988; Barro, 2006, 2009; Wachter, 2013). Whereas
the neoclassical pricing kernel is linear, our pricing kernel is nonlinear–a finding consistent with
financial econometrics (Rosenberg and Engle, 2002), and behavioural finance (Shefrin, 2008).
Furthermore, our model predicts large swings in the price of consumption risk–a result consistent
with findings inDuffee(2005) study.
We prove that loss averse decision makers (DMs) in a current gain state in income, but
who anticipate a loss state in income in the next period (GL states), place the highest value on
assets. Evidently, they hope the asset would make up the anticipated short fall in income. Those in
a current loss state in income, but who anticipate a gain in income in the next period (LG states),
had the second highest evaluation. We prove that DMs are risk seeking in each of those GL and
LG states.
The asset price valuation for lower ranked states LL (current loss, anticipated loss) and
GG (current gain, anticipated gain) is more complex. We find that there is a critical level of
consumption growth beyond which the equity premium predicted by the behavioural pricing kernel
is higher than that predicted by the neoclassical model for risk averse DMs in GG states. It is lower
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otherwise. In LL states there is a small probability of risk aversion at which point the risk premium
is negative. Otherwise DMs are risk seeking almost surely.
Our model predicts that DMs distort probabilities in the state transition probability matrix
for the CCAPM. Investors in a current state of loss anticipate gains and shift probability mass
from loss state to stochastically dominant gain states and this manifests itself as risk seeking over
losses. This causes average returns and variances to be uniformly higher than that predicted by
neoclassical models. In particular, this stochastic dominance feature of the model explains why
the equity premium is high at the trough of a business cycle–an empirical regularity of equity
premia (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Yogo, 2008). To the best of our knowledge, this stochastic
dominance explanation of counter-cyclicality of the equity premium is new to the literature. Refer
to Ludvigson(2013); Campbell(2015) for recent reviews of the literature.
Among the various pwf shapes implied by the permutation of ranked asset prices induced
by our behavioural pricing kernel, is an endogenous fourfold ranking ofanticipated asset prices:
pDLL ≺ pDGG ≺ pDLG ≺ pDGL︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk aversion
or pDGG ≺ pDLL ≺ pDGL ≺ pDLG︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk seeking
where superscriptD stands for behavioural
asset pricing, and subscripts denote the transition states in which the asset was priced. The antici-
pated price is what DMs act on. It is a disposition effect. So for example, they sell winners in GG
states too soon and hold on to losers in LG states too long. Risk aversion is supported by concave-
convex pwfs, and risk seeking by convex-concave pwfs. We characterize the ranking in the context
of Tversky and Kahneman(1992) fourfold pattern of risk attitudes. Perhaps more important,our
model predicts the shape of the probability weighting function for relatively low income investors
because it predicts switching in the shape of lower and upper tail ranks based on whether income
growth crosses a certain threshold. This prediction of our theory finds support inHartzmark(2015)
study where “[t]he [rank] effect indicates that trades in a given stock depend on how it compares
to other positions in an investors portfolio”.
2.1.1 Positioning the paper in context of related literature
Subsequent to the influential paper on CPT byTversky and Kahneman(1992), the loss aver-
sion index is mostly estimated with data generated from controlled experiments in behavioural
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and experimental economics.12 Refer toAbdellaoui et al.(2007); Booij et al.(2010) for a review.
Moreover, loss aversion index estimates derived from economic experiments are used to calibrate
influential models in behavioural economics and finance, e.g.,Benartzi and Thaler(1995); Barberis
etal. (2001); Barberis and Huang(2008). However, the conditions induced in controlled laboratory
experiments, with student subjects, do not capture the full range of experiences a decision maker
faces in the real economy.
To be sure, papers byFox et al.(1996); Haigh and List(2005); Abdellaoui et al.(2013)
have shown that the behaviour of financial professionals mirror that of student subjects in con-
trolled laboratory experiments. However, the type of stress induced by extreme conditions of
market failure were not replicated in those studies. For instance, losing a job or a home in an
economic downturn should invoke a more visceral response than that observed from the relatively
small stakes in economic experiments or hypothetical choices in survey instruments.Dunn and
Mirzaie (2015) provide evidence that the stress levels in extreme conditions are more sensitive
to uncollaterlized loans than collateralized loans. So one would expect the loss aversion index for
calamitous events like the Great Recession of 2008 to be different from that found under controlled
conditions.
Recently,De Neve et al.(2015) examined myopic subjective well being response to eco-
nomic growth. They found that subjective well being is twice as sensitive to negative economic
growth as it is to positive economic growth. Their results are based on an “experienced utility” ap-
proach wherein survey response (as opposed to economic time series data) to questions pertaining
to life satisfaction is the dependent variable. However, our results show that estimates of the MLA
index derived from survey data isα-stable.13 So it is subject to large deviations which impact may
be muted by aggregation bias. Thus, our results implicate the “twice as sensitive” finding in the
De Neve et al.(2015) study.
More on point, our model is based on a novel interpretation ofDuesenberry(1949) rel-
ative income hypothesis (RIH) consumption function with a skewed S-shaped value function for
12Notable exceptions includeHardie et al.(1993) who used supermarket scanner data to estimate a loss aversionindex i a
marketing context.
13Charles-Cadogan(2015b) introduced an econometric theory of loss aversion index recovery in cross sectional regression mod-
els of subjective well-being that also predictα-stable distribution for loss aversion index.
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changes in consumption.14 Duesenberry’s value function is functionally equivalent toKahneman
and Tversky(1979) original prospect theory (OPT) value function and precedes it by at least three
decades. The value function is related to the “surplus consumption” feature ofCampbell and
Cochrane(1999) habit formation model.Breeden et al.(2015) likened aspects of habit formation
paradigm to the RIH. They posit thatConstantinides(1990) “formulation is an extreme version of
habit formation that implies a [Duesenberry(1949)] type racheting consumption demand that pre-
vents consumption from falling below the exponentially weighted average of past consumption.”
For instance, Dusenberry’s habitual consumption is a running maximum of past consumption over
a given sliding window.15 That is a robust estimator of the exponentially weighted average of past
consumption. However, our model is distinguished from the class of habit formation models be-
cause we embed a MLA index in the consumption function. That specification provides a nexus
for the joint distribution of the MLA index and consumption growth that drives the behavioural
pricing kernel in our exposition of the CCAPM.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Insection 2.2we provide the main results of our
asymptotic theory of the MLA index from foundations of behavioural economics. Insection 2.3
we embed the MLA index inDuesenberry(1949) RIH and identify its estimator. We provide
empirical evidence that risk attitudes in the RIH induce probability distortions which supportα-
stable distributions. Insection 2.4we introduce a new proof of the nexus between probability
weighting functions as outcome dependent transformations of utility functions. Inection 2.5we
devise a strategy for estimating the MLA index from time series data. We apply and test the
asymptotic theory in different contexts to establish robustness. Inection 2.6we show how our
theory applies to information based asset pricing of defaultable binary bonds. Insection 2.7we
show how our theory resolves the equity premium puzzle. We conclude ins ction 5.4with some
perspectives on avenues for further research.
14Our approach is distinguished fromDybvig (1995) andRiedel(2009) who derived Duesenberry’s consumption ratcheting from
a continuous time model of habit formation.
15The running maximum as reference point is also popular in the behavioural finance literature under rubric of “52-week high”.
See e.g.,George and Hwang(2004); Huddart et al.(2009); Baker et al.(2012).
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2.2 Foundations of the myopic loss aversion index estimator
In this section we provide some preliminaries, and we present the microfoundations of our model
in a topological basis set in the Euclidean topology. Whereupon we derive an existence theorem
for the statistical distribution of the MLA index. This theorem is tested (and upheld) empirically
in subsequent sections.
Tversky and Kahneman(1992, p. 32) introduced a robust ratio of slopes procedure for
estimating the loss aversion index. It amounts to a calibration exercise in which subjects were












, wherea ndc are
losses,b andx are gains, and12 is the corresponding probability of occurrence for each outcome.
They reported the median value ofx which subjects used to establish equivalence between the two




as a robust estimator of the loss aversion index.Tversky and Kahneman(1992, p. 310) noted that
“when the possible loss is increased byk the compensating gain must be increased by about 2k”.
So λθ is a ratio of the slope of gains over the slope of losses in this “compensatory” framework.
This sets the stage for a ratio type estimator for the loss aversion index.
2.2.1 The empirical myopic loss aversion (MLA) index estimator
We start with microfoundations of behavioural economics to motivate the theory behind our MLA
index. Letv be CPT’s value function bifurcated at a reference pointxr , and separated by sub-utility
functionsvg andvℓ over gain and loss domains respectively. So that ifx is change in income then
we write the value function as
v(x) = vg(x)I{x>xr}−vℓ(−x)I{x<xr} (2.2.2)
whereI is an indicator function and points to the right ofxr are gains and points to the left are loses.
Assume the existence of measurement errorε with mean 0 and varianceσ2ε , i.e.,ε ∼ (0,σ2ε ), for
17
change of income.
Definition 2.2.1 (Reference point topology). Define a small open set centered at the reference point
xr with radiusε, asBε(xr) = {x| |x−xr |< ε}. The familyT of such open sets forms a topology in
R.
We make the following technical assumption which implies exist nce of convergent and approx-
imate probability distributions inBε(xr). Refer toGikhman and Skorokhod(1969, p. 441) for
technical entails.
Assumption 2.2.1(Existence of approximation). Assume that there exist a compact set Kδ ⊂
Bε(xr) such that Pr{x /∈ Bε(xr)\Kδ}< εδ whereεδ ↓ 0.
This assumption accommodates the existence of “bump functions” or mollifiers (Karatzas and
Shreve, 1991, p. 206) on the compact setKδ that vanish on the setBε(xr)\Kδ .














MLA estimator in an openε disk Bε(xr) for the bifurcated value functionv
introduced inKahneman and Tversky(1979). It collapses to theKöbberling and


















whereC0 is a normalizing constant such thatC0
∫ a
−a ϕ(ε)dε = 1.
Remark2.2.1. Siddiqui (2004, §5.4.1) defines the space of mollifiers or test unctions as “C∞(u)
equipped with the topology induced through the convergence is called the space of test functions
and often denoted byD(Ω). In other words, a test function is an infinitely differentiable function
on Rn identically zero outside of some compact set.”
A first order Taylor expansion of the left hand side of (2.2.2) around a reference pointxr implies
v(x) = v(xr)+v
′(xr)(x−xr)+Op(x2) (2.2.4)
whereOp is a function that is bounded in probability.16 This first order expansion is applied sep-
arately to each subutility function on the right hand side of (2.2.2). The proof of Proposition 2
in Kőszegi and Rabin(2006, p. 1160) used a similar argument. The utility based loss aversion
index measure for riskless choice (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) implied by Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992) is λ =
vℓ(−1)
vg(1)












wherer is a reference point andx+ andx− are gains and losses respectively. Whenr = 0 his
formula collapses to the ones above. Refer toWakker(2010) for a review of loss aversion index
formulae. Thus, our task is to establish a correspondence between (2.2.4) and those loss aversion
16We note that nondifferentiability at the reference pointxr implies that limx↓x+r v
′(x) 6= limx↑x−r v′(x) if v(x) is piecewise contin-
uous atxr , i.e., it has no jump discontinuity. Ifη = Op(x2), then by virtue of Assumption2.2.1, for some constantCε we have
Pr{|η|>Cε x2} ≤ 2ε. SeeChow and Teicher(1988, p. 255) for details.
17The related concept of probabilistic loss aversion is presented as a ratio of slopes of gain and loss domain dependent probability
weighting functions inSchmidt and Zank(2005, 2008). However, that is outside the scope of the present paper.
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index formulae.
Kahneman and Tversky(1979) assumed a reference pointxr = 018 and we do the same
here. Let y = v(x), xr = 0, α = v(xr) = 0, β = v′(xr) and η = Op(x2). The piecewise linear
function in Figure 2.1has a kink atxr = 0. Sincexr = 0 is “known” we can treatα andβ as
parameters. Whereuponα = 0 andβL = v′(0−) over loss domain, andβG = v′(0+) over gain
domain. Thus we rewrite (2.2.4) as a simple linear model:
y= α +β (x−xr)+η =⇒ ȳ= (α −β xr)+β x̄+ η̄ = β x̄+ η̄ (2.2.6)
This is the equation of a straight line that passes through the point(x̄, ȳ), with interceptα = 0.
Sincev(x) = vg(x) over gain domain, andv(x) = vℓ(x) over loss domain, application of (2.2.4) and






=− βL x̄L + η̄L
βG x̄G+ η̄G
(2.2.7)
where the G and L subscripts pertain to gain and loss domains, and theegative signis retained
so that−ȳL > 0 and−x̄L > 0 sinceλ is positive. The line in (2.2.6) passes through the origin
so ȳ = β x̄. This procedure applies to gain and loss domains.19 It is depicted inFigure 2.1for
β > 0. Under the identifying restrictionxr = 0 we have the following empirical measure of the









We summarize the foregoing in the following:
Theorem 2.2.2(MLA estimator). The empirical MLA index estimator in(2.2.7) pertains toTver-
sky and Kahneman(1992) utility ratio formula. Whereas the empirical MLA index estimator in
(2.2.8) pertains toKöbberling and Wakker(2005) ratio of marginal utility formula in a smallε-
18This was subsequently extended byKőszegi and Rabin(2006) to include a generalized reference point.
19In their reference dependent model,Kőszegi and Rabin(2006, p. 1146) write this relation asµ(x) = η x, x > 0 andµ(x) =
λη x, x< 0 where theirη > 0 (ourβ ) is the weight a subject attaches to “gain-loss utility”.
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neighbourhood of the origin.
Remark2.2.2. The linear approximation implies that the MLA index estimator should produce
reasonably close estimates for theTversky and Kahneman(1992) and Köbberling and Wakker
(2005) estimators in (2.2.7) and (2.2.8), respectively. However, in economic experiments the values
produced by those estimators differ (Abdellaoui et al., 2007, p. 1662).
2.2.2 The limit distribution of MLA index
Before we derive the distribution forλ we need the following preliminary definitions.
Preliminaries
Definition 2.2.3(Generalized Cauchy). A probability density functionf is standard Cauchy, writ-
tenC (0,1) if f (x) = 1/π(1+x2), −∞ < x< ∞. If Y follows a standard Cauchy law, thenZ has a
generalized Cauchy lawC (a,b) if Z= bY+a, whereb is a scale anda is a location parameter.
Definition 2.2.4 (Stable distribution). Samoradnitsky and Taqqu(1994). A random variableX is
said to have a stable distribution if for any positive numbersA andB, there is a positive numberC




whereX1 andX2 are independent copies ofX and
d
= denotes equality in distribution.
Another popular definition ofα-stable is ifX1, . . . ,Xn are independent and identically distributions
(iid) random variables, and there exist constantscn,dn such thatX1+ · · ·+Xn
dist
= cnX +dn where
X has the same distribution as theX′si , andcn = n
1
α , 0< α ≤ 2, thenX is α-stable. Anα-stable
distribution (such as the normal distribution) retains its shape up to scalec and shiftd after addition.
Refer toSamoradnitsky and Taqqu(1994) for further details.
Theorem 2.2.3(α-stable distribution). Samoradnitsky and Taqqu(1994). For any stable random
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variable X , there is a numberα ∈ (0,2) such that the number C in(2.2.9) satisfies
Cα = Aα +Bα (2.2.10)
The numberα is called the index of stability or characteristic exponent. A stable random variable
X with indexα is calledα-stable.
Proof. SeeFeller (1970, §VI.1, pp. 170-171).
Definition 2.2.5 (Spherically symmetric vector). Arnold and Brockett(1992). A random vector
U is said to be spherically symmetric ifΓU has the same distribution asU (i.e.,ΓU ∼U ) for all
orthogonal matricesΓ.
Definition 2.2.6(Elliptically symmetric). Arnold and Brockett(1992). A random vectorX is said
to be elliptically symmetric if there exists an invertible matrixA such thatX =AU whereU has a
spherically symmetric distribution.
Existence theorem for generalized Cauchy for MLA index
Assume that gains and losses are symmetric around the reference pointxr . Assumption 2.2.1
implies the existence of bump functions characterized by a symmetric elliptic distribution that
vanishes outside ofKδ .
20 Let X = (X1, . . . , Xr , . . . , Xn)T be an×1 vector of random variables for
gains and losses with an elliptically symmetric distribution around a reference pointXr . We state
the following theorems implied by the foregoing assessment, and provide proofs in the appendix.
Theorem 2.2.4(Standard Cauchy distribution). If U = (U1, . . . ,Un)T , has a spherically symmetric
distribution, then, for i6= k Ui/Uk has a standard Cauchy distribution.
Proof. See Appendix2.B.1.
Theorem 2.2.5(Generalized Cauchy distribution). If X = (X1, . . . , Xr , . . . , Xn)T has an elliptically
symmetric distribution, then, for i6= k,Xi/Xk has a general Cauchy distribution.
20Anderson(2003, p. 47) provides analysis for spherical and elliptically symmetric distributions.Owen and Rabinovitch(1983);
Landsman and Valdez(2003) provide applications of symmetric elliptic distributions in economics and finance.
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Proof. See Appendix2.B.2.




be a vector comprised of the sample mean of loss and gain values relative to a
reference point Xr . Assume that̄U is elliptic symmetric, and definēX = ĀŪ . There exist a3×3
invertible matrixĀ such thatX̄L/X̄G ∼ C (a,b).
Proof. See Appendix2.B.3.
2.3 The relative income hypothesis with myopic loss aversion
The main purpose of this section is to establish a nexus between loss aversion to decline in the
standard of living and the relative income hypothesis (RIH). This provides a basis for the MLA
index theory to be tested. We derive the consumption function underDu senberry(1949) RIH, and
prove that it is a piecewise linear version ofKahneman and Tversky(1979); Tversky and Kahne-
man (1992) value function over gain and loss of income.21 According toShea(1995, pp. 798-799)
“Under myopia, consumption tracks current income. Thus, the failure of the [Life Cycle Hypoth-
esis/Permanent Income Hypothesis] should be symmetric: consumption should respond equally to
predictable income increases and decreases.” We use that observation as a basis for the following
Axiom 1 (Myopia). Under myopia, consumption tracks income.
Figure 2.37in Appendix 2.C.2 illustrates “myopia” under the “consumption tracking income”
postulate for US nondurable consumption and real disposable income series. The US and South
Africa data used in the sequel were taken from publicly available data at the Federal Reserve Bank-
St. Louis (FRED database) and the South African Reserve Bank (SARB database) websites.22




2.3.1 Reference dependence and the relative income hypothesis
Let Yt be disposable income,t = 1, . . . ,T, St be savings andCt be consumption of an investor at
time t soCt +St =Yt . Let Mt be the running maximum income measured at timet for all periods
before t, i.e.,Mt = max0<s<t Ys.
The running maximumMt is critical to our analysis. It is the variable that captures retro-
spective standard of living and induce nonseparability of consumption. Moreover, it is an indepen-
dently important subordinate income process. As a practical matter, it is measured over a finite slid-
ing windowu so thatMt(u) = maxt−u≤s<t Ys. For example, if the real income distribution of an in-
dividual over the last five years is{20,000;25,000;19,000;27,000;22,000}, then her maximum is
27,000. As that 5-year window slides over time it retains the highest maxima attained in retrospect.
To see this, suppose we considered a 10-years period obtained by concatenating the five years
above with the following five years income distribution{18,000;21,000;26,000;23,000;26,500}.







So the highest standard of living attained remained fairly stable at 27,000 until income systemat-
ically dropped in the last 5-years period. If income did not systematically drop over any 5-year
period, it will have only upward jumps. Over the entire 10-years periodM10 = max0<s<10Ys =
27,000. The five years period was arbitrarily chosen. However, it is consistent with empirical lit-
erature on consumption and income, e.g.,Parker and Julliard(2005); Guvenen et al.(2014); Bandi
and Tamoni(2015), and evaluation of life satisfaction over a period of time popularized in the
subjective well being literature spawned byCantril (1965). For example,
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Duesenberry’s monthly relative incomeMt = max
t−u<s<t
{Ys} is a running maximum for
real disposable incomeYt over a select windowu taken here to be a 60-months or
5-years sliding window over the period 2000:10–2012:11. The first 5-years of data in
the monthly time series between 1995 and 2000 is used to derive the first maximum
value 8016.3 above.
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Guvenen et al.(2014) studied the cyclical behaviour of 5-year average income of top income
earners over the business cycle.Bandi and Tamoni(2015) studied aggregate consumption growth
over heterogenous durations that subsume 5-year cycles to explain equity premia in their model.
Figure 2.2depicts a plot of the highest standard of living attained for USreal disposable income
over a rolling 5-year window. More will be said about the construction of that plot in the sequel.
Duesenberry(1949, p. 4) described his relative income model as follows:
“I f in periods of steadily rising income the savings ratio is constant while in depressions
the ratio depends on current income and previous peak income, we can explain saving
with the relationSt/Yy = 0.25Yt/Y0−0.196, whereSt , andYt , are current saving and
disposable income respectively andY0 is highest previous disposable income. When
fitted to the data, this relation yields a high correlation. Moreover, it accurately predicts
the savings rates of 1947.” (Duesenberry, 1949, p. 4).






, Mt = max
0≤s≤t



















where gLt > 0 and g
G
t > 0 are relative-growth rates of income, andα1 is a savings
rate factor. Note thatMt does not include the current period in its evaluation. In
continuous time the evaluation is over 0< s < t−. In discrete time it is 0< s ≤
t − 1. We can rewrite (2.3.1)-(2.3.4) for change in consumption∆bCDt as follows:
Duesenberry’s reference dependent change in consumption
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a(d))Yt +∆bCDt if gain in income
a(d))Yt if reference income
a(d))Yt −λt∆bCDt , λ > 0 if loss of income
(2.3.5)
∆bCDt =−α1gGt Yt , λt =
|gLt |
gGt
, a(d) = 1−α0−α1 (2.3.6)
Remark2.3.1. Sinceλt is constrained to be positive by definition, we use the absolute value|gLt |
instead ofgLt < 0.
Proof. See Appendix2.B.4.
We formalize the embedded myopic loss aversion index in the foregoing with the following
Theorem 2.3.2(MLA to decline in standard of living). Myopic loss aversion to decline in standard
of living induces asymmetric response to anticipated gains and losses in relative income.
In (2.3.5) a gain in relative income signifies an increase in savings and decline in consumption
in (2.3.1). Whereas a loss in relative income induces decreased savingsand asymmetric or “ir-
reversible” increase in consumption in (2.3.1) (Duesenberry(e.g., 1949, p. 101); andKomlos
(2014)). λt is areference dependentloss aversion index, and∆bCDt is thepiecewise [linear] change
in consumptionconsistent with that inFigure 2.1. Benartzi and Thaler(1995, p. 83) andBarberis
et al. (2001, p. 12) used a functionally equivalent piecewise linear valuefunction specification for
stock returns in their analyses. In fact, the variable referred to as “historical benchmark levelZt ”
in Barberis and Huang(2001, p. 9) is ourMt in (2.3.1). In Campbell and Cochrane(1999) habit
formation model a quantity like∆bCDt is referred to as a consumption surplus.
2.3.2 Relative income dynamics for US and South Africa
Figure 2.2depicts a plot of the RIH for monthly real disposable income in the US. The standard of
living Mt(u) is measured over a 5-year or 60-months rolling window. It jumps only when there is
an increase in real income or it stays flat otherwise. HenceMt(u) is a subordinate income process.
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Cursory inspection shows that there was a persistent decline in the standard of living for at least
5-years after the onset of the Great Recession of 2008.
Figure 2.3depicts US real income growth, and relative income growth. The“pain” or
intolerance associated with a decline in standard of living is reflected by the exaggerated downward
growth. According to (2.3.5) and (2.3.6) this reflects loss aversion to decline in consumption and
intolerance to decline in standard of living. The negative growth implies that the level of happiness
or well-being in the economy has declined.
























































































































































































































US monthly relative income growth is computed fromgt = ln(Yt)− ln(Mt)
whereMt = max
t−u<s<t
{Ys} is a running maximum for real disposable income
Yt over a select windowu taken here to be a 60-months or 5-years sliding
window over the period 2000:10–2012:11. The exaggerated negative
growth reflects the psychological pain associated with loss of income and
consequent intolerance for decline in standard of living.
Figure 2.4is the South Africa analog ofFigure 2.2. By virtue of Axiom 1 on myopic
consumption tracking income, and without loss of generality, we used semi-durable personal con-
sumption expenditure in 2010 prices as an instrument for income since a suitable income series
was unavailable at the SARB website. Cursory inspection shows that with few exceptions, the
28
“consumption ratchet” is persistent.


























































































































































































Semidurable personal consumption expenditure (PCE) in 2010 prices is
used as an instrument for South Africa’s quarterly relative income.
Mt = max
t−u<s<t
{Ys} is a running maximum for the income instrumentYt over
a select windowu taken here to be a 20-quarters or 5-years sliding window
over the period 1960:1-2014:1. The first 20-quarters or 5-years of data in
the quarterly time series is used to derive the first maximum value. Under
the consumption tracking income myopia hypothesis, the exaggerated
negative growth reflects the psychological pain associated with loss of
income and consequent intolerance for decline in standard of living.
Figure 2.5depicts the growth rates in quarterly personal consumption expenditure (ZA
PCE) for 2010 base year for South Africa. The shaded regions coincides with the Soweto uprisings
around 1976; P. W. Botha’s hardliner Rubicon speech in 1984, prelude to democracy talks with the
ANC in the early 1990s, and the Great Recession in 2008. Thus, political uncertainty drives the
MLA index implied byFigure 2.5. Loss aversion accentuates the decline in growth rates.
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ZA Rolling 5yrs Impact of Loss Aversion to Decline in Growth of Standard of Living
ZA (Semidurable) Personal Consumption Expenditure  Growth Rate in 2010 Prices
South Africa’s quarterly relative PCE growth in 2010 prices iscomputed from
gt = ln(Yt)− ln(Mt) whereMt = max
t−u<s<t
{Ys} is a running maximum for the PCE instrument for
incomeYt over a select windowu taken here to be a 20-quarters or 5-years sliding window over
the period 1960:1-2014:1.
2.4 Probability weighting functions induced by myopic loss aversion
In this section, we show howα-stable distributions are induced by utility based loss aversion, and
risk aversion, towards outcomes by projection of mollifiers (test functions) in the base topology
Bε(xr) in Definition2.2.1. One of the empirical regularities of prospect theory is risk seeking over
losses, and risk aversion over gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 268). These are typically
represented by convex and concave utility functions over loss and gain domains, respectively. An-
other empirical regularity is nonlinear transformation of probabilitiesP with a probability weight-
ing functionsw(P). The latter carries probabilistic risk attitudes.Mosteller and Nogee(1951)
conducted one of the earliest experiments to elicit utility functions from a mixed gamble in which
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probabilities were fixed and a certainty equivalent payoff waselicited.Preston and Baretta(1948)
were the first to publish a plot of an inverted S-shape probability weighting functions (pwf) from
experiment data.Mosteller and Nogee(1951) found that the utility functions of several subjects
were convex over small sums of money and concave over comparatively larger sums. Furthermore,
they found that subjects probabilistic risk attitudes coincided with the Preston-Baretta finding. This
implies that probabilistic risk attitudes and utility risk attitudes are related to each other. This rela-
tionship is formalized inPfanzagl(1967) andSchneeweiss(1974).
The inverted S-shape probability weighting function was popularized in the economics
literature byQuiggin (1982) rank dependent utility (RDU) model, andTversky and Kahneman
(1992) CPT model. The literature often treats pwfs as carriers of probabilistic risk attitudes distinct
from the risk attitudes characterized by utility functions. For example,Schmidt and Zank(2005,
2008) argue in favor of probabilistic loss aversion based on analysis of pwfs. In this section,
we establish a theory based nexus between utility and probabilistic risk attitudes below. We also
provide a new proof of the nexus and use it to explain a seemingly misinterpreted experiment
result.
2.4.1 Skewed mixture distributions induced by reference point topology
Figure 2.6andFigure 2.7depict projection of the distribution of ranked outcomes thatsupport a
mollifier centered at reference outcome. CPT is a rank and sign dependent model (Luce, 2000)
based on separate application of rank dependent utility (RDU) (Quiggin, 1993) over gain and loss
domains. To the extent that RDU is a generalized expected utility model, is the extent to which
concepts like Arrow-Pratt risk measure is applicable to the underlying subutility functions in CPT
(Köbberling and Wakker, 2005, p. 128). In the economics literature a concave utility function l ke
that inFigure 2.6is often associated with risk aversion.23 A risk averter transforms the underlying
objective distribution of outcomesx relative to a reference outcomexr . Points to the left of the
reference pointxr are treated as “losses”, and points to the right are treated as ”gains”. This
distorts the distribution and induces a left tail skew that corresponds to a fear of losses, i.e., loss
aversion. Thus,Figure 2.6illustrates the connection between risk aversion and loss aver ion.
23Hansson(1988) argues against this notion and provides alternative definitions of risk aversion.
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Figure 2.7: Risk seeker utility function
  





Risk attitudes over mollifiers centered at reference pointxr . Left tail skew distribution
projected by risk averter inFigure 2.6implies risk averter avoids losses from tail risk.
Right tailed skew distribution projected by risk seeker inF gure 2.7implies risk
seeker attracted to gains from long shot bias.
Figure 2.7depicts a risk seeker’s transformation of outcomes relative to the same reference
outcomexr . In this case, the effect of losses is muted and the effect of gains are magnified. This
is a manifestation of long shot bias (Ali , 1977; Golec and Tamarkin, 1998), and stocks as lotteries
phenomenon (Barberis and Huang, 2008; Kumar, 2009). It shows how DMs transform probability
distributions based on their preference for certain outcomes, see e.g.,Lopes(1987); Lopes and
Oden (1999) security/potential, aspiration (S/P A) theory. The risk seeker is overly optimistic
about gains relative to losses. This gain seeking behaviour is reflected by right tail skew.
We present the following analytic framework in the topological basis setBε(xr) for the
geometry above. Letε ∼N (0,σ2ε ). Consider a second order Taylor expansion of a utility function
u around a reference pointxr with “measurement error”ε.




=⇒ ∆εr u(xr) = u(xr + ε)−u(xr) = α1ε +α2ε2 (2.4.2)
whereα0 = u(xr), α1 = u′(xr), andα2 = u′′(xr)/2 are parameters.α2 < 0 for concave utility
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It is known that ifε ∼ N (0,σ2ε ), thenε2 ∼ σ2ε χ21 , whereE[χ21 ] = 1 and variance[χ21 ] = 2
are the mean and variance of a chi-squared distribution with 1-degree of freedom (Johnson et al.,
1994). Therefore, the utility transformation in (2.4.2) is a mixture normal andχ2-distribution
weighted byα1 andα2 respectively. The skewness and long tail features of theχ2 distribution are
evident inFigure 2.6andFigure 2.7.24 Furthermore, (2.4.2) is characterized by excess kurtosis
inherited from theχ2 component. Moreover, imposition of Inada conditions (Inada, 1963) on
u imply that limx↓0u′(x) = ∞+. Thus, α1 can become quite large and explosive under certain
conditions. In which case the mixture distribution portended by the transformation is anα-stable
distribution. Thus we prove the following
Proposition 2.4.1 (Existence of utility inducedα-stable distribution of outcomes). The utility
transformation of reference outcome with normally distributed measurement error in the base
topology Bε(xr) induces a skewed mixture distribution that admits an alpha-stable distribu-
tion.
Proposition 2.4.1provides further proof of the existence of anα-stable distribution induced by
risk attitudes around a reference pointxr . It differs from the proof inDillenberger et al.(2013)
stake dependent probability weighting function. Those authors assume monotonic transformation
of preferences to facilitate their representation theory of presences based on a “state dependent”
probability distribution theory.
24Skewness is measured by the formulaγ =
µ3
µ3/22
whereµ2 andµ3 are second and third central moments, respectively.γε = 0
for the normal distribution andγε2 = 2
√
2/k for theχ2-distribution withk-degrees of freedom. For kurtosisκε = 3 for the normal
andκε2 = 3+(12/k) for the χ2-distribution. (Johnson et al., 1994). For excess kurtosis we subtract 3 so its 0 for the normal and
12/k for χ2 distributions.
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2.4.2 Optimism, pessimism, and probabilistic risk attitudesover ranked outcomes
Preliminaries–Normal distribution mollifier
Assume that the outcomes inFigure 2.6andFigure 2.7are ranked from worst to best on outcome
spaceX ⊂ R. Furthermore, Assumption2.2.1allows us to use a normal distribution as mollifier
at reference pointxr . For purposes of exposition we assume that the mollifier vanishes forx> |xr |.
Thus, in anε-neighbourhoodBε(xr) centered arxr with ε ∼ N (0,σ2ε ), for x ∈ Bε(xr), we have
x= xr + ε whereE[x] = xr andV(x) = σ2ε . This allows us to use aZ-transformation of outcome
spaceX such thatZ =
X−xr
σε
. So the reference pointxr is transformed to reference point 0 in
Z transform space. If we chooseX = {x|0 ≤ x ≤ 2xr}, then the mollifier condition is such that
it has compact support on−xr/σε ≤ z≤ xr/σε and vanishes outside of that set. Thus,(xr) 7→
u(0) andu(x) 7→ u(z) = u((x− xr)/σε) where lower casez is an observedZ-score. Moreover,
u(−xr/σε) ≤ u(z)≤ u(xr/σε). Note that∆εr u(xr) = u(xr + ε)−u(xr) = α1Z+α2χ is the change
in utility measured on the vertical axis relative to reference utilityu(xr) whereχ is aχ2 r.v. So the
change in utility is a mixture distribution.
Endogenous outcome dependent probability weighting functions
Claim: If subjects overweight low ranked outcomes, then we expect that if the probability
supported by 0≤ x ≤ xr is p, then the probability supported by the projected utility interval
0≤ u(x)≤ u(xr) will be larger thanp. We prove this claim as follows.
We consider the probabilistic relationships





≤ 0}= p (2.4.4)
Pr{xr < x≤ ∞}= Pr{0< z≤ ∞}= 1− p (2.4.5)
Recall that the mollifier vanishes forx> |xr |, i.e., it is zero overxr/σε < z≤ ∞ in (2.4.5). Hence
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the relationship in (2.4.5) supports the corresponding probability relationships on the vertical axis:
Pr{u(xr + ε)> u(xr)}= Pr{u(xr + ε)−u(xr)> 0} (2.4.6)






















where fk(x) is the probability density function for aχ2-distribution withk degrees of freedom. In









> p. Recall thatxr 7→ 0 in Z-space so the latter inequality
is consistent with values to the right of the reference pointxr . After substitution of the Arrow-Pratt
risk measure from (2.4.3), the inequality in (2.4.10) becomes






















fk(x)dx= 1− p (2.4.12)
We are interested in the probabilistic relationship Pr{0≤ u(x)≤ u(xr)}. This is functionally equiv-
alent to Pr{∆−εr u(xr)≤ 0}=Pr{0≤ u(x−ε)≤ u(xr)} for 0≤ x≤ xr , asε runs through the interval
[0,xr ]. By virtue of the symmetry of the mollifier around the reference pointxr , we have from
(2.4.12)
Pr{∆−εr u(xr)≤ 0}= 1−Pr{∆εr u(xr)> 0} (2.4.13)
=⇒ Pr{∆−εr u(xr)≤ 0}> 1− (1− p) = p (2.4.14)
A similar argument to the ones above hold for risk seekers. In that caseα2 > 0 and the direction
of the inequalities above change. Sincexr was arbitrary, asxr runs throughX, andp runs through
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Figure 2.8is a sketch of the probability weighting function induced by our risk
averter inFigure 2.6. Figure 2.9is a sketch of the probability weighting function
induced by our risk seeker inFigure 2.7. Our ranking of outcomes is from worst to
best. InWakker(2010, p. 174) the ranking of outcomes is from best to worse so
concavity implies optimism and convexity implies pessimism.
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the interval 0,1], the corresponding pwf that overweighs in (2.4.12) and underweighs in (2.4.14) is
traced.
So according to (2.4.14) low ranked outcomes less thatxr are underweighted and high
ranked outcomes abovexr are overweighted. Thus, our claim is proved. Interestingly, the Arrow-
Pratt risk measure for outcomes is embedded in the probabilistic statements above, e.g., (2.4.12).
Thus establishing a nexus between utility risk aversion and probabilistic risk aversion. So in addi-
tion to probability distortionw(p), pwfs are outcome dependent. Thus, we established:
Proposition 2.4.2(Probability distortion). Risk averters overweight low ranked outcomes, and un-
derweight high ranked outcomes. Risk seekers underweight low ranked outcomes, and overweight
high ranked outcomes. Probability weighting functions are outcome dependent functions of type
w(p,x) where x is ranked outcome, and p is the cumulative probability that corresponds to the
ranked outcome.
The predictions of Proposition2.4.2are depicted inFigure 2.8andFigure 2.9. This probability
weighting scenario lies at the heart of rank dependent utility theory (RDU) popularized byQuiggin
(1982, 1993). To the best of our knowledge, the proof of Proposition2.4.2based on mollifiers cen-
tered at a reference point is new to the literature. Armed with Propositions2.4.1and 2.4.2one can
see that probability weighting functions are useful devices for analyzing tail risks.Wakker(2010)
provides a review of the “likelihood insensitivity” induced by tail risk. That is, outcomes near rank
extremities are overweighted or underweighted accordingly, while outcomes in the “middle” ranks
are relatively flat compared to the linear probability associated with expected utility.
Explaining economic experiments results on skewness preferences
Kraus and Litsenberger(1976, p. 1086) argued for a class of utility functions that accommodates
risk averse investors while at the same time allowing for third moments. Their reason for doing so
is based on factors that support concave utility functions.Golec and Tamarkin(1998) proposed a
cubic utility model in which they interpreted the coefficients of polynomial terms as risk attitude
parameters. They tested that specification with data on horse race track betting and found that
























































































































































A recent experimental study bẙAstebro et al.(2015) used a structural model, based on
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)25 andPrelec(1998) model of probability weighting, to test
the skewness preference hypothesis. Prelec’s two-factor pwf is(p) = exp(−β (− ln p)α) where
β controls elevation, i.e., degree of optimism, andα controls curvature, i.e., degree of likelihood
insensitivity. For 0< β < 1 the pwf captures optimism. Forβ > 1 pessimism. If 0< α < 1, then
the pwf is inverse S-shaped like inFigure 2.8. Forα > 1 the shape is skewed S-shaped like that in
Figure 2.9. On the basis of those structures,Åstebro et al.(2015) found that, among other things,
subjects made riskier choices when lotteries displayed positive skew. They identified probabilistic
risk seeking, i.e., the shape of probability weighting functions is as inFigure 2.9, as the explanatory
factor for this behaviour. However, they claimed that their study found no evidence of utility based
risk seeking.
According to Proposition2.4.1one can introduce skewness and kurtosis in preference
based models without resorting to third order expansion by virtue of inclusion of theχ2-factor.
This observation seems to have escaped analysts who use third order expansions. For example,
the probability relationships in (2.4.12) show that likelihood insensitivity or tail risk is controlled
by the presence of the Arrow-Pratt risk measurerA(xr) in the probabilistic statement. That risk
measure is negative for risk seekers and positive for risk averters. Thus,Åstebro et al.(2015) mis-
interpreted their results when they claimed to have found evidence of optimism (from probabilistic
risk attitude factors) but not risk loving (from convex utility) among the subjects in their experi-
ments.Figure 2.7plainly shows that a convex utility function induces an optimistic pwf so the two
are substitutes for each other. A finding for one is equivalent to a finding for the other. The more
likely explanation is that the̊Astebro et al.(2015) econometric specification may have crowded out
the convex utility factor. This is all the more likely given their finding that “[t]here are significant
rates of decision errors” (p. 203) among subjects in their experiments.
2.4.3 Probabilistic preference for skewness in US and South Africa income growth
This section provides empirical evidence that support our theory of skewed distributions induced
by risk attitudes over mollifiers centered at reference points.
25Under CRRAu(x) = x1−rA/(1− rA) whererA is Arrow-Pratt risk measure.
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Figure 2.10represents the distribution of US real income growth fitted to abattery of
candidate probability density functions. Refer to Appendix2.D.3 for computer diagnostics on
fits. All the fitted distributions are leptokurtic–a characteristic ofα-stable distributions, and they
are candidate mollifiers. The Cauchy distribution emerges as one of the best fitted distributions.
We applied the RIH procedure inhered in Theorem2.3.2 to generate a distribution of income
growth relative to a 5-years standard of living. Thus,Mt is ade factoreference point. We fitted a
battery of probability distributions to the transformed distribution as shown inFigure 2.11. Refer
to Appendix2.D.4 for computer diagnostics on fits. Cursory inspection shows that the geometry
of Figure 2.6and predictions of Proposition2.4.1are bourne out. Most important, theα-stable
prediction in Theorem2.2.6for the MLA index also has currency.
Figure 2.12depicts the probability distribution functions fitted to South Africa PCE growth
data. Again, the Cauchy distribution emerges as a fitted probability distribution function. Consis-
tent with Figure 2.6and Propositon2.4.1the underlying probability distribution is distorted by
risk attitudes about outcomes.
It should be noted that the analyses above apply equally toFigure 2.7. In Appendix2.C.3
and Appendix2.C.4, Figure 2.38andFigure 2.39depict a “reflection effect” (Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979, p. 268) for growth rates. That is, the signs of the growth ratesr changed. Substitution
of the reflection growth rates would reverse the direction of the skew in the analysis above to
characterize risk seeking behaviour depicted inFigure 2.7.
2.5 Application to income and consumption growth
In this section we provide a simple apparatus for estimating the MLA index with time series data
for income and consumption. We derive a “marked MLA index process”26 and introduce some
new results and econometric tests for MLA index behaviour.
Data on real income and consumption growth are characterized by runs. For example, in
26Data from a marked point process are represented by(t j ,X(t j)) where the time-point j of observing the phenomenon is
generated by a process independent of the process generatingX. The idea behind the term “marked MLA index process” is that
some independent event in the economy causes a run of losses and gains in income, relative to a reference income, from which an
MLA index can be computed. This event is a “mark” that can be modelled as a random variable attached tot j . Refer toCox and
Isham(1980, p. 131) for illustrate examples of marked point process. Marked point processes are outside the scope of this paper.
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periods of increasing income we can expect to see runs of positive relative income growthgGt .
For falling incomes, we would see runs of negative income growthgLt . These runs are mani-
festations of information based economic activity. Assume that there are a total ofK n n-zero
runs each of lengthnk generated by an arbitrary time series of lengthT, wherek = 1, . . . ,K and
T = n1+ · · ·+nK. According to (2.3.6) the loss aversion index is characterized by a gain-loss pair
(gGt ,g
L
t ). De Neve et al.(2015, p. 19) used the phrase “macroeconomic loss aversion” to recom-
mend that “future research should consider positive and negative economic growth rates separately
in piecewise analyses in order to more accurately interpret the gradient for the general relation-
ship between economic growth rates and subjective well-being.” That statement is functionally
equivalent to Theorem2.2.2which contemplates the estimatorλ = ḡL/ḡG. Thus, we propose the
following estimation strategy for the “macroeconomic loss aversion” index in our study.
2.5.1 An empirical strategy for constructing the MLA index process
We illustrate the procedure for implementing Theorem2.2.2in discrete time with the following ex-












is an observed sequence of losses
(gL <0), and gains(gG> 0) adjacent to, and separated from, each other by the local reference point
0, i.e.,gL−1 < 0< g
G
1 . The negative subscript is used to highlight the fact that the runs are to the left




−1)/3 is the average
over the run (or block) of losses; andḡG = (gG1 +g
G
2 )/2 the average over the run (or block) of gains.
According to Theorem2.2.2, the MLA index estimator in correspondence with the joint block f
gains and losses iŝλ = −ḡL/ḡG. We reiterate with a numerical example. Consider the sequence
of losses and gains:−0.04,−0.02,−0.03, 0, 0.01, 0.02. HereḡL = −(0.04+0.02+0.02)/3=
−0.03 andḡG = (0.01+0.02)/2= 0.015. Hencêλ =−(−0.03/0.015)= 2.0. We abstract from
this procedure below.
Axiom 2 (Blocks of growth). Every economic time series generates a block or run of negative
(loss) growth rates followed by a block or run of positive (gain) growth rates.
Let gL
t2k−1i
be the observation at timeti included in the 2k−1 “marked block” of losses. For
example, the block is marked by some random event in the economy which generated the run of
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losses. For notational convenience we writet2k−1i instead of−t2k−1i . It being understood that the
observed block of negative growth (gL < 0) is to the left of the local reference point 0. SogL
t2k−1i
is
a random variable. It is the “marked observation” at timet2k−1i where the latter should read timeti
in the “marked block” 2k−1 for i = 1,2, . . . ,n2k−1. Let gGt2kj be the observation at timet j included
in the adjacent 2k block (separated from the 2k−1 block by local reference point 0) of gains where
j = 1,2, . . . ,n2k. Here, the observed marked block of positive growth (gG > 0) are to the right of
the local reference point 0. Similarly,gG
t2kj
is a random variable. We use even and odd subscripts
for blocks to emphasize their non-overlapping feature.
Definition 2.5.1 (Topology of gains and losses). Let BL2k−1 and B
G
2k be adjacent open sets or
marked blocks of growth rates for losses and gains, respectively, in a univariate time series ofT
growth rates. LetN = {n1, . . . ,n2K−1,n2K} be the set ofK block lengths, andT = n1+ · · ·+
n2K−1+n2K . Son2k−1 ∈ N is the number of observations inBL2k−1, andn2k ∈ N is the number
of observations inBG2k. Thus, we have
B
L





































, . . . ,gGt2kn2k
}
is the joint distribution of growth rates that generate the(k−1)th MLA index. And⊕ is the global
concatenation operation that reconstructs the joint distribution of growth rates for the entire time
seriesBT in (2.5.2). HereB0 is the (closed) zero set comprised of the local reference point 0
common to all blocks.
Lemma 2.5.1(MLA index operation). There exist an operatorLk−1 such thatLk−1 : B2k−1,2k −→
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λk−1.
Remark2.5.1. After dropping the subscriptk−1, the “existence” operationL is decomposed into
the operationsL= Ldiv⋆Ladd. In matrix operator termsLdiv is a 1×2 matrix, andLadd is a 2×n
matrix where the elements of each matrix are suitably defined for an×1 vectorv comprised of
gains and losses such thatv ∈ B2k−1,2k. For example, one row ofLadd contains 1’s that pick up
gains, and the other row contains -1 that pick up losses, with zeros used as filler for non-gains and
non-losses in each row. Thus, ifv= [g1,g2,g3,−g4,−g5]T is 5×1 then the 2×5 matrix for addition
is Ladd = [ 1 1 1 0 00 0 0 −1 −1]. The elements of theL
div = [0, 32 ∑
3
i=1 gi ] matrix are suitably defined to
compute the MLA index from the column(s) ofLaddv. Soλ̂ = Lv = (∑2i=1gi/2)/(∑
3
i=1gi/3)




= 0 or gG
t2kj
= 0}, i = 1,2, . . . ,n2k−1, j = 1,2, . . . ,n2k (2.5.4)
Here,B̃0 contains the event of zero growth included in a block of losses or gains where such zero
growthis not a reference point. That is, it does not separate gains and losses but is containedw thin
a gain or loss block accordingly. The foregoing gain-loss topology set the stage for the following
Theorem 2.5.2(Empirical MLA index). LetBT be an observed sequence of growth rates(g) for

















The empirical myopic loss aversion index estimator generated by the operationLk−1 onB2k−1,2k,




, k= 1, . . . ,K, λ0 = 0 (2.5.7)
In particular, the sequence of ordered pairs(ḡLn1, ḡ
G




n2k) generates the distribution
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{λ̂1, . . . , λ̂K−1} of MLA index estimates from the operationsL1 : B1,2 → λ1 ,. . .,Lk−1 : B2k−1,2k →
λk−1.
Remark2.5.2. In this setup, the sequence always starts with a block of losses followed by a block
of gains–the two blocks being separated by 0 and so on. One weakness of the procedure is that it is
sensitive to the starting block. So if we start with a block of gains followed by a block of losses, we
will generate different MLA index estimates compared to if we start with a block of loss followed
by a block of gains. So the estimates are not “ordinal independent”.
By virtue of the above, we claim thatλ̂k−1 is iid.
Proposition 2.5.3(MLA index independence). The distribution{λ̂1, . . . , λ̂K−1} of MLA index es-
timates, generated by the operationsL1 : B1,2 → λ1 ,. . ., Lk−1 : B2k−1,2k → λk−1, is independent
and identically distributed.
Proof. See Appendix2.B.5.
Functional implications of lognormally distributed income
In keeping with the literature on income and consumption, we assume that income is lognormally
distributed (seeBattistin et al.(2009) for a recent review of the literature). Thus, we assume













e.g.,Borowiak and Shapiro(2014, p. 26) for details. Thus, ifY=1 at the start of a given period, and
g is income growth over the period, then at the end of the periodY = 1+g and lnY = ln(1+g)≈
g∼ N (µy,σ2y ). Accordingly, we make the following
Assumption 2.5.4(Lognormal income). Income Yt is lognormally distributed, and income growth
gY is normally distributed.
It is known that if the numerator and denominator in (2.5.7) are normally distributed then
λ̂k has a standard Cauchy distribution characterized by probability density functionf (λ ) = [π(1+







asymptotically normal consistent estimator for sample sizen (Serfling, 1980, p. 85). However, the
numerator and denominator are drawn from a truncated normal. Vizly, gains from the right half
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and losses from the left half. By symmetry, gains and losses aredr wn from the same law (Çinlar,
2011, p. 331). So the ratio is actually a truncated or generalized Cauchy distribution which lies
entirely in the positive quadrant. Thus, our estimator is consistent with the predictions of Theorem
2.2.6. We summarize this formally.
Proposition 2.5.5(Statistical test for MLA index). Let Y∈ BT be a lognormally distributed real-
ization of income with growth rate gY ∼ N (µy,σ2y ) in the reference point basis set Bε(µy) under
assumption2.2.1. Let µy be a reference point, and define gL = I{gY<µy} and g
G = I{gY>µy}. We







Proof. See Theorem2.2.6andWalck (2007, Ch. 7, p. 31).






(Q3−Q1) whereQ3−Q1 is the interquartile range for̂λ . We setb = 1 for standard







Motivated by Theorem2.2.6we introduce the following processes.
Definition 2.5.2 (Subordinator). (Çinlar, 2011, p. 279) LetS= (St)t∈R+ be an increasing right-
continuous stochastic process with state spaceR+ andS0 = 0. It is said to be an increasing Lévy
process (or subordinator) if
(a) the incrementsSt1 −St0, St2 −St1,. . . ,Stn −Stn−1 are independent forn≥ 2 and 0≤ t0 < t1 <
· · ·< tn, and
(b) the distribution of the incrementSt+u−St is the same as that ofSu for everyt andu in R+.
The property (a) is called the independence of increments, and (b) the stationarity of the incre-
ments.
Definition 2.5.3 (Cauchy process). (Çinlar, 2011). Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space where
Ω is a sample space,P is a probability measure onΩ, andF is theσ -field of Borel measurable
subsets ofΩ. Let Ta be the first crossing time of levela for the running maximum of a Brownian
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motionBt , i.e.,Mt(ω) = max0≤s≤t Bs(ω) for someω ∈ Ω. Thus, we have
Ta(ω) = inf{t > 0; Mt(ω)> a} (2.5.8)
Mt(ω) = inf{a> 0; Ta(ω)> t} (2.5.9)
If Wt(ω) is a Brownian motion independent ofBt(ω), thenCut (ω) =WTa(ω) is a Cauchy process
that depends on the subordinatorTa.
The next proposition follows readily from Theorem2.2.6, Proposition 2.5.3, and Proposition
2.5.5
Proposition 2.5.6 (MLA index as Cauchy r.v). The MLA index estimator̂λ admits a Cauchy
random variable (r.v.).
Proof. See Appendix2.B.6.
Assumption2.5.4implies thatYt admits a Geometric Brownian motion (GBM). Thus, the
Cauchy process induced by lognormally distributed income can be modelled as a subordinate or
time changed GBMCut (ω) = WYTa for some GBMW
Y
t (ω). Refer toKaratzas and Shreve(1991,
p. 174) for details on time changed Brownian motion. Hence, Axiom1 i plies that intolerance to
decline in standard of living can be modelled as the running maximum of a Cauchy process. We
state that formally as
Theorem 2.5.7(Intolerance to decline in standard of living). If CYt (ω) is the Cauchy process
induced by myopic loss aversion, then the subordinate process CY
⋆
t (ω) = max0<s<t CYt (ω) mimics
a decision maker’s intolerance to decline in standard of living.
2.5.2 Statistical tests of MLA index estimator theory
In this subsection we provide the results of statistical tests of ourα-stable theory of the MLA
index. The tests are applied to published data from surveys, a meta study, and our own estimates






















































































































Table 2.1: Diagnostics for MLA index around the world
Statistic Value Percentile Value
Sample Size 45 Min 1
Range 4.5 5% 1.132
Mean 2.0731 10% 1.318
Variance 0.63346 25% (Q1) 1.635
Std. Deviation 0.7959 50% (Median) 2
Coef. of Variation 0.38392 75% (Q3) 2.06
Std. Error 0.11865 90% 3.132
Skewness 2.2889 95% 3.832
Excess Kurtosis 7.3994 Max 5.5
Fitting the distribution of MLA indexes around the world
Summary statistics for α-stability of MLA indexes around the world
To illustrate the robustness of our theory, we analyze the MLA index estimates for loss aversion
around the world published inRieger et al.(2011, Table 2, p. 7). The data is reproduced in Ap-
pendix 2.C.1. Those numbers were generated from hypothetical choices in a survey instrument
administered to mostly university students in forty-five different countries. All the index values
are greater than or equal to 1.0 with a maximum of 5.5 reported for Georgia.
The descriptive statistics inTable 2.1indicate that the distribution of MLA index estimates
is skewed (skewness coeff.=2.2889) and leptokurtic (excess kurtosis = 7.3994).Figure 2.14shows
the ten best distributions fitted to the world MLA index data. Refer to Appendix2.D.6for details
on distribution ranks and fits. All the distributions are members of theα-stable class popularized
in the actuarial science and economics literatures (Samoradnitsky and Taqqu, 1994; Kleiber and
Kotz, 2003). In fact, the generalized Cauchy distribution with MLE scale
△
σ = 0.21558, and MLE
location
△
µ = 1.9422), is ranked as the best fitting distribution by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and
Chi-squared goodness of fit tests, and ranked as the fourth best fitted distribution by the Anderson-
Darling27 goodness of fit test.
Fitting the Fishburn-Kochenberger MLA index metatstudy data
27This is a nonparametric goodness of fit test that is sensitive to tail behaviour in distributions. Refer toAnderson and Darling
(1954).
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Kahneman and Tversky(1979, p. 280) referenced theFishburn and Kochenberger(1979) metas-
tudy as one of many pieces of evidence which supports their loss aversion theory. The MLA index
estimates in that metastudy were generated from data points collected from eyeballing plots in
published papers. Thus, the data is quite noisy. Nonetheless, they employed a procedure, related to
Theorem2.2.2in this paper, to estimate local piecewise linear (“two-piece”) utility functions. The
majority of functions were concave over gains and convex over losses. The Fishburn-Kochenberger
procedure provides contrast to the distribution of MLA indexes obtained from hypothetical choice
data in survey instruments in theRieger et al.(2011) study described above.
Table 2.2: Diagnostics for Fishurn-Kochenberger
MLA index metastudy data
Statistic Value Percentile Value
Sample Size 30 Min 0.8
Range 164.4 5% 1.295
Mean 12.34 10% 1.83
Variance 876.65 25% (Q1) 2.825
Std. Deviation 29.608 50% (Median) 4.85
Coef. of Variation 2.3994 75% (Q3) 7.725
Std. Error 5.4057 90% 22.96
Skewness 5.0684 95% 87.925
Excess Kurtosis 26.809 Max 165.2
Summary statistics forα-stability of MLA index metastudy data
The descriptive statistics inTable 5.3are for the loss aversion index estimates reported inFish-
burn and Kochenberger(1979, Tales 1A, 1B, pp. 508-509) for their two-piece linear(L−L+) local
utility function. Conceptually, the “two-piece(L−L+)” is functionally equivalent to the piecewise
linearized utility function depicted inFigure 2.1. The statistics show that the index is right skewed
and extremely leptokurtic. TheFishburn and Kochenberger(1979) data were best fitted to a Log
Pearson Type III distribution (p = 0.32514 for Anderson-Darling goodness of fit statistic). How-




µ = 4.1153) which was not
rejected at thep= 0.20 level for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Chi-squared test statistic. Refer to
Appendix2.D.5for details on function ranks and fits.28
28 Fishburn and Kochenberger(1979) also reported extreme values for the loss aversion index, i.e., λ = 3300,λ = ∞ for a two-
































US MLA index for intolerance to decline of standard of living
Figure 2.16depicts a plot of the empirical MLA index for US monthly real income computed ac-
cording to Theorem2.5.2. The plot is based on a “marked time series” constructed by replacing
the elements of eachBL2k−1 set with the loss aversion index̂λk−1 generated fromB2k−1,2k. The
observations in theBG2k component of that block were “zeroed out”. In that way the MLA index
is restricted to loss domain. That procedure gave the plot a tableau look over losses. The explo-
sive values for the index, in or around 2004, coincides with Hurricanes Charlie and Ivan which
resulted in many deaths. Hurricane Katrina was even more devastating in 2005. In 2008, the Great
Recession 2008 with prolonged effect.







































































































































































































































The MLA index in (2.3.5) is estimated over monthly real disposable income in US by dividing the average
relative growth rate for loss of income by the average relative growth rate for gains in income for
60-months sliding windows between 2000:10 and 2012:11. The loss aversion index is time and state
dependent. Its value is backfilled and displayed in the plot over periods with loss of income.
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Summary statistics forα-stability of US MLA index
Table 2.3provides descriptive statistics for the US MLA index estimated in accord with The-
orem 2.5.2. The excess kurtosis of 6.3515 confirms that the MLA index is leptokurtic. Even
though the median MLA index value of 1.9163 is consistent with that reported in the behavioural
and experimental economics literature, the mean is over 3 times as large and the variance is quite
high. These are characteristics of anα-stable distribution.
Table 2.3: Diagnostics for US MLA index
Statistic Value Percentile Value
Sample Size 14 Min 0.13896
Range 33.862 5% 0.13896
Mean 6.2046 10% 0.14787
Variance 85.959 25% (Q1) 0.90275
Std. Deviation 9.2714 50% (Median) 1.9163
Coef. of Variation 1.4943 75% (Q3) 8.2694
Std. Error 2.4779 90% 25.349
Skewness 2.4209 95% 34.001
Excess Kurtosis 6.3515 Max 34.001
Figure 2.17is an empirical plot of the US MLA index series adjusted for the mdian
MLA index value of 2.25. So thatf (λ̂) = 1/[π(1+ (λ̂ − 2.25)2)]. The plot provides a visual
image for the descriptive statistics inTable 2.3. However, the MLE estimates for a generalized
Cauchy distribution returned
△
σ = 1.4716 for the scale parameter, and
△
µ = 1.6182 for measure of
location. Three popular goodness of fit measures: Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Anderson-Darling, and
Chi-squared tests, upheld the generalized Cauchy fit at thep= 0.05 level.
Statistical tests for US MLA index independence
Proposition 2.5.3posits that the MLA index is independent. Consequently, we should not








where the subscripts for̂λ emphasize that MLA indexes were estimated in accord with the set
B2k−1,2k, k= 1, . . . ,K. The intercept term is statistically significant atp= 0.05 but the coefficient
on the autoregressive term is not statistically different from 0 at thep= 0.438 level, i.e., we could
not reject the null hypothesisH0 : β = 0. Hence, the proposition is upheld at thep = .05 level.
Figure 2.40in Appendix2.C.5provides a plot of the relationship.
Figure 2.17: Empirical distribution of US MLA index
f (λ̂ ) = 1
π[1+(λ̂−2.25)2]


































Table 2.4provides further diagnostic tests for the MLA index. We compared test results
for the median-value hypothesisH0 : λ = 2.25 vs. Ha : H0 not true, for three variations of the
asymptotic distribution for the sample median of a Cauchy distribution: standard Cauchy, robust
Cauchy, and generalized Cauchy. Keeping in mind that the tests statistics contemplate large sam-
ples while our sample size is small atn= 14. At thep= 0.01 level the standard Cauchy failed to









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































South Africa’s numbers are generated from personal consumption expenditure
in 2010 prices.
and its MLE counterpart upheld nine out of fourteen or 64% of the estimated MLA index values.
In this case the standard Cauchy over rejectedH0. This may be because that test statistic
fails to take the scale parameter into account. The scale parameter is related to the interquartile
range for the robust Cauchy statistic, and it influences the MLE Cauchy statistic.
ZA MLA index for intolerance to decline of standard of living
Summary statistics for α-stability of South Africa MLA index
Figure 2.18depicts a plot of the empirical MLA index for South Africa quarterly semidurable
PCE data computed according to Theorem2.5.2. 29 Cursory inspection of the plot shows that
it is explosive around the time of the Soweto uprisings in 1976, P. W. Botha’s hardliner Rubicon
29We restate here the description used insection 2.5.2The plot is based on a pseudo time series which was constructed by
replacing the elements of eachBL2k−1 with the loss aversion index̂λk−1 computed from concatenation blockB2k−1,2k. The
observations in theBG2k component of that block were “zeroed out”. In that way the MLA index only corresponds to losses. That
procedure gave the plot a tableau look over losses.
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speech around 1985, and pre-democracy talks with the African National Congress (ANC) in the
early 1990s. Thus, the index is sensitive to political uncertainty.
Table 2.5: Diagnostics for South Africa MLA index
Statistic Value Percentile Value
Sample Size 16 Min 0.07807
Range 20.315 5% 0.07807
Mean 2.4611 10% 0.09636
Variance 26.705 25% (Q1) 0.27523
Std. Deviation 5.1677 50% (Median) 0.66892
Coef. of Variation 2.0997 75% (Q3) 1.5212
Std. Error 1.2919 90% 11.842
Skewness 3.2348 95% 20.393
Excess Kurtosis 10.911 Max 20.393
Statistical tests for South Africa MLA index independence
A weak form test of Proposition2.5.3for MLA index independence was conducted with a






where the subscripts for̂λ emphasize that MLA indexes were estimated in accord with the set
B2k−1,2k, k = 1, . . . ,K. The intercept term is statistically significant at thep= 0.10 level sôλ is
independent. However, the coefficient on the autoregressive term is not statistically different from
0 at thep= 0.679 level. A plot of this relationship is presented in Appendix2.C.6.
Figure 2.19is an empirical plot of the South Africa MLA index series adjusted for the
median MLA index value of 2.25. So thatf (λ̂ ) = 1/[π(1+(λ̂ −2.25)2)]. The plot provides a
visual image for the descriptive statistics inTable 2.5. The MLE estimates for a generalized Cauchy
distribution for South Africa data are
△
σ = 0.36797 for the scale parameter, and
△
µ = 0.57702 for
measure of location. Three popular goodness of fit measures: Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Anderson-
Darling, and Chi-squared tests, uniformly upheld the generalized Cauchy fit at thep= 0.05 level.
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Figure 2.19: Empirical distribution of South Africa MLA index
f (λ̂ ) = 1
π[1+(λ̂−2.25)2]





























Table 2.6displays the results of statistical tests for whether South Africa MLE index values
are statistically equivalent to the median value of 2.25. The robust Cauchy test uniformly rejected
the South Africa MLA index values as being statistically equivalent to 2.25. The standard Cauchy
and MLE Cauchy upheld the null hypothesis in only two of the sixteen or 12.5% of the values at
p= 0.05. Most of the MLA index values were less than 1. This implies that South Africans tend
to be risk (gain) seeking (Wakker, 2010). That is, their utility function is convex over gain domain
and steeper than that for loss domain. In the context of (2.3.5) this implies that the impact of loss
of income on consumption is much lower than it would be for a similar loss in the US. Here, the
standard Cauchy and MLE Cauchy upheld the same values at thep= 0.05 level. For US data, the


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.5.3 Macroeconomic loss aversion and cross-country uncertainty avoidance
The Hofstede uncertainty avoidance index (UAI is a popular measure of cross-cultural attitudes
towards uncertainty in the literature on international business. It is computed from survey item
response and data reduction techniques like cluster analysis (Hof tede, 1983).30 The survey is
typically given to employees in a sample of firms within a given country and the UAI score is
assigned to the country. For example, the US UAI score is 46 while that for South Africa is 49 and
the international business literature treats the two countries as if their attitudes towards uncertainty
is similar. Hofstede(1983, p. 53) provides details on the theory and credits the 1963 edition of
Cyert and March(1992) with the phrase “uncertainty avoidance”.
Our cross-country analysis of loss aversion between the US and South Africa provides
contrast to UAI type survey item response, and use of incentivized experiments in measuring risk
attitudes.Anderson and Mellor(2009) found that risk preferences were not stable across survey
response and incentivized experiments for the subjects in their experiments.Sahm(2012) finds that
risk preference is stable at the level of the individual but very heterogeneous among individuals
from the survey item responses in her study. However,Coppola(2014) finds that domain specific
surveys are more effective in eliciting risk preferences in some situations. The empirical evidence
in income and consumption data for US and South Africa in our study show that risk attitudes
in the two countries are markedly different from that reported in surveys and experiments. So
our empirical strategy provides a mechanism for measuring macroeconomic risk attitudes like loss
aversion with hard economic data. This allows for a more internally consistent method for cross-
country risk attitude comparison up to measurement error in macroeconomic data.
2.6 Application to information based asset pricing
In this section we show how the MLA index applies to information based asset pricing. It serves
double duty as jumps in a subordinate Cauchy process for information flows in asset pricing of
defaultable binary bonds, and as the source of loss aversion to default. Unless otherwise stated we
30Refer to Hofstede indexhttp://www.clearlycultural.com/geert-hofstede-cultural-dimensions/uncertainty-avoidance-index/The
index is computed from a formulaUAI = 40× (Q18−Q15)+25× (Q21−Q24)+C whereC is a constant, andQ# is the average
item response for questionQ# in the Values Survey 2013 Module available athttp://www.geerthofstede.nl/vsm2013.
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make the standard assumption that uncertainty in the model is chara terized by a probability space
(Ω,F ,F,P) whereΩ is the underlying sample space,F is aσ -field of Borel measurable subsets
of Ω, F is a filtration of informationFs⊂ Ft , s< t, andP is a probability measure.
2.6.1 MLA and Cauchy information flow for defaultable binary bonds
Preliminaries
To fix ideas we define a defaultable binary bond over a finite duration[0,T] as one which has a
terminal cash flowHT ∈ {h0, h1}. The creditor recoversh0 upon default with probabilityp0 or she
receives the contracted amounth1 with probability p1 wherep0+ p1 = 1. SoHT is based on a
binary outcome: default or no-default. LetPtT be a discount factor, andBtT be the bond price at
time t < T. We assume that information flows with an “activity rate”c. The bond is thinly traded
whenc is small so the price moves only when there is new information that affects the beliefs of
traders. Refer toClark(1973) for an early review of the activity rate or trading times concept. More
recent models byCarr and Wu(2004) use the phrase “business time” to distinguish the activity rate
from “clock time” in their option price model based on subordinate Lévy processes.Cartea and
Jaimungal(2013) used marked point processes to model activity rate in a marketmicrostructure
model of high frequency trading.
Defaultable binary bond pricing
The price of the bond is given by
BtT = PtTE
P[HT |Ft ] (2.6.1)
The goal of information based asset pricing is to characterize the information inFt with a suitable
stochastic process. For instance,Hoyle (2010, §7) model information flow with a Cauchy random
bridge (CRB) among other candidate bridge processes.Hoyle et al.(2011) model the information
flow as a Lévy random bridge (LRB) process. More recent,Ikpe et al.(2014) extended the model to
more abstract processes based on a conditioning information theory. Our contribution extends the
information process to myopic loss aversion to default that mimic jumps in a Cauchy information
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process.
Figure 2.20: A Cauchy process sample path
ht ps:/ almostsure.wordpress.com/2011/02 25 properties-o -f l ve y-processes/ more-1052
Figure 5: A Cauchy processSource:https://almostsure.wordpress.com/2011/02/25/properties-of-levy-processes/#more-1052
Figure 2.20depicts a simulated Cauchy processCYt (ω). In Theorem 2.5.7, the process
CY
⋆
t (ω) is comprised solely of the positive jumps ofCYt (ω) and remains flat otherwise.





















































































































































































































Figure 2.22: South Africa MLA










































































































































































































































The subordinate “credit risk index” processCY
⋆
t (ω) is comprised solely of the
independent (positive) jumps of the Cauchy processCYt (ω) and remains flat
otherwise. The positive jumps are the MLA index estimates for US and South Africa
constructed from the activity rate in the setB2k−1,k defined in Definition2.5.1, and
rationalized in Propositions2.5.3and 2.5.6.
Figure 2.21andFigure 2.22depict theCY
⋆
t (ω) process for US and South Africa. In the context of
information based asset pricing,CY
⋆
t (ω) is functionally equivalent to a macroeconomic credit risk
index. Its jumps reflect fear of loss motivated by some “credit event” in the economy. By virtue of
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Figure 2.23: US MLA synthetic Credit




































































































































US MLA Credit Risk Index FNMA Price
Figure 2.24: Lehman Brothers Credit
Default Swap Prices and Asset Price Paths
Figure 2.23depicts a cross-plot of our synthetic credit risk index based on the subordinate
Cauchy bridge processCY
⋆
t (ω). The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) had a lot
of mortgage default exposure leading up to the Great Recession of 2008. That information was
impounded in the asset price. Jumps inCY
⋆
t (ω) coincide with credit events arising from natural
disasters and financial market instability.Figure 2.24is a cross-plot of Lehman Brothers credit
default swap (CDS) risk premia, and Lehman Brothers asset price in the months leading up to the
financial crisis. Positive jumps in the CDS risk premium coincide with drops in the asset price.
Figure 2.25: Binary bond path process



















The MLA index estimator̂λ mimics independentpositive jumpsof a
Cauchy bridgeCtT(ω).
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Propositions2.5.3and 2.5.6, the MLA index estimator̂λ mimics independentpositive jumpsof
the subordinate Cauchy processCY
⋆






Figure 2.23depict cross plots of the asset price for the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA) which had a large exposure to mortgage default leading up to the financial crisis in 2008.
Figure 2.24is a similar plot for Lehman Brothers in the months preceding their bankruptcy. In
each case the credit risk index jumps up when there is a credit event, and the asst price drops.
Thus, lending support to our claim that positive jumps in a suitable credit index process mimic
loss aversion to default. We provide a sketch of the binary bond pricing process inFigure 2.25.
Anticipated bad news increases trade activity. According to Definition2.5.1, bad news causes a
run of typeBL2k−1 and induces an MLA index estimatêλ from B2k−1,2k. The default path follows
a “bridge” or “tied down” process fromB0T until default ath0. The non-default path ends at
h1. Throughout the life of the default path, each jump in the information process signals investor
pessimism and fear of loss.
Figure 2.26: Subordinate Cauchy
information processes forc= 10−3


































Information process when activity rate for
information arrivalc= 10−3
Figure 2.27: Defaultable bond price paths
for c= 10−3








































Bond price when activity rate for
information arrivalc= 10−3
Source:Hoyle (2010, p. 112). Positive jumps in the Cauchy bridge process mimic theMLA index. As
default date approaches for the bond, the information flow is pessimistic with persistent loss aversion.
For example, the jumps att − k, t − r andt are represented by the MLA index random variables
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λ̂t−k, λ̂t−r and λ̂t , respectively. The cumulative effect of this pessimism, i.e.,(λ̂t−k+ λ̂t−r + λ̂t ,
coincides with the default date atT.
Figure 2.28: Subordinate Cauchy
information processes forc= 1




























Information process when activity rate for
information arrivalc= 1
Figure 2.29: Non-defaultable bond price
paths forc= 1





























tT Bond price when activity rate for
information arrivalc= 1
Source:Hoyle (2010, p. 113). Positive jumps in the Cauchy bridge process mimic theMLA index. As
terminal date approaches for the non-defaultable bond, the information flow is optimistic so loss aversion is
overcome.However, bond prices were decreasing for the most part when the Cauchy bridge process jumped
up.
We note in passing that inasmuch as the natural filtrationFC
Y





CYs ; 0≤ s≤ t
)
, the information flow in the asset pricing paradigm above is equivalent to
FC
Y
t ⊆ σ(B2s−1,s; 0≤ s≤ t), whereB2s−1,s is defied in Definition2.5.1. The latter implies that,
in principle, we should be able to price binary bonds with the information we have about income
and consumption inB2s−1,s. In other words, there exist a consumption based capital asset pricing
approach to binary bond pricing. Cf.Backus et al.(1989). Moreover, in (2.6.2) λ̂t is independent
of the natural filtrationFC
Y
u .
Behavioural explanation ofHoyle (2010) simulation model
The following example is adapted fromHoyle (2010, §7). It is effectively, a simulation of our
model sketch.Hoyle (2010) constructed an example of an information-based defaultablebinary
bond for which the information flow follows a Cauchy random bridge (CRB) processξtT . The
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Y1 = α0(t)+α1ξtT +α2ξ 2tT (2.6.4)
Y2 = β0(t)+β1ξtT +β2ξ 2tT (2.6.5)
whereα0(t) andβ0(t) are functions oft and the other coefficients are relative constants that de-
pend on terminal dateT andh0, h1, p0, p1 and activity ratec. The ratioY1/Y2 is a pricing kernel
Mt(ξtT |h0, h1, p0, p1,c) which can be written as







Cursory inspection show that (2.6.6) contains a stochastic trend driven by innovations inξtT and
ξ 2tT . These innovations include the MLA index for loss aversion to credit default. In principle,
given our knowledge about the behaviour of the MLA index we should be able to estimate the
probability of a market crash. We leave that for another day.
For our purposes,ξtT is subordinate to the Cauchy processCYt (ω), and its jumps reflect
loss aversion to decline in the bond price. According to Theorem2.5.7Hoyle’s Cauchy bridge







Thus, the positive jumps inξtT mimic the MLA indexλ̂ as in (2.6.2). Figure 2.26depicts Hoyle’s
simulated model of information flows for Cauchy bridge processes with activity ratec= 10−3 (rep-
resented byσ in our appendix (2.B.13)). Cursory inspection ofFigure 2.27shows that when there
is an increase in information flow about the bond–presumably bad news, the CRBξtT increases.
However, the bond priceBtT tends to decrease. So investor loss aversion is being mimicked by the
CRB.
The information flows and price patterns for non-defaultable bonds inFigure 2.28and
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Figure 2.29show that as long as the Cauchy bridge process is positive the bond price remains
fairly stable. Even though there are small jumps which may signal loss aversion. However, when
information flow is negative, i.e., the bridge process in negative, bond prices continue to decline.
It is only after the first crossing of the bridge into the positive quadrant does bond price paths jump
on this good news toh1.
2.7 Application to the equity premium puzzle and behavioural pricing ker-
nel
The equity premium puzzle is one of the most actively researched areas in financial economics
and macro-finance (Campbell, 2003; Ludvigson, 2013; Campbell, 2015). Therefore, this section is
limited in scope to a theoretical characterization of the equity premium in the context of our relative
income model with embedded MLA index. In particular, our goal is to establish our behavioural
model’s ability to do the following:
• predict large equity premia;
• explain why equity premium is counter-cyclical to business cycles;
• identify the source/cause of excess volatility.
We do not address the issue of price/dividend ratio or Hansen-Jagannathan bounds Sharpe ratio
connection in the CCAPM (Hansen and Jagannathan, 1991). However, we note thatCampbell and
Cochrane(1999, pp. 220-221) showed empirically that the price/dividend ratio is linear in surplus
consumption ratio. And their surplus consumption ratio(C−X)/C, relative to habit formation
consumptionX, is similar to our RIH consumption growth(CDt −a(d))Yt)/CDt , relative to reference
consumptiona(d))Yt in (2.3.6). Therefore, in principle our theoretical model should be able to
explain the behaviour of price/dividend ratio in a manner analogous toCampbell and Cochrane
(1999) albeit with MLA index included in our growth formulation. Additionally, the α-stable
feature of the the MLA index embedded in the behavioural pricing kernel makes it (the kernel)
unmeasurable. So in order to apply the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds one needs a time change
transformation of theα-stable process which is subordinate to a Gaussian distribution. Whereupon
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a modified Sharpe ratio can be applied. See e.g.,Charles-Cadogan(2016a) for time changed
Sharpe ratio analysis.
In this section, we introduce a behavioural pricing kernel that depends on the joint distribu-
tion of consumption growth rates and MLA index. So it synthesizes aspects of theConstantinides
(1990) (habit formation) andBenartzi and Thaler(1995) (myopic loss aversion) models resolu-
tion of the equity premium puzzle.Yogo (2008); Hung and Wang(2011); Curatola(2015) also
introduced models with loss aversion and consumption. However, in their models loss aversion is
deterministic. Our model is distinguished because in it the MLA index is a random variable based
on theα-stable theory we introduce in this paper. Furthermore, we embed the MLA index in the
pricing kernel and show how its statistical distribution affects asset prices.
2.7.1 Myopic loss aversion and holding periods of stocks
The impact of myopic loss aversion is illustrated by the following example adapted from
Jensen et al.(2003). Let S(t) be the levels price of a stock andr∆t(t) = lnS(t+∆t)− lnS(t) be the
short horizon return. We are interest in the first passage timeτρ(t) of returns to attain a levelρ , i.e.,
τρ(t) = inf{t > 0| |r∆t(t)|> ρ}. Thus, an investor may implement a simple trading strategy based
on short sellr∆t(t)< −ρ or hold for r∆t(t)> ρ . They used wavelet analysis to filter out the long
term trend in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) between May 1896 and June 2001 so that
s(t) = s̃(t)+d(t), wheres(t) = lnS(t), d(t) is filtered trend and̃s(t) is the gain or loss component
or returns around trend.Jensen et al.(2003) fitted the following generalized Gamma probability


















A cross plot of the fits is depicted inFigure 2.30. The probability density functionp−(t) for
losses has a much higher elevation for losses over a given time period compared to that for gains
p+(t) over a similar period. Thus, the probability of experiencing a loss or “draw down” is much
higher over a given period. However, as the length of the trading intervals increase the probability
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distributions cross such that the probability of gains exceeds that of losses in an interval[tℓ, tu] =
{t > 0| p+(t)> p−(t), tℓ ≤ t ≤ tu}. Whereafter the window of profitability disappears and the two
distributions coincide. The phenomenon of higher returns over less frequent evaluation periods
was confirmed in an economic experiment byGneezy and Potters(1997). We note in passing that
the generalized Gamma distribution is an admissibleα-stable probability distribution function for
the MLA index estimated for US and South Africa.
Figure 2.30: Gain loss asymmetry over
investment horizons on DJIA















According toJensen et al.(2003) the fitting parameters used to obtain these fits are
for ρ+ = 0.05: α = 0.50,β = 4.5days1/2,ν = 2.4, andt0 = 11.2 days; and for
ρ− = 0.05: α = 0.50,β = 5.0days1/2,ν = 0.7, andt0 = 0.6 days
Figure 2.31andFigure 2.32depict the distribution of the holding period of a stock on the
NYSE and JSE over the last 100 years and 50 years respectively. It shows that the holding period is
in steady decline. According toDumontier(2012), for the US it bottomed out at 9-months in 2008
and climbed back to 14-months in 2012. “In other words, investors are now roughly turning over
their entire portfolio on an annual basis. When you consider that the two fundamental components
of real equity returns are the dividend yield and real earnings growth, you quickly realize that
the current level of trading activity is impossible to justify in terms of economic fundamentals.”
Benartzi and Thaler(1995) argue that myopic loss aversion is the cause of such behaviour. Their
simulation show that a MLA index of around 2.77 coincided with a holding period of around
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Figure 2.31: Average holding period of a stock traded on US NYSE
Source:Dumontier(2012), “Best Practices for Long-Term Investors in a Microsecond Market”,
The Motley Fool
Figure 2.32: Average holding period of a stock traded on South Africa JSE
Source:Wessels(2010), “Dividends: The Major Source of Real Equity Returns”,DRW Invest-
ment Research Report
The plots depict the average holding period of a stock on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
and Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) over the last 100 years, and 50 years respectively. The
holding period is in steady decline. An eyeball of the plots show that the most recent holding
period is below 12-months in each exchange. The exponential growth in the volume of stocks
traded on the JSE originated around 1998.







whereπi is the decision weight obtained fromQuiggin(1982) transformation procedure for prob-
abilities associated with a gambleP, andv is Tversky and Kahneman(1992) value function over
gains and losses (in returns) relative to a reference point.
The equity premium puzzle introduced byMehra and Prescott(1985) posits that the ob-
served equity premium in financial markets is too high to be explained by neoclassical equilibrium
models. In particular, an unrealistically high risk aversion index and covariance between con-
sumption growth and asset returns are required to match the observed equity premium.Campbell
(2003, pp. 803-803) list 14-different empirical regularities of stock market returns and consump-
tion growth that motivate research in consumption based capital asset pricing. Two important
models that predict large equity premia areConstantinides(1990) continuous time habit formation
in consumption model, andBenartzi and Thaler(1995) simulation model with myopic loss aver-
sion and mental accounting in equity portfolios.Campbell(2003) andLudvigson(2013) survey
the literature on alternative preference based theories that resolve aspects of the puzzle.
In this section we compare, and contrast, the asset pricing behaviour of investors under
our modified RIH with myopic loss aversion, to fundamental asset pricing under the neoclassical
model. As shown in Theorem2.3.1the RIH consumption function retains several aspects of the
CPT value functionv in (2.7.2) for linear utility. Furthermore, to the extent that∑ni=1πi = 1 in
(2.7.2), the transformed probability weightsπi are functionally equivalent exchange of probability
distributions that admit an expectations operator of the type used in (2.7.8) below.
2.7.2 Asymmetric distribution of behavioural pricing kernel for RIH
The ensuing analysis is based on the pricing kernel approach to the consumption asset pricing
model (CCAPM) inCochrane(2005, pp. 15-17). pt is the ex-dividend price of an asset,Ct is
consumption at timet; β is a subjective discount factor;xt+1 is a future payoff at timet +1; Et
is an expectations operator based on information at timeandU is a utility function;Mt+1 is a
pricing kernelrelated to the intertemporal rate of substitution obtained from an Euler equation.
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, pt = Et [Mt+1xt+1] (2.7.3)
Assuming a CRRA specificationU(Ct) =
C1−γ
1− γ with constant risk aversion parameterγ, after a





≈ β e−γgct+1 (2.7.4)
wheregct+1 is consumption growth. Under our myopia Axiom1, consumption tracks income so the
growth rates of the two are approximately equal, i.e.,gct+1 ≈ gYt+1. According toWickens(2011,
p. 303) the equity premium puzzle arises because (2.7.4) fails empirically. The observed asset
price pt in (2.7.3) is much higher than that predicted by (2.7.4). As will be shown below, our RIH
approach to asset pricing predicts a much larger asset price (and hence equity premium) than the
neoclassical model. So it is sufficient to resolve the equity premium puzzle.
According toKahneman and Tversky(1979); Tversky and Kahneman(1992) DMs do
not formulate decisions on the basis of terminal wealth. Rather they formulate it on the basis
of changes in wealth relative to a reference point.Benartzi and Thaler(1995) andBarberis and
Huang(2001) extended that concept to asset pricing in tandem with MLA in order to resolve the
equity premium puzzle. MLA reflects investor psychology and risk perception wherein losses
loom larger than gains. Myopic investors concentrate on short-term price movements. They frame
financial decision making such that loss aversion is the predominant risk attitude that motivate
them to overweight short term price movements. Consequently, they tend to be more conservative
investors who demand higher equity premia to hold equities.Yogo(2008); Hung and Wang(2011);
Curatola(2015) also extend the MLA concept to specification of preferences ina CCAPM with loss
aversion. We extend that concept to the change in the RIH consumption function by substituting
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where the growth rateϕt+1(g,λ ) is a function of thejoint distribution of income and consumption
growth rates and MLA indexes, i.e.,g = (gt ,gt+1,gYt+1) andλ = (λt ,λt+1) wheregt =−α1gGt < 0.
In Campbell and Cochrane(1999, pp. 208-209) habit formation modelSt = Ct −Xt is referred
to as “surplus” consumption, whereXt is the level of habitual consumption. In our model, the
equivalent of theirXt is a reference consumption levela(d)Yt, and loss aversion enters through
intolerance to decline below reference consumption as shown in (2.3.6). The joint distributions
above are motivated by (2.3.5) which induce four possible values for consumption growth rate as
shown below.
The following state transitions play a prominent role in the rest of this section.
Definition 2.7.1(State transitions).
Let {G, L} be the possible states of income whereG is gain andL is loss.I = {G, L}×{G, L}=
{GG, GL, LG, LL} is the index set for the possible state transitions for current and anticipated
states. For example, the consumption pair{∆bCDt , ∆bCDt+1} reflects current states at timet and
anticipated states at timet+1. The possible current and anticipated gain (G) and loss (L) states in
income are:
GG current gain state G and an anticipated gain state G for next period;
GL current gain state G and an anticipated loss state L for next period;
LL current loss state L and an anticipated loss state L for next period;
LG current loss state L and an anticipated gain state G for next period;
Assumption 2.7.1(Time dependent loss aversion). Loss aversion is time dependent so thatλ ∼
iid C is substituted withλt .
This assumption is motivated byBarberis and Huang(2001); Barberis et al.(2001) who used
time and state dependent loss aversion in their model. The RIH consumption function in (2.3.5)
31(Shefrin, 2008) provides a review of the literature on this issue.
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induce the following heterogenous consumption growth rates
∆bCDt+1
∆bCDt











θt+1(g)−1 if GG state transitions
−λt+1θt+1(g)−1 if GL state transitions
− 1
λt
θt+1(g)−1 if LG state transitions
λt+1
λt
θt+1(g)−1 if LL state transitions
(2.7.7)
We use a log growth rate relationship forYt+1 = (1+ gYt+1)Yt to constructθt+1(g) in (2.7.6).
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According to (2.7.7) GG is the only consumption state transition that is not affected by the loss
aversion index.
The behavioural pricing kernel depends on the CRRA parameterγ and the joint distribution
of growth rates and MLA indexes throughϕt+1(g,λ ).33 Log linear approximation ofMDt+1 in
(2.7.5) implies the existence ofγ such that we have a behavioural pricing kernel
MDt+1(β ,γ,g,λ )≈ βe−γϕt+1(g,λ ), pDt = Et [MDt+1(β ,γ,g,λ )xt+1] (2.7.8)
where pDt is the price of the asset predicted by the RIH pricing kernel. We reiterate here that
the expectations operator in (2.7.8) is admissible forMDt+1, defined in (2.7.5), by virtue of the
exchangeability of probability measures implied by the “prospect utility” valuation in (2.7.2).
2.7.3 Resolution of equity premium puzzle with behavioral pricing kernel



























33Choi et al.(2007, pp. 1931-32) also found that the risk premium in their model ofattitudes towards risk in insurance microdata
are driven jointly by loss aversion (or (Gul, 1991) disappointment aversion) and risk aversion indexes.
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Let r ft be the risk free rate. The price of the risk free asset in (2.7.9) is such that the payoff 1-period







































Let rt+1 be the return on the asset in the next period. Assuming thatMt+1 and(1+ rt+1) are jointly
lognormalWickens(2011, pp. 284-285) shows that under the no arbitrage hypothesis
Et [rt+1]− r ft =−
1
2
Vt(rt+1)+ γt(c)Covt (∆ lnCt+1, rt+1)
=−1
2
Vt(rt+1)+ γt(c)Covt (gct+1, rt+1)
(2.7.12)





is theconditional covariancebetween asset returns and con-
sumption growth.34 The equity premium puzzle arises empirically because the observed left hand
side (LHS) of (2.7.12) is too large to be explained by asset price volatilityVt(rt+1), risk aversion




between consumption growth and asset returns.

















where the superscriptD implies RIH. However, under Theorem2.3.1DMs evaluate their consump-
tion stream relative to a reference consumption, and they have MLA and intolerance to decline in
consumption. So that ifC1,C2, . . . ,Cr−1,Cr ,Cr+1, . . . ,CT is aT-period consumption stream with
reference consumptionCr , thenηt =Ct −Cr is the relative change in consumption. We assume that
ηt ∼ (µη , σ2η) whereE[ηt ] = µη andσ2η is the variance ofηt .35 On the basis of those prerequisites
34The quantity−1
2
Vt(rt+1) is referred to as Jensen’s inequality correction factor. For example, ifRA = ∑Tt=1(1+ rt )/T −1 is an




−1 is the corresponding geometric mean, then 1+RG ≈ eRA ≈ 1+RA−R2A/2. So
thatRG ≈ RA−R2A/2. SeeGrinblatt and Linnainmaa(2011); Becker(2012) for further details on this issue.




η = µ2η exp(
σ2w
2 −1).
So we treatµη andσ2η as parameters.
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we claim
Proposition 2.7.2(MLA index and risk aversion nexus). Under RIH the relationship between
Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion and myopic loss aversion to decline in consumption
is given by
γDt (µη) = µη sgn(γ̃(µη)) γ̃(µη)λt(µη ) (2.7.14)




is a pseudo Arrow-Pratt risk measure for sub-utility functions U+ (gain)
and U− (loss) such that sgn(γ̃(µη)) = +1 for risk aversion and sgn(γ̃(µη)) =−1 for risk seeking.
Remark2.7.1. The right hand side of (2.7.14) collapses to Arrow-Pratt risk measure when there are
no loss domains involved in the analysis. Sinceλt(µη) is undefined over gain domains we cannot
say thatµη λt(µη) = 1. This proposition is a manifestation ofWakker and Tversky(1993, Thm 9.1)
and generalizes the example inKöbberling and Wakker(2005, p. 128) relating Arrow-Pratt risk
measure to loss aversion.
Proof. See Appendix2.B.8.
This proposition shows that time varying risk aversion, in a context where DMs are faced with
possible loss, is linked to the MLA index in our model. In particular, theα-stable properties of the
MLA index implies that time varying risk aversion admits large values by and through the MLA
index.
Procedure invariance and the price of consumption risk
Theoretically, theobserved risk premium̂πEt+1, and observed asset returnst+1 should be invariant
to the RIH behavioural pricing kernel, and neoclassical pricing kernel, when the two models price
the same asset. However, the covariance between excess returns and consumption growth is dis-
positive of the price of consumption risk (Breeden(1979, pp. 275-276),Duffee(2005, p. 1674)).
Cursory inspection of (2.7.12) and (2.7.13) shows that the measure of covariance and risk aver-
sion differ between the two asset pricing paradigms. So that is a source of pricing differential.
76
According to Proposition2.7.2under RIH behavioural asset pricing, risk aversion depends onthe
MLA index. Furthermore, we proved in Proposition2.5.6that the MLA index is a Cauchy random
variable that admits large values. Thus, the RIH behavioural pricing kernel resolves the observed
equity premium according to:
Proposition 2.7.3(RIH resolution of equity premium puzzle). Let π̂Et+1 be the observed equity
premium and V(r̂t+1) be the variance of observed asset returns.λt(µη) is the MLA index Cauchy
random variable under RIH for reference consumption level Cr with average consumption devia-




V̂(rt+1)+c(µη)λt(µη)Covt (ϕt+1(g,λ ), rt+1) (2.7.15)
where c(µη ) = µη sgn(γ̃(µη)) γ̃(µη) is a relative constant scale and c(µη )λt(µη) is the price of
consumption risk.
Proof. Substitute value ofλt(µη) in Proposition2.7.2for λt(c) in (2.7.12).
According to (2.7.15) the empirical equity premium depends on a Cauchy random variable so it
is susceptible to large swings. However,Charles-Cadogan(2016b) introduced a model which pre-
dicts that the loss aversion index is nonmeasurable–a prediction supported by the Cauchy random
variable. In which case the empirical equity premium above may be nonmeasurable.
Anticipative risk attitudes and the covariance of equity premia
In the analysis that follow, we assume that the equity premium is positive, i.e.,π̂t+1> 0 sort+1> 0.
Our focus is on the impact of risk attitudes on conditional covariance and the equity premium. In
other words, we try to answer the question:
QUESTION:
What are the risk attitudes that support an investors’ anticipation of a positive risk premium
across states?
A more detailed analysis that accounts for statistical properties ofλt (based on a comparison of the
neoclassical and behavioural asset paradigms) is provided insubsection 2.7.4
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GG states
Here, our DMs is in a current “income gain state” and she anticipates income gain in the next
period. This scenario plays out entirely in gain domains. According to (2.7.7) ϕt+1(g,λ ) depends
on θt+1(g). Thus,Covt (ϕt+1(g,λ ), rt+1) > 0. This implies that in Proposition2.7.3γDt (µη) > 0
andour DM is risk averse. This inference is consistent with prospect theory’s prediction of risk
aversion over gain domain almost surely.
GL states
In this case, our DM in current state gain, and she anticipates a loss in income in the next period.
Now loss aversion kicks in andϕt+1(g,λ ) depends on−λt+1 θt+1(g). Our DM will demand a
higher risk premium to buffer the shortfall in income and myopic consumption. If she expects
rt+1 > 0, thenCovt (−λt+1ϕt+1(g,λ ), rt+1) < 0. In order forπ̂t+1 > 0 we must haveγDt (µη)< 0.
That is,DMs are risk seeking. They decrease myopic consumption tracking income under Axiom1
and invest as much as possible in the stock market hoping that itwill rise (Curatola, 2015, p. 106).
LG states
Like the GL state, loss aversion kicks in in this state. Our DM is in current loss state and she
anticipates a gain in income in the next period. Nowϕt+1(g,λ ) depends on− 1λt θt+1(g) and
Covt
(
− 1λt ϕt+1(g,λ ), rt+1
)
< 0. SoDMs are risk seekingfor the same reasons above.
LL states
This is perhaps the most complicated state of all for the following reason. Our DM is in current
loss state, and she anticipates a loss in income in the next period. In this stateϕt+1(g,λ ) depends
on λt+1λt θt+1(g). However, the ratio of two Cauchy random variables has a probability distribution
function, f , say, i.e.,λt+1λt ∼ f . We show insection 2.7.4below thatf is approximated by a symmet-




λt ϕt+1(g,λ ), rt+1
)
> 0 andγDt (µη)> 0 so our DM is risk averse. According
to the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes inTversky and Kahneman(1992) this is a low probability
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event. That is, even though DMs demand higher risk premia in LL state the probability that the
covariance is positive is low. This implies that the more likely hypothesis is that the covariance is
negative, andDMs are risk seeking almost surely. This would generate a positive counter-cyclical
risk premium at the trough of the business cycle for LL states that characterize falling income.
2.7.4 Behavioural asset pricing vs. Neoclassical asset pricing over business cycle
One of the empirical regularities of the equity premium is its counter-cyclical. It is highest at the
troughs and lower at the peaks of business cycles (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Campbell, 2003;
Ludvigson, 2013). In this sub-section we show how the regularity is explained by our behavioural
pricing kernel. In particular, we identify the role of the statistical distribution of the MLA index
in affecting the process. We compare the asset prices predicted by the neoclassical pricing kernel
to the asset prices predicted by our behavioural pricing kernel. In that way we identify differences
between the two pricing paradigms.
Let p⋆t be the price of the asset predicted by the neoclassical pricing kernel in (2.7.3). Under
RIH preferences DMs price the asset aspDt in (2.7.8). So their risk premiump
D
t −bt relative to a
risk free assetbt differs from the neoclassical risk premiump⋆t −bt . A first order approximation of
the pricing kernel in (2.7.4) and (2.7.5) leads to the following price differential in equity premia
∆t(p⋆, pD) = p⋆t − pDt (2.7.16)
= Et [β (1− γgct+1)xt+1]−Et [β (1− γϕt+1(g,λ ))xt+1] (2.7.17)
=−βγEt [(gct+1−ϕt+1(g,λ ))xt+1] (2.7.18)
The sign of the quantity inside the brackets determines whether the difference in predicted prices
is positive or negative.
Asset prices under GL, LG income state transitions
The growth ratesϕt+1(g,λ ) are negative for GL and LG state transitionsin (2.7.7). Hence
e−γ ϕt+1(g,λ ) = eγ |ϕt+1(g,λ )| ≫ e−γ gct+1 andMDt+1(g,λ ) ≫ Mt+1 where the symbol≫ reads “much
greater than”. To see this, under myopia Axiom1 consumption tracks income, we can writegY
79
instead ofgc. Suppose that anticipated state dependent growth ratesgYGL < 0 andg
Y
LG > 0. In GL
states the Cauchy random variable componentλt+1 impliesϕt+1(g,λ ) =−λt+1θt+1(g)−1≪ gYGL
which impliesλt+1θt+1(g)+1 ≫ gYGL almost surely, sinceλt+1 is restricted to the positive real
axis and its variance very large. A similar argument holds for− 1
λt




θt+1(g) + 1 ≫ −gYLG in LG states. The following lemma guarantees the inequality
MDt+1(g,λ )≫ Mt+1.
Lemma 2.7.4 (Necessary RIH consumption growth condition). The consumption growth rate
predicted by the neoclassical pricing kernel cannot exceed the growth rate predicted by the be-
havioural pricing kernel, i.e., gct+1 ≯ ϕt+1(g,λ )
Proof. See Appendix2.B.7.
Remark2.7.2. According to Lemma2.7.4the volatility of RIH consumption growth is uniformly
higher than that for neoclassical consumption growth. This observation is formally proven below
in Proposition2.7.10. It is a necessary condition for RIH to predict a larger risk premium than the
neoclassical hypothesis. Cf.Wickens(2011, p. 203).
In GL and LG statesϕ(·) < 0. So the quantity in (2.7.18) is negative, and investors with
RIH preferences price assets much higher than their neoclassical counterparts, i.e.,pDt ≫ pt , when
either a gain in income is followed by an anticipated loss of income or a loss of income is followed
by an anticipated gain in income. For a given benchmark assetbt the equity premium is such that
pDt −bt ≫ pt −bt .
Recall that Benartzi and Thaler take consumption as given in their model and focus solely
on equity portfolios. Their assumption is equivalent to neutralizing consumption growth. In our
model this can be achieved by settinggt+1= gt = constandgYt+1= constso thatM
D
t+1 only depends
on themarginal distribution forλ . In which case the asset pricepDt and equity premiumpDt −bt
only depend on the CRRA parameterγ and MLA vectorλ . Thus, our theory derives aBenartzi and
Thaler (1995) type result, that under myopia the equity premium driven by MLA is much greater
than that predicted by (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) neoclassical model. According to Propositions
2.5.3 and 2.5.6 the MLA index is an independent and identically distributed Cauchy random
variable that takes values in the range(0,∞]. This implies the following scenarios.
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Recall that theiid loss aversion index generated by the setB2k−1,2k is used to replace and back fill




< 1. This implies
ϕGL(·)≪ ϕLG(·) =⇒ pDGL ≻ pDLG (2.7.19)
where the subscript on behavioural growth rateϕ denotes its value in that state transition, and
pDj , j ∈ {GL, LG} is the correspondinganticipated price. We interpret this scenario as one in
which decision makers in GL states engage in risk seeking behaviour in anticipation of losses. So
they require much larger equity premium to hold stocks. In which case they need stock prices to be
much higher than that predicted by the neoclassical model. We believe that this is plausible because
a recent experimental study byDoerrenberg et al.(2015) found that subjects who anticipated a loss
of income held more risky assets.








ϕGL(·)≫ ϕLG(·) =⇒ pDLG ≻ pDGL (2.7.20)
We interpret this scenario as one in which decision makers in LG states engage in risk averse
behaviourrelative to GL states in anticipation of gains. They demand a higher risk premium to
hold assets in order to compensate them for the recent lost they experienced.
Asset prices under GG income state transitions
Inspection of the GG state transitions in (2.7.5) shows thatϕt+1(g,λ ) does not depend on the MLA
index. Thus, for this relative income state with increasing income we haveYt+1 >Yt andgYt+1 > 0.
Only the CRRA factorγ and growth rates for income affects the pricing kernelMDt+1. Substituting
81
θt+1(g)−1 for ϕt+1(g,λ ) in (2.7.18) gives us the difference between neoclassical and RIH asset
prices is(p⋆t − pDt ) in GG state transitions:













sincegt < 0, gt+1 < 0 by definition. In this case, the price differential is more nuanced.























Figure 2.33shows that in income states GG, under RIH, the equity premium isgreater than under
neoclassical if income growthgt+1 > g⋆t+1. It is lesser ifgt+1 < g
⋆
t+1. We characterize this result
as follows.
Lemma 2.7.5(Critical income growth rate). There exist a critical income growth rate g⋆t+1 which,
if exceeded, then the equity premium predicted by RIH is much greater than that predicted by the
neoclassical model in states of rising income.
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Asset prices under LL income state transitions
For this relative income group withdecreasing income, we haveYt+1 <Yt ⇒ gYt+1 < 0. The CRRA




θt+1(g)−1 for ϕt+1(g,λ ) in (2.7.18) to get


















The quantity inside the bracket is nuanced (recallgt < 0, gt+1 < 0) so the sign of∆t(p⋆, pD) has to






The analysis here pertains to loss followed by anticipated loss. In the context of our loss
aversion generatorB2k−1,2k the ratio
λt+1
λt
= 1 for LL states inBL2k−1 and (2.7.7). However,
λt , λt+1 ∼ iid C . Thus, the ratio behaves as if it was constructed from adjacent blocksB2k−1,2k





. Therefore, we will treat the ratio
λt+1
λt
= 1 as a given value for the ratio of two Cauchy random variables by virtue of Proposition
2.5.3. If λ has a Cauchy p.d.f(x) =
a
π(a2+x2)
, then the ratio of two Cauchy random vari-







, −∞ < y< ∞ (Springer,
1979, p. 158). According to Definition2.2.2, f (y) admits a candidate mollifier on[−a2, a2] since
f (a2) = f (−a2) = 0. We consider two cases:Case Awhere the neoclassical price is greater than
the behavioural price, andvice versafor Case B.
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Case A: p⋆ > pD
If p⋆t > p
D



























wheregt < 0, gt+1<0, |gt+1|<1 and the absolute values are used to distinguish the signs of values.
Case B: p⋆ < pD
























We are only interested in the positive values of the ratio. So the foregoing relationships leads to
the following







, −∞ < y< ∞ and f(y) = 0 otherwise, be the pdf for the ratio y= λt2k−1,2k
λt2k−3,2k−2
of two independent MLA indexes, i.e., two independent Cauchy random variables. We consider the
mollifier for the restricted range−a2 ≤ y≤ a2 and f(y) = o otherwise. If y/∈ [ν, a2], then p⋆t < pDt .





= 1. According to Lemma2.7.6and the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes inTversky




t and neoclassical prices are higher than RIH prices. So risk aversion is very high
under RIH in this case. On the other hand, Pr{1 /∈ [ν, a2]} is large so DMs are risk seeking over
losses under the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, andp⋆t < p
D
t . The small probability associated




Figure 2.34: PDF bump function truncated
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Figure 2.35: PDF bump function truncated
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, −∞ < y< ∞
The curve has unbounded kurtosis, i.e.,f (y) ↑ ∞, y+ ↓ 0. The sharp peak was arbitrarily chosen
at f (0) = 0.5 which is 500 times a probability unit of 0. 01 in order to satisfy software
requirements for the plot. We impose the mollifier conditiona= 1 in Figure 2.34anda= 2 in
Figure 2.35. That removes the tail probabilities for|y|≥ 1 and|y|≥ 4 as indicated.
Figure 2.34andFigure 2.35depict a plot of the probability distribution forf (y) in Lemma
2.7.6whena= 1 anda= 2, respectively. Whena= 1, Pr{1∈ [ν, a2]}= 0 in Figure 2.34. How-
ever, inFigure 2.35, Pr{0< y< 1} is much larger than Pr{1≤ y≤ 4} by virtue of the asymptote
at 0. Sop⋆t < p
D
t uniformly underFigure 2.34and DMs are risk seeking over losses. Whena= 2,
p⋆t < p
D
t almost surely underFigure 2.35since the associated probability of that event is much
larger than that for the eventp⋆t > p
D
t . Hence DMs are risk seeking almost surely in LL states.
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2.7.5 Probabilistic risk attitudes towards the Markov state transition matrix
Let q j , j ∈I be thej-th transition probability such thatqLL+qLG = 1 andqGL+qGG= 1. Recall
that in Definition2.7.1I = {LL, LG, GG, GL} is an index set for the possible gain loss states
{G,L}×{G,L}. Furthermore, letw+(·) be the probability weight assigned over gain domains and
w−(·) be the probability weighting function of loss domain.
We introduce two synthetic lotteriesLg = (rGG,qGG; rGL,qGL) andLℓ = (rLL,qLL; rLG,qLG)
wherer j j ∈I corresponds to thej-th state dependent asset returns.Lg is comprised ofanticipated
returnswhen the current state is “gain”, andLℓ is comprised ofanticipated returnswhen the current
state is “loss”. Assume that utility is linear in asset returns so that risk attitudes are driven by
probability weighting (Yaari, 1987). We assume that if a DM is in gain stateG and she anticipates
a gain stateG in the next period, then she weights probability according tow+(qGG). If she
anticipates a lossL, then she employsw−(qGL). Similarly, if she is in loss state, and anticipates a
loss state then the assigned weight isw−(qLL). If she anticipates a gain state from a loss state, then
the assigned weight isw+(qLG). These assumptions are consistent with probability weighting in
two-outcomes lotteries (Quiggin, 1993, p. 57). The state transition probabilities are given by
qGG = Pr[∆bCDt+1 = gt+1Yt+1|∆bCDt = gtYt ] (2.7.29)
qLG = Pr[∆bCDt+1 = gt+1Yt+1|∆bCDt =−λtgtYt ] (2.7.30)
qGL = Pr[∆bCDt+1 =−λt+1gt+1Yt+1|∆bCDt = gtYt ] (2.7.31)
qLL = Pr[∆bCDt+1 =−λt+1gt+1Yt+1|∆bCDt =−λtgtYt ] (2.7.32)







Q is ergodic because every state can be attained from any other state.Mehra and Prescott(1985,
pp. 150-151) assumed the existence of a symmetric Markov matrix, i.e., state transition probability
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matrix in their model.36 Here we show how it is a natural artefact of RIH preferences. In the
simple synthetic lottery setup, we have the 2-states probability weighting relationship (Quiggin,
1993, p. 57)
w+(qGG)+w
−(qGL) = 1 (2.7.34)
w+(qLG)+w
−(qLL) = 1 (2.7.35)








We make the following
Assumption 2.7.7(Preference for good states). Decision makers prefer good states over bad
states.
Under the hypothesis that DMs prefer good states to bad, we haveLg ≻Lℓ. So that DMs evaluate





FollowingMehra and Prescott(1985), assume thatQ in (2.7.33) is symmetric so thatqGL = qLG =
1−φ andqGG = qLL = φ . The relationship in (2.7.37) is reduced to
w+(φ)rGG+(1−w+(φ))rGL > (1−w−(φ))rLG+w−(φ)rLL (2.7.38)








Assuming that assets are priced under more likely (2.7.19) in Scenario 1, and more likely (2.7.27)
36Lucas(1978, p. 1431) also used a Markov transition function in his model.
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for Case B, we get the asset price rankingrGL ≻ rLG ≻ rLL ≻ rGG. In which case (2.7.40) implies
w−(φ)
w+(φ)
> 1=⇒ w−(φ) = w+(φ)+∆1, w+(1−φ) = w−(1−φ)+∆2 (2.7.41)









The identifying restriction in (2.7.36) and (2.7.42) are such that
w+(1−φ)+∆2+w−(φ)+∆1 = 1=⇒ ∆2+∆1 = 0 (2.7.43)
Source of excess volatility and counter-cyclical equity premia
There are two scenarios implied by (2.7.42) and (2.7.43):
w+(qLG) = w
+(1−φ)+∆2, w−(qLL) = w−(φ)−∆2 (Optimistic)
w+(qLG) = w
+(1−φ)−∆1, w−(qLL) = w−(φ)+∆1 (Pessimistic)
To help interpret the results above we introduce the following
Definition 2.7.2(Stochastic dominance). Montes et al.(2013). Given two cumulative distribution
functionsF andG, we say thatF stochastically dominatesG, and denote itF FSD G, if F(t) ≤
G(t) for everyt ∈ [0,1], and given two random variablesX,Y taking values on[0,1], we say thatX
stochastically dominatesY , and denote itX FSDY when its associated distribution functionFX
stochastically dominatesFY, whereFX(t) = P(X ≤ t) andFY(t) = P(Y ≤ t) ∀t ∈ [0,1].
In the optimistic scenario DMs shift probability mass from LL states to LG states. SorLG stochas-
tically dominatesrLL (Machina, 1987a, p. 236). They underweight the probability of LL states and
overweight the probability of LG states. In the pessimistic scenario, they shift mass from LG state
to LL states. SorLL stochastically dominatesrLG in that case. Thus, we prove
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Lemma 2.7.8(Asymmetricw(Q)). The weighted transition probability matrix W(Q) is asymmet-
ric because DMs shift probability mass within good and bad states to reflect stochastic dominance
of anticipated state dependent probability distributions.
The probabilistic risk attitude associated with pessimism (or risk aversion) is characterized by a
concave (or concave-convex ) probability weighting function. The probabilistic risk attitude asso-
ciated with optimism (or risk seeking) is characterized by a convex (or convex-concave) probability
weighting function. On the basis of our evaluations in (2.7.19), (2.7.20), andw(Q) in Lemma2.7.8
we posit the following
Proposition 2.7.9 (Endogenous rankings of anticipated asset prices). The behavioural
pricing kernel induces an endogenous ranking of assets: pDLL ≺ pDGG ≺ pDLG ≺ pDGL︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk aversion
or
pDGG ≺ pDLL ≺ pDGL ≺ pDLG︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk seeking
where the subscripts correspond to theanticipated priceof the asset
generated by the growth rate in(2.7.7). In particular, the rankings accommodate the outcome
dependent probability weighting functions sketched inFigure 2.8andFigure 2.9.
Remark2.7.3. The analyses above accommodate different permutations of prices and hence var-
ious shapes of the corresponding probability weighting functions (Stewart et al., 2015). So in a
sense the proposition describes two of many possible sample function shapes. This proposition
and other results presented above show that the behavioural pricing kernel is nonlinear (Sh frin,
2009, p. 86).
The implications of probability mass shifting in the asymmetric transition probability matrixw(Q)
can be seen in how DMs evaluate state dependent average returns and volatility. Average returns
predicted by the behavioural pricing kernel are lower than that predicted by the neoclassical kernel
in good states. In contrast, in bad states average returns (and hence average equity premium)
predicted by the behavioural pricing kernel is higher than that predicted by the neoclassical pricing
kernel. Furthermore, volatility is uniformly higher under the behavioural pricing paradigm. Thus,
the behavioural model captures the counter-cyclical behaviour of equity premia. We summarise
these results in the following.
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Proposition 2.7.10(Stochastic dominance, probabilistic risk aversion, and excess volatility). As-
suming that DMs prefer good states over bad states, if the transition probability matrix Q is sym-
metric, then the probability weighted transition matrix w(Q) is asymmetric. In bad states, the
behavioural pricing kernel predicts large risk premia and excess volatility are caused by stochas-
tic dominance of anticipated good states. In good states, the behavioural pricing kernel predicts
lower average equity premium, and excess volatility due to probabilistic risk aversion. The equity
premium is counter-cyclical over the business cycle peak and troughs for good and bad states.
Proof. See Appendix2.B.9.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper fills a gap in the literature by introducing an asymptotic theory of prospect theory’s
myopic loss aversion (MLA) index. It produces several new results that are important in their own
right. We prove that the MLA index isα-stable, and that it follows a generalized Cauchy law in
most cases. Because a Cauchy process belongs to the class of Lévy processes, our theory expands
the solution space for loss aversion to include its embedding in Lévy type processes.
We provide a simple procedure for estimating the MLA index from economic time series
data. Whereupon we applied it to US and South Africa income and consumption data. A distribu-
tion of macroeconomic MLA indexes was computed for each country, and a battery of statistical
tests upheld theα-stable law prediction of our theory. We checked for robustness of the theory by
applying it to different domains such as MLA index data from around the world, and MLA index
data from a meta study. In each case, the theory was upheld.
An independently important result of our theory is that the MLA index mimics positive
jumps of a Cauchy process. We show how this can be applied to information based asset pricing
when the information process is a Cauchy bridge. Jumps in the bridge process mimic bad news
and loss aversion and the asset price falls. Thus, we contribute to the strand of information based
asset pricing.
We employed a novel specification of the relative income hypothesis (RIH) to embed
the MLA index in a behavioural pricing kernel in the consumption based asset pricing model
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(CCAPM). We show how this resolves the equity premium puzzle. Theory predicts a much larger
equity premium than that obtained from the neoclassical pricing kernel. Consistent with the em-
pirical literature, our RIH behavioural pricing kernel is nonlinear. In what appears to be new to the
literature, our model predicts that the price of consumption risk includes myopic loss aversion to
decline in consumption. The Cauchy random variable attribute of the MLA index predicts wide
swings in the price of risk observed in the empirical literature. Moreover, we prove that the be-
havioural pricing kernel induces an endogenous ranking of assets supported by outcome dependent
probability weighting functions. In fact, we prove that DMs who prefer gain states to loss states
shift probability mass from loss states to gain states. This stochastic dominance behaviour distorts
the state transition probability matrix, and induces a uniformly higher risk premium and asset price
volatility than that predicted by neoclassical models.
Further research includes identifying the small sample properties of the MLA index esti-
mator to facilitate statistical inference in economic experiments. A natural extension of our results
is to cross-country data in order to identify and compare cross-cultural risk attitudes. In related
work, we show that cross sectional regressions of economic growth on subjective well being are
misspecified by virtue of simultaneity bias induced by the MLA index embedded in the growth
series. This result has implications for economic growth policies formulated on the basis of such
models. For if the parameter to be estimated in drawn from anα-stable process, analysts are
likely to get a “policy surprise” when observed values of the purported parameter are much larger
than that predicted by their models. Preliminary results show that the model makes empirically
testable predictions about leverage effects that depend on risk aversion, loss aversion, and income
and consumption growth in cross-sectional asset pricing.
2.A APPENDIX–EMBEDDING MLA INDEX IN PRICING KERNEL
2.A.1 State dependent pricing kernels and loss aversion embedding
This appendix provides the basic idea behind how we embed the MLA index in our behavioural
pricing kernel. We assume a single good pure exchange economy. In what follows “A state con-
tingent consumption claim is a security that pays one unit of the consumption good when one
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particular state of the world occurs and nothing otherwise. A state contingent claim is an elemen-
tary claim. Existing assets, however, may be viewed as complex bundles of elementary claims.”
(Huang and Litzenberger, 1988, p. 119). For example, we consider a DM faced with a state con-
tingent claim on consumption over two periods: the present 0, and future 1, with the following
primitives:
Primitives
Ω the set of all possible states of nature
ω an element of the setΩ
c0 present period 0 certain consumption
c1(ω) next period 1 uncertain consumption
e0 present period certain endowment
e1(ω) next period’s uncertain endowment
φω Arrow security state price of insurance per unit of consumption
β subjective discount factor
u(c0, c1(ω); β ) utility over consumption plan over periods 0, 1
πω DM’s subjective probability about the occurrence of stateω ∈ Ω
The contingent claim pays 1 if stateω occurs in period 1 and 0 otherwise. So that forc1(ω)
units of state contingent consumption, the total price isφω c1(ω). Similarly, the total price for
state contingent endowment isφω e1(ω). For the sake of exposition in what follows we assume
that utility is nonseparable. We relax that assumption later. We note thatEpstein and Zin(1989)
introduced a class of flexible nonseparable utility functions that are used to derive pricing kernels.
Those functions admit separability as a special case with constant elasticity of substitution (CES).



































The necessary first order conditions (FOCs) for optimality in (2.A.3) is applied to each period. In
period 0 our DM does not know whichω state will occur so she takes the expected value over all
possible statesΩ and the FOC is applied there. In period 1, the state is revealed so there is no need

























Since the contingent claim is pricedφω per unit of consumption, and it pays 1 only if the stateω
occurs or 0 otherwise, the total price for consumption in a given state is a simple function given by
P(c) = ∑
ω∈Ω














whereMω is the “pricing kernel” for state contingent consumption. FollowingLucas(1978), an
asset is a claim to all the output in our simple exchange economy. SoP(c) is a consumption based









= E[Mω xi(ω)] (2.A.10)
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wherex1(ω) is the total return on assets, i.e.,x1(ω) = 1+ r1(ω). If the risk free rate is given byr f ,
then (2.A.10) also prices the risk free asset. Substituting 1+ r f for x1(ω), and using the definition
of covariance, gives usE[Mω ] and the equity premium relationship
E[r1(ω)]− r f = (1+ r f )Cov(Mω , x1(ω)) (2.A.11)
Thus, the equity premium is driven by the covariance structure of the pricing kernel andx1(ω)
which serves double duty as a consumption growth relation. In (2.A.6) we proved that the Arrow
state price of insuranceφω is related to the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS)
betweenc0 andc1(ω).
The problem is simplified by assuming that utility is separable with a subjective time dis-
count factorβ such that
u(c0,c1(ω); β ) = u(c0)+βE[u(c1(ω))] (2.A.12)
∂
∂c0
u(c0,c1(ω); β ) = u′(c0),
∂
∂c1(ω)











Thus, the pricing kernel in (2.A.14) includes a time discount factor and DM’s subjective expecta-
tion about future consumption.
Embedding myopic loss aversion
UnderTversky and Kahneman(1992) CPT the arguments of the utility function are gains and
losses relative to a pre-specified reference point (Shefrin, 2009, p. 17). So DMs care about changes
in consumption relative to a reference consumption level–not about terminal consumption. More-
over, they have “value functions” to distinguish this utility attitude from classic utility functions.
Furthermore, the value function is bifurcated into sub-utility functions over gains and loss relative
to a reference consumption levelcr and its parameterizations includes a loss aversion indexλ .
Thus, we replace the utility functionu by a “carrier of value”v(·|λ ) for consumption, we replace
c1(ω) with c1(ω)−cr , andc0 with c0−cr . Note that in our model theloss aversion index is inside
the utility functionas opposed to extant literature where it lies outside the utility function. So that
94
we get the “relative consumption” pricing kernel




If (c1(ω)−cr)<0, and(c0−cr)>0, then according to (2.2.7)−(c1(ω)−cr)= λ (ω)(c0−cr)>0.
Substitution in (2.A.15) gives us















Thus, we embed the loss aversion index in a behavioural pricing kernel.MDω (λ ) inherits theα-
stable property of the MLA index random variableλ (ω). So it is subject to large fluctuations. We
note in passing that the pricing kernel also depends on subjective probability assessmentπω which
admits a probability weighting function (pwf)w(·). So that formation of expectations in (2.A.17)
is amenable to pwf analysis. The result in (2.A.17) extends readily toKőszegi and Rabin(2006)
reference dependent preference model.
Anticipating Gain (G) and Loss (L) states
In order for loss aversion to affect our analysis, a DM must either be in a current loss state, i.e.,
c0−cr < 0 or in an anticipating loss state, i.e.,c1(ω)−cr < 0 or both. To simplify the analysis,
we will assume acurrentgain state G and ananticipatingloss state L.
A probabilisticapproach. Suppose thatΩ , {G,L}. In what follows an up-arrow↑ signifies that
the associated quantity goes up, a down-arrow↓ signifies that it goes down. Letw(·) be our DMs
probability weighting function. For a given priceP(c,λ )=E[Mω(λ )c1(ω)], if our DM anticipates




latter condition is satisfied ifπω ↓ or φω ↑ or both. That is, the Arrow security price of insurance,
i.e., risk premium, goes up in bad states or DMs revise their subjective probability downwards in
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bad states or both.
Suppose thatφω , the Arrow security price of insurance goes up in bad states. ThenP(c)
goes up in (2.A.7). If our DM revised her subjective probability downwards, i.e., w−(πω) < πω ,
she is more optimistic about L state, then the anticipated given price of the asset goes up higher
than that predicted byφω alone. We represent this with a double arrowP(c) ↑↑. Thus, our
DM is risk seeking in this state, and the risk premium associated withP(c) is in excess of that
predicted by the Arrow security price of insurance alone. The complementary event is if our
DM anticipatesc1(ω) ↑. Then,Mω ↓ and eitherφω ↓ or (1− πω) ↑ or both. Assuming both,
our DM revises her subjective probability upwards andw+(1− πω) > 1− πω . Thus, the risk
premium associated withP(c) ↓↓ is much lower than that predicted byφω alone. In this two-state
casew−(πω) +w+(1− πω) = 1 and our DM is optimistic because she revises her probability
to underweight bad states, and overweight good states. This example is not exhaustive of the
taxonomy of behaviours that is accommodated by combinations ofφω andπω in Mω .
A utility basedapproach. In this caseMω(λ ) ↑ impliesE[v′(λ (ω)(c0−cr))] ↑. This implies that
the argument inside the utility function is decreasing. Sincec0−cr is fixed, it implies thatλ (ω) ↓.
Our DM is becoming less loss averse as she anticipatesc1(ω) ↓ in L states. This is the utility analog
of risk seeking over losses. Sinceλ (ω) is α-stable, its value can drop dramatically. According to
the fourfold pattern, if there is a high probability of a large drop in loss aversion when consumption
drops, then DMs will be risk seeking. Forλ (ω)< 1 this behaviour is called gain-seeking (Wakker,
2010).
2.B APPENDIX OF PROOFS
2.B.1 Proof of Theorem 2.2.4Standard Cauchy Spherically Symmetric
Proof. The following is a modified proof ofArnold and Brockett(1992, Thm. 1). LetF(t) =
Pr{Ui/Uk ≤ t}. By symmetry, we need only consider the first quadrantUi > 0,Uk > 0. Accord-
ingly, Pr{Ui/Uk ≤ t|Ui > 0,Uk > 0} is the area under the joint density ofUi,Uk)T in the region
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0<Ui ≤ tUk.





By spherical symmetry this area depends only on the angle,θ = tan−1(t), that the lineUi = tUk,
makes with theUk axis as shown inFigure 2.36. Thus,F(t) = F(tan(θ)) = h(θ) and Pr{Ui/Uk ≤
t}, is considered as a functionh(θ). For each pointU = (Ui ,Uk)T in R2 there corresponds a
homeomorphism (i.e., mapping)H : R2×Θ → R2 of R2 into itself such that̂U = H(U ,θ1) ∈ R2.
Thus, there exist a point
Ũ = H(Û ,θ2) = H(H(U ,θ1),θ2) (2.B.1)
= H(U ,θ1+θ2) (2.B.2)
These operations are consistent with a transformation group with group operation addition onΘ.
Refer toGuggenheimer(1977, p. 88) for further details. Since the erstwhile group maps into
itself, there exist a group homomorphismh(θ1+ θ2) = h(θ1)+ h(θ2). The group isomorphism
implies that this must satisfy the Cauchy functional equationh(θ1+ θ2) = h(θ1)+h(θ2). Aczel
(1966, pp. 31-32) proves thath(θ) = cθ satisfies the Cauchy functional equation. Consequently,
the distribution functionF(t) = Pr{Ui/Uk ≤ t} = h(tan−1(t)) = ctan−1(t). This is the distribu-
tion function for a standard Cauchy. Thus, we prove that the ratioUi/Uk has a standard Cauchy
distribution.
2.B.2 Proof of Theorem 2.2.5Generalized Cauchy Elliptically Symmetric
Proof. The proof is adapted fromArnold and Brockett(1992, Thm. 2) with slight modification to
fill gaps. The general idea of the proof is related to transformation groups (Guggenheimer, 1977,
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pp. 88-90). By hypothesis,X being elliptically symmetric implies that it has a representationX =
AU whereA is invertible, andU has a symmetrically symmetric distribution. Any two elements of






whereB is a 2×n matrix. Under the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization process, a set of independent
vectors (that comprise a matrix) can be mapped into a set of mutually orthogonal and orthonormal
vectors that constitute an orthonormal matrix (Gentle, 2007, p. 27). Under theLU matrix trans-
formation method (Gentle, 2007, p. 186), whereL is a lower triangular matrix andU is an upper
triangular matrix, there exist a 2×2 matrixC and an orthonormal matrixQ such thatQQT = I and
B =CQ. In which case,BU = (CQ)U =C(QU). By virtue of orthogonality ofQ, we induce the












































follows a standard Cauchy law, i.e.,
Y1
Y2
∼ C (0,1) by virtue of







follows a generalized Cauchy law by definition.
98
2.B.3 Proof of Theorem 2.2.6on existence of Generalized Cauchy for MLA index
Proof. The proof follows that for Theorem2.2.5in Appendix2.B.2. In this case we letXi = X̄L and






. Thus we havēXL/X̄G = bC (0,1)+a∼C (a,b).
2.B.4 Proof of Theorem 2.3.1Bifurcated RIH with Consumption Ratchet






= 1−α0−α1(1+gGt ) (2.B.7)
=⇒Ct =Yt(1−α0−α1)−α1gGt Yt (2.B.8)
Similarly, for lossesCt =Yt(1−α0−α1)+α1gLt (2.B.9)
For no changeCt =Yt(1−α0−α1) (2.B.10)
Let a(d) = 1−α0−α1, ∆bCDt =−α1gGt Yt andλt =
|gLt |
gGt
and the proof is done.
2.B.5 Proof of Proposition 2.5.3MLA index iid
Proof. By Lemma 2.5.1and construction in (2.5.7), the MLA index estimator̂λk−1 is put in cor-
respondence withB2k−1,2k. Soλ̂k−2 is put in correspondence withB2k−3,2k−2. Suppose that the
premise of the proposition is false. Thenλ̂k−1 andλ̂k−2 are correlated, for they are in correspon-
dence with a common element, call itx, in B2k−1,2k andB2k−3,2k−2. The probability associated
with that event is given by
Pr{x∈ B2k−3,2k−2∩B2k−1,2k}= Pr{x∈ B0} (2.B.11)
=⇒ Pr{g= 0}= 0 (2.B.12)
Thus, the probability that two MLA index estimates are in correspondence with a common element
is zero. This contradicts our assumption. Hence the premise of the proposition stands.
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2.B.6 Proof of Proposition 2.5.6MLA index is Cauchy rv
Proof. By definition a Cauchy process{Cut (ω); Ft} is comprised of independent increments (Ja-











This is the equation of a generalized Cauchy distribution with scale parameterσ t. Under Theorem
2.2.6 the MLA index estimator̂λt also has a generalized Cauchy distribution. Thus,ĉt and λ̂t
follow the same law so that Pr|λ̂t− ĉt |
p→0. By Slutsky’s Theorem (Chow and Teicher, 1988, p. 254)
the two random variables converge to the same (Cauchy) distribution on the same probability
space.
2.B.7 Proof of Lemma 2.7.4consumption growth condition
Proof. Suppose−gct+1 >−ϕt+1(g,λ ) so the direction of the inequality≫ is reversed. Hence










Under the myopia Axiom1 gct+1 = g
Y


















2.B.8 Proof of Proposition 2.7.2MLA index and AP risk nexus
Proof. Let Cr be a reference consumption andU be a twice differentiable utility function atCr . In
an ε-disk Bε(Cr) centered atCr such that forε sufficiently largeµη ≤ ε we have a MLA index




, λr(Cr ,µη) =
U ′−(Cr −µη )
U ′+(Cr +µη )
(2.B.18)
U ′−(Cr −µη) =U ′(Cr −µη ) U ′+(Cr +µη) =U ′(Cr +µη ) (2.B.19)
The convention in (2.B.19) is adapted fromWakker(2010, p. 239) who, using different notation,
referred to the sub-utility functionsU+ andU− as intrinsic utility andU as overall utility. Substi-
tution ofCr +µη for Cr andU ′+(Cr +µη ) in the equation forγDr (Cr) leads, by abuse of notation,
to
γDr (Cr ,µη) =−(Cr +µη )
U ′′+(Cr +µη )





U ′′+(Cr +µη )





U ′′+(Cr +µη )




γDr (Cr ,µη) = γ
D











Implicit in the analysis is∂/∂ µη [−U−(−µη)] =U ′−(−µη) to account for negative utility.Tversky
and Kahneman(1992, p. 309) also use a negative argument in the parameterizationsof their value
function. The sign of̃γ(µη) depends on the sign ofU ′′+(µη). The latter is negative for risk averse
DMs and positive for risk seeking DMs. HenceγDr (0,µη)> 0 for risk aversion andγDr (0,µη)< 0
for risk seeking.
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2.B.9 Proof of Proposition 2.7.10excess volatility from behavioural pricing kernel
Proof. The proof contains two parts. One for bad states, i.e., loss states L; and another for good















= w+(1−φ)(rLG− r̄L)2+w−(φ)(rLL− r̄L)2+∆1(r2LG− r2LL−2r̄L(rLG− rLL))
(2.B.24)
In the neoclassical model the mean and variance fromQ are given by
r̄L = (1−φ)rLG+(φ)rLL = rLG−φ(rLG− rLL) (2.B.25)
s2L = (1−φ)(rLG− r̄L)2+(φ)(rLL− r̄L)2
= (rLG− r̄L)2+(rLL− r̄L)2+φ(r2LG− r2LL−2r̄L(rLG− rLL))
(2.B.26)
The expected mean return under probability weighting is larger because
r̄WL = rLG+(w
−(φ)+∆1)(rLL− rLG) > r̄L = rLG−φ(rLG− rLL) (2.B.27)
by virtue ofw−(φ)+∆1 > 0. The variance is larger under probability weighting ifsW
2
L −s2L > 0.
This implies that
(w+(1−φ)+∆1)>








Let 0< δ < 1 be the ratio expression in (2.B.29) by virtue of preference for good states under
Assumption 2.7.7. Substituting 1−w−(φ) for w+(1−φ) we get
1−w−(φ)+∆1 > (φ −∆1)−δ (w−(φ)−∆1) (2.B.30)
=⇒ (w−(φ)−∆1)(1−δ )< 1− (φ −∆1)< 1⇒ (w−(φ)−∆1))<
1
1−δ (2.B.31)
The latter expression is true for 0< ∆1 < 1 uniformly. Hence the probability weighted variance of
returns is larger than under the neoclassical model.
Good states G





G are given by
r̄G = qGGrGG+qGLrGL, s
2
G = qGG(rGG− r̄G)2+qGL(rGL− r̄)2 (2.B.32)
r̄WG = w(qGG)rGG+w(qGL)rGL, s
W2
G = w(qGG)(rGG− r̄G)2+w(qGL)(rGL− r̄)2 (2.B.33)
Sincew−(qGL)< qGL for probabilistic risk seeking, andw+(qGG> qGG for probabilistic risk aver-
sion, assuming thatqGG= qLL = φ andqGL = qLG = 1−φ for symmetricQ under the neoclassical
model, if r̄WG > r̄G, then
w+(φ)rGG+w−(1−φ)rGL > φ rGG+(1−φ)rGL (2.B.34)
⇒ (w+(φ)−φ)rGG+(1−w+(φ)+φ)rGL > rGL (2.B.35)
⇒ (w+(φ)−φ)rGG− (w+(φ)−φ)rGL+ rGL > rGL (2.B.36)
⇒rGG > rGL (2.B.37)
This result is contrary to the ranking predicted by the behavioral pricing kernel. Therefore, the
hypothesis̄rWG > r̄G is false. Thus, we must haver̄
W







w+(φ)(rGG− r̄G)2+w−(1−φ)(rGL− r̄G)2 > φ(rGG− r̄G)2+(1−φ)(rGL− r̄G)2
(2.B.38)
⇒ w+(φ)[(rGG− r̄G)2− (rGL− r̄G)2]+(rGL− r̄G)2 > φ [(rGG− r̄G)2− (rGL− r̄G)2]+(rGL− r̄G)2
(2.B.39)
⇒ w+(φ)> φ (2.B.40)





G is upheld. So in good states we have low average risk premia and excess
volatility relative to the neoclassical model.
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2.C DATA APPENDIX
2.C.1 Loss aversion index estimate around the world
Table 2.7: Loss aversion indexes around the world
Country α β γ θ
Angola 0.60 1.00 0.60 1.45
Argentina 0.60 1.00 0.70 1.09
Australia 0.60 0.95 0.60 1.24
Austria 0.40 0.95 0.65 1.62
Azerbaijan 0.60 1.00 0.65 1.23
Bosnia–Herzegovina 0.65 0.90 0.45 1.00
Canada 0.50 1.00 0.50 2.00
Chile 0.55 1.00 0.65 2.00
China 0.60 1.00 0.60 1.83
Colombia 0.40 1.00 0.35 2.00
Croatia 0.60 1.00 0.45 2.33
Czech Republic 0.60 1.00 0.55 2.00
Denmark 0.50 1.00 0.65 2.00
Estonia 0.50 1.00 0.35 4.00
Georgia 0.55 1.00 0.60 5.50
Germany 0.45 1.00 0.50 2.00
Greece 0.65 0.80 0.50 2.00
Hong Kong 0.40 1.00 0.30 2.43
Hungary 0.50 1.00 0.45 2.00
Ireland 0.50 1.00 0.45 2.00
Israel 0.58 0.95 0.35 1.99
Italy 0.45 1.00 0.50 2.46
Japan 0.45 1.00 0.60 2.00
Lebanon 0.53 0.95 0.25 1.74
Lithuania 0.55 1.00 0.35 2.00
Malaysia 0.58 1.00 0.60 1.50
Mexico 0.40 1.00 0.35 1.50
Country α β γ θ
Moldova 0.65 0.95 0.65 3.44
New Zealand 0.65 0.95 0.50 1.50
Nigeria 0.75 1.00 0.50 2.00
Norway 0.55 1.00 0.55 1.83
Portugal 0.50 1.00 0.65 1.83
Romania 0.50 1.00 0.60 3.33
Russia 0.53 1.00 0.33 3.00
Slovenia 0.55 1.00 0.40 2.12
South Korea 0.60 0.95 0.70 1.37
Spain 0.45 1.00 0.60 2.38
Sweden 0.50 1.00 0.65 2.00
Switzerland 0.45 1.00 0.50 2.00
Taiwan 0.55 0.95 0.53 2.00
Thailand 0.65 0.90 0.55 3.00
Turkey 0.60 1.00 0.65 1.80
UK 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.38
USA 0.58 1.00 0.43 1.65
Vietnam 0.60 1.00 0.55 1.75
Source:Rieger et al.(2011, Table 2, p. 7)
α , β are curvature parameter for power value function;
γ is the curvature parameter for probability weighting function;
θ is Tversky and Kahneman(1992) robust ratio scale loss aversion index.
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2.C.2 Plot of US Myopic Consumption Tracking Income










































































































































































































































Year and Month 
Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditure 
RPersonConsExpen RDispIncome
According toShea(1995, pp. 798-799) “Under myopia, consumption tracks current income. Thus, the
failure of the LCH/PIH should be symmetric: consumption should respond equally to predictable income
increases and decreases.”
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2.C.3 Plot of US Real Disposable Income Growth With MLA Reflection





































































































US Real Disposable Income Growth With Reflective Loss 
Aversion To Decline In Standard Of Living 
US Rolling 5yrs Impact of Loss Aversion to Decline in Growth of Standard of Living
US 5yr Reflection Growth In Living Standard
US Real Disposable Income Growth
107
2.C.4 Plot of South Africa PCE Growth With MLA Reflection






















































































































































































Sout Africa Personal Consumption Expenditure Growth With 
Reflective Loss Aversion To Decline In Standard Of Living 
ZA Rolling 5yrs Impact of Loss Aversion to Decline in Growth of Standard of Living
ZA (Semidurable) Personal Consumption Expenditure  Growth Rate in 2010 Prices
ZA Rolling 5yrs Reflection Impact of Loss Aversion to Decline in Growth of Standard of Living
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2.C.5 Plots of US MLA index independence

















2.C.6 Plots of South Africa MLA index independence













Autoregression plots support the prediction of Proposition2.5.3that the MLA index is independent and
identically distributed.
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2.D APPENDIX OF FITTED STATISTICAL DISTRIBUTIONS
The distributions were fitted using the maximum likelihood option in EasyFitr. The Anderson
and Darling (1954) is a nonparametric test which did not providep-values. Theχ2-test and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit tests providep-values as indicated. Additionally, the soft-
ware ranked the distributions in a tournament for goodness of it as indicated.
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2.D.1 Diagnostics for fitted US income growth data
112
2.D.2 Diagnostics for fitted US standard of living growth data
113
2.D.3 Diagnostics for fitted South Africa income growth data
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2.D.4 Diagnostics for fitted South Africa standard of living growth data
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2.D.5 Diagnostics for fittedFishburn and Kochenberger(1979) Metastudy data
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2.D.6 Diagnostics for fittedRieger et al.(2011) MLA index around the world
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2.D.7 Diagnostics for fitted US macroeconomic MLA index
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2.D.8 Diagnostics for fitted South Africa macroeconomic MLA index
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Chapter 3
A Probability Model of Irrational
Exuberance and Financial Market
Instability
“A source is a specific set of events”.Wakker(2010, pg. 318)
3.1 Introduction
This chapter contributes to the literature on behavioural finance by introducing a behavioral em-
pirical stochastic process based on probabilistic risk attitude factors that affect investor confidence.
We show how the process provides early warning for financial market instability and we calibrate
the empirical process with published parameter estimates.
Financial markets reflect activity in the real economy. For example, bond markets facili-
tate the allocation of credit to firms, and stock markets reflect the valuation of shareholder equity
in publicly traded firms. Events like the Great Recession of 2008 triggered by uncertainty about
credit risk from the US real estate and collateralized debt obligation (CDO) crisis (Adelson, 2013),
and the Eurozone financial crisis (Castellacci and Choi, 2014), have eroded confidence in financial
markets.1 This has led to credit freeze, subsequent massive unemployment, social unrest and calls
for market reform. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that financial market stability, and confidence in
same, are of utmost importance to market participants, regulators, and policy makers.2 However,
asset pricing bubbles and market crashes are not new.3 So they are likely to repeat themselves.
Refer to Kindleberger and Aliber(2011); Reinhart and Rogoff(2014) for a detailed history of
1For example, a March NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll showed 57 percent of surveyed American adults believed the
United States was still in a recession (although that is the lowest share of respondents under that impression since early 2008),
according to “5 Years After the Great Recession, Our Economy Still Far from Recovered, Huffington Post (updated August 26,
2014)http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-fieldhouse/five-years- fter-the-grea˙b˙5530597.html.
2For example, the IMF Global Financial Stability Report (https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/); Financial Policy Com-
mittee, Bank of England; and Financial Stability Committee, Federal Reserve Board in the US are newly formed entities tasked
with monitoring financial stability (McGrane and Da Costa, 2014).
3See e.g.,Shefrin(2015b) who draws parallels between the recent Chinese stock marketcrash and Minsky’s financial instability
hypothesis. But compareLondon(2015) who questions whether the recent Chinese stock market crash“was that big”.
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such events. This paper provides some new tools, based on a probbility model of “irrational ex-
uberance” and financial instability motivated by behavioural finance. It provides an early warning
systems for bubbles and crashes predicated on market confidence factors.
Active research on financial market instability is conducted under rubric of market mi-
crostructure (Easley et al., 2011; Aldridge, 2014), econophysics (Johnson et al., 2000; Zhou and
Sornette, 2006; Quax et al., 2013), macrofinance (Grasselli and Costa Lima, 2012; Keen, 2013;
Wigniolle, 2014), agent based models (Thurner et al., 2012; Poledna et al., 2013; Hommes, 2013),
experimental finance (Smith et al., 1988; Ashparouva et al., 2014) financial networks (Allen and
Gale, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2015), bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), debt-deflation cycles
(Fisher, 1933), revolving doors (Charles-Cadogan and Cole, 2014; Shive and Forster, 2014; Lucca
et al., 2014; Lambert, 2015; Charles-Cadogan and Cole, 2015), and creative destruction in finan-
cial markets (Minsky, 1986). However, none of the foregoing papers use probability weightin
functions4 (pwfs)–which reflect pessimism and optimism in the presence ofrisk and uncertainty–
to characterize financial market instability. Yet investor optimism, pessimism and uncertainty are
common cores of all financial crises (Fisher, 1933; Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). A notable
exception isBhattacharya et al.(2015) who model Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis in the
context of financial institutions’ optimism, leverage and portfolio risk as part of a debt-deflation
cycle. However, those authors did not use probability weighting functions to characterize financial
market expectations about future states of the economy.
This paper contributes to the literature with a novel behavioural empirical local Lyapunov
exponent5 (BELLE) process that characterizes financial market instabili y with pwfs implied by
index option prices. The latter allow natural experiments on probabilistic risk attitudes because
they involve bets on future price movements.6 The shapes of pwfs for index option prices reflect
4A probability weighting function reflects the weight that decision makers give to an otherwise objective cumulative probability
measure over corresponding ranked outcomes.
5A Lyapunov exponent(λ ) is a measure of the rate of convergence or divergence of a trajectory over time relative to two
nearby starting points. Refer toBask(2010); Bask and Widerberg(2012) for application of Lyapunov exponents to financial market
instability.
6The Black and Scholes(1973, p. 644) European style call option price at timet is a pseudo-lotteryL =
{S(t),P1; −er(T−t)K,P2; 0,1−P1−P2} for P1+P2 < 1 with actuarial valueC(S,σ , t) = S(t)P1−er(T−t)KP2 whereS is the un-
derlying stock price,σ is its volatility, K is strike price,r is a discount rate, andT is expiry date,P1 andP2 are probabilities. The
pwf w implied by ranked outcomes inL impliesw(P1) 6= P1, w(P2) 6= P2. Refer toBoyer and Vorkink(2014) for details on stock
options as lotteries phenomenon.
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investors optimism and pessimism about different sources of credit risk in the market. So pwfs are
source functions. In the sequel “source function” refers to a pwf generated by a specific credit risk
source whereas “pwf” pertains to an abstract pwf.7
Time dependentbehavioural noisein the orbit of source functions induce a local empir-
ical process8 for Lyapunov exponents in fixed point probability neighbourhoods. This facilitates
estimation of critical values for investor probabilistic risk attitude factors from closed form ex-
pressions for the probability that a stable source function becomes unstable andvice versa. We
calibrate the model with data from (Polkovnichenko and Zhao, 2013), and illustrate its robustness
across credit risk sources for the 1997 Asian currency crisis, 2005 US real estate and CDO bubble,
and Great Recession of 2008. We prove that credit risk source functions implied by index option
prices provide early warning of financial market instability, and that they are sufficient statistics
for a behavioural version of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis: An economy has stable and
unstable regimes, and it transits from financial relations that make it stable to those that make it
unstable (Minsky (1986, pp. 173-174) andMinsky (1994)).














Phase diagrams for stable and unstable pwfsw(p). The behavioral stochastic
Lyapunov exponent process{λ (t,ω); t ≥ 0} in fixed point(p⋆) probability
neighbourhoodBδ (p
⋆) predict the shape of pwfs.
Figure 3.1andFigure 3.2depict the topology of our model. The phase diagram inFig-
7Refer toWakker(2010, pp. 318-321) for a detailed exposition of the source functioc ncept.
8A classic empirical process is one comprised of sums of independent and identically distributed (iid) random variables (in our
case noise) that converge to a limit process (Shorack and Wellner, 1986, pp. 1, 24).
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ure 3.1is stable because perturbed points contract to the restoring fixed point. In contrast, inFig-
ure 3.2perturbed points diverge from the fixed point. See e.g.,Devaney(1989, p. 21). Behavioural
dynamics in fixed point probability neighbourhoodsBδ (p
⋆) centered atp⋆ with radiusδ , control
the shape of pwfs, and determine phase transition of stable and unstable pwfs shapes. Specifically,
we introduce a local behavioural stochastic Lyapunov exponent (BELLE) process{λ (t,ω); t ≥ 0}
in Bδ (p
⋆) that characterizes stochastic stability of pwfs, and we calibrate it to different credit risk
source functions implied by index option prices to identify early warning signals for financial mar-
ket instability. According toMinsky (1986) new financial products increase leverage and risk in
the economy. Since the long term consequences of these financial innovations are unknown they
can cause a seemingly stable system to become unstable. We believe that the pwf implied by index
option prices is a sufficient statistic for the destabilizing effects of financial innovation since the
implied pwf summarizes investor confidence.
3.1.1 Positioning of the paper in context of related literature
A growing literature on behavioural finance features pwfs popularized byQuiggin (1982),
(Lopes, 1987, 1990) andTversky and Kahneman(1992) in the evaluation of investor risk atti-
tudes towards financial decision making (Polkovnichenko and Zhao, 2013; He and Zhou, 2013;
Kliger and Levy, 2010; Wigniolle, 2014; Dierkes, 2009, 2013; Chabi-Yo and Song, 2013; Weigert
and Ruenzi, 2013). A common theme in those papers is the impact of psychologicalfa tors or
“sentiment” such as hope, fear, aspirations, underconfidence and overconfidence on investor risk
attitudes towards tail events and formation of asset pricing bubbles.9 Several of those papers use
rank dependent utility (RDU), in conjunction with stochastic discount factors or pricing kernels10
to evaluate risky prospects. Under expected utility theory (EUT), preference for lotteries are lin-
ear functionals over probabilities for given utility of outcomes (Von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1953, p. 24, eq(3:1:b)). RDU generalizes EUT by replacing probabilities in the latter with decision
weights obtained by transforming a pwf, and it accommodates probabilistic risk attitudes via pwfs
9That strand of literature is distinguished from that spawned byBreeden and Litzenberger(1978, pp. 627,630) formulae for
recovering state price density from option prices. Refer toMerton(1992, pp. 351-354) for a review.
10Roughly, the pricing kernel is the ratio of the price of an Arrow security and an investor’s subjective probability about future
states of the economy (Breeden et al., 2015). Formally, the pricing kernel incorporate risk, intertemporal substitution, and and time
discount factors. Refer toCochrane(2005, p. 17) for details.
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(Quiggin, 1993, p. 76). Appendix3.B provides examples on how those attitudes are accommo-
dated.
In contrast, a subset of the neuroscience and by extension neuroeconomics literature study
probability distortions, and noise induced patterns, in fast and slow dynamical systems of neuronal
activity (Tobler et al., 2008; Zhang and Maloney, 2012; Berglund and Gentz, 2010). In particular,
the class of random accumulator models (RAMs) contemplate a decision maker’s accumulation of
noise terms over time whereupon a decision is reached after it attains a given threshold (Resulaj
et al., 2009). This implies thatbehavioural noiseis inherent in the decision making process and it
should be accounted for in pwf dynamics. In the experimental economics literature, among others,
Hey (1995, 2005); Blavatskky(2007); Loomes(2005); Loomes and Pogrebna(2014) study the
impact of noise on measuring risk preferences.
Even though decision times are an important element of decision making, they seem to be
neglected in the behavioural economics and finance literature (Webb, 2015). Our model fills that
gap in the literature. It synthesizes pwfs dynamics and behavioural noise to construct a behavioural
stochastic Lyapunov exponent process. Even though stochastic Lyapunov exponent processes are
known to the statistical theory (Nychka et al., 1992; McCaffrey et al., 1992) and econometrics the-
ory (Whang and Linton, 1999; Shintani and Linton, 2004; Park and Whang, 2012; BenSaı̈da, 2014)
li teratures, they have not been extended to pwf dynamics. Thus, our model is new to behavioural
finance.11
11The model is in the spirit ofShefrin (2014, p. 588) who reminds us that the highly interdisciplinary nature of behavioural
finance combines aspects of psychology, economics, mathematics, and statistics.
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Our study of pwf dynamics implied by S&P 500 index option pricesha implications for
understanding global financial market instability.12 For instance, synergies between risk prefer-
ences around the world (Szpiro, 1986; Rieger et al., 2015), integrated global financial markets
(King and Wadhwani, 1990; Bongaerts et al., 2014), and contagion from the Great Recession of
2008 triggered by U.S. real estate and CDO markets,13 imply that market instability is transmitted
globally.14 To be sure, credit spreads are also market indicators of investor fear level.15 How-
ever, the model introduced in this paper is based on a probability model of investor confidence in
financial markets.
Figure 3.3provides aschemaof how investor beliefs about credit risk sources are trans-
mitted to the CBOE VIX and the pwf implied by S&P 500 index option prices. According to
Figure 3.3, the sources of credit risk are prepayment, bankruptcy or default of debt obligations
of sovereigns, corporations and households that interrupt the cash flow streams anticipated by in-
12The S&P 500 stock market index contains the stocks of 500 Large-Cap corporations, that comprise over 70% of the total market
cap of all stocks traded in the U.S. See e.g.,http://seekingalpha.com/article/1139431-u-s-as-a-percentage-of-world-market-cap
andhttp://www.world-stock-exchanges.net/indices.html. Furthermore, the US market cap makes up over a third of the world’s stock
market cap, and(alias?) (a measure of the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index) is a sufficient statistic for investor psychology
(Whaley, 2000).
13Dymski (2010) extends Minsky’s FIH to include contagion in a globalized economy and the consideration of subprime lending
in banks investment opportunity set.
14For example, shocks to the VIX are transmitted to the global economy via flight to quality wherein investors sell relatively
risky EME bonds and buy US treasuries (Choi, 2014).
15“What is a credit spread, after all, but a measurement of the fear level associated with holding the underlying instrument? As
fear spikes, spreads widen. The worry is over a “tail” event. VIX itself moves via much the same dynamic, and often in reaction to
the exact same events. And the lion’s share of demand lies in hedging against the “tails”. . . in the VIX’s case, that translates into
out-of-the-money VIX calls.”Shaeffer Investment Research 4/2014.
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vestors over a given time horizon. This is a manifestation of the uncertainty described inMinsky
(1996, p. 362) “Money Manager Capitalism”. It makes investors probabilistic risk attitudes to-
wards credit events time and source (state) dependent. Refer toBaucells and Heukamp(2012);
Savadori and Mittone(2015) for time varying probabilistic risk attitudes. The source dependence
of pwfs (Tversky and Wakker, 1995; Kilka and Weber, 2001; Abdellaoui et al., 2011) provides
insight about probabilistic risk attitudes that is lacking in raw VIX scores.
The CBOE VIX provides a volatility score for credit risk; whereas a credit risk source
function, i.e., the pwf corresponding to the source of credit risk, reflects investors probabilistic risk
attitudes about the ranked index option prices that produce the VIX score. To see this, suppose
we are given a raw VIX score of 30 that correspond to an “objective probability” of 0.1 derived
from some forecast model. If the source of credit risk is sovereign default investors could assign a
pessimistic probability weight of 0.25 to that event. By the same token if the source of credit risk
is corporation default investors may assign to it a pessimistic probability weight of 0.15. Thus,
investors give greater weight to the sovereign default source than they do to the corporation default
source. Moreover, their assigned weight is controlled by curvature and elevation parameters of a
source function.16
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Insection 3.2we introduce the local empirical
process for the Lyapunov exponent which characterizes stochastic stability of pwfs. We provide
closed form expressions for tipping points in pwf shape reversal. Insection 3.3we calibrate the
model to pwfs corresponding to the source of credit risk implied by S&P 500 index option prices,
and show how they predict market crash and provide early warning systems for market instability.
In section 5.4we conclude.
16 Abdellaoui et al.(2011, p. 704) interpret curvature(α) and elevation(β ) parameters for (Prelec, 1998) 2-parameter pwfs, and
Abdellaoui et al.(2011, Fig. 9, p. 713) provide an example of source dependent pwfs.
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3.2 The behavioural empirical local Lyapunov exponent (BELLE) process
for probability weighting functions
In this section, we consider thefinite-timebehaviour of the Lyapunov exponent for the noisy orbit
of deterministic subjective probability distributions for a large sample of heterogenous decision
makers (DMs) with a noisy addend. Specifically, we characterize stable and unstable pwfs and the
large sample probability estimate(s) fortail event instabilityin a seemingly stable system of DMs
pwfs. And we apply it in the next section to detect market crash phenomenon in option price data.
Bδ (p
⋆) characterizes the stable and unstable pwfs for DMs in the dynamical system (see Appendix
Definition3.C.1) for pwfs based on an invariant manifold theorem that follows.17
Stable and unstable probability weighting functions
In nonlinear dynamics the stable manifold theorem (stated in Appendixsubsection 3.C.2) plays
a key role in identifying stable and unstable fixed points. It essentially decomposes an invariant
manifold into stable and unstable components (Chicone, 1999, Ch. 4). This subsection applies the
stable manifold theorem in the context of pwfs.
17“I nformally, a manifold is a subset ofRn such that, for some fixed integerk ≥ 0, each point in the subset has a neighborhood
that is essentially the same as the Euclidean spaceRk . . . Points, lines, planes, arcs, spheres, and tori are examples of manifolds.”
(Chicone, 1999, p. 28). Alternatively, a manifold implies that every pointx in an abstract spaceX can be mapped into a small ball
in Rm. The small ball is am-manifold (McLennan, 2014, p. 10).
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Figure 3.4depict stable fixed points for Prelec’s 2-factor pwf calibrated to parameter estimates for
α = 0.56,β = 0.93 for monthly index option prices data for 1996-2008 inPolkovnichenko and Zhao
(2013). The orbit generated by the iterated function system (IFS)p,w(p), . . . ,wn(p) for that plot converges
to the fixed pointp= 0.428292. This limiting value ofp is close to values reported in the experimental
economics literature (Prelec, 1998, p. 506). This is a stable attractor because all starting points for the
trajectoriesFearFix,FearFix1, FearFix2,FearFix3 converge top⋆. This is an empirical realization of the
phase portrait inFigure 3.1. By contrast,Figure 3.5depicts an unstable fixed point forα = 1.6,β = 1. A
small perturbation of the fixed point 0.36< p⋆ = e−1 ≈ 0.3679< 0.37 causes the orbit to jump top= 0
(HopeFix0 trajectory) which contains no information orp= 1 (HopeFix1 trajectory) which represents full
certainty. This is an empirical realization of the phase portrait inFigure 3.2. Thus, iterative pwf dynamics
is dispositive of pwf [in]stability.
Proposition 3.2.1(Invariant manifold for probability weighting functions).
Let F be a cumulative probability distribution, and w(F) be a probability weighting functional.
Define the set
C(F) = {F| −w(F) ln(w(F)) = F, 0≤ F ≤ 1} (3.2.1)
Then C(F) is an invariant set of fixed point functions for probability weighting. Moreover, in the
restricted case when w(F) = F we get C(F) = {0, e−1, 1} where F= p⋆ = e−1.
Proof. See Appendix3.D
Remark3.2.1. McLennan(2014, Fig. 1.2, pg. 8) identified sets likeC(F) asanessential setof fixed
points. Alternatively,C(F) is an invariant subspace of[0,1]. That is,w : C(F)→C(F)⊂ [0,1] and
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C(F) is an invariant manifold.
Corollary 3.2.2 (Invariant manifold decomposition). C(F) is decomposable into stable(S) and
unstable(U) submanifolds such that U⊕S=C(F).
Proof. Apply the stable manifold theorem insection 3.Cto C(F) in Propsition 3.2.1.
Remark 3.2.2. Since w is defined onC(F) the invariance decomposition property implies
w(S(F))⊂ S(F) andw(U(F))⊂U(F). Refer tosection 3.Cfor further details.
Corollary 3.2.3 (Linear Probability Weighting Operator). There exist a linear probability weight-
ing operatorT̂ on C(F) separating expected and nonexpected utility theories.
Proof. See Appendix3.E
The phase diagrams inFigure 3.1andFigure 3.2depict the stable manifold theorem’s decompo-
sition of the invariant manifold in Proposition3.2.1. Figure 3.4andFigure 3.5depict the stable
manifold theorem at work in the stable and unstable probability weighting functions implied by
index options.
Local Lyapunov exponent for probability weighting functions
In this subsection we formally define the Lyapunov exponent for pwfs. Intuitively, a Lyapunov
exponentλ is a measure of the rate of system divergence or convergence when two nearby initial
conditions are compared.
Definition 3.2.1 (Lyapunov exponent). Jost(2005, pg. 31). Letw(p) be a probability weight-
ing function such that the first derivativew′ exist. The Lyapunov exponent of the orbitpn =
w(pn−1), n∈ N for p0 = p is








provided the limit exist.
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This definition implies that the Lyapunov exponent is an invariant of the Jacobianw′(p j) = ∂w∂ p j
that determines local stability of the points that satisfy (3.2.2). It is the average rate of diver-
gence for theiterative function system p, w(p), w◦w(p), . . . ,w ◦ . . .◦︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−1) times
w(p) wherew◦w(p) =
w2(p), (w◦w◦w)(p) = w◦w2(p) = w3(p) and so on.
For purposes of exposition, we consider the 2-parameter probability weighting function
introduced byPrelec(1998, Prop. 1, pg. 503):18
w(p) = exp(−β (− ln(p))α), 0< α < 1, β > 0 (3.2.3)
After log differentiation we get
ln[w′(p)] = a(p;α,β ) = ln(αβ )+(α −1) ln(− ln(p))− ln(p)−β (− ln(p))α (3.2.4)
Monotonicity of w(p) guarantees thatw′(p) > 0 so the absolute value requirement in (3.2.2) is
satisfied. However, the true probability weighting functionw(p) is unknown, so the parametersα
andβ are unobservable in phase space.
3.2.1 Stochastic Lyapunov exponent process in econometrics theory
The stochastic Lyapunov exponent concept was presented in nonlinear time series analysis in
the early 1990s via its estimation with nonparametric regressions. Refer toNychka et al.(1992);
McCaffrey et al.(1992) and references therein. Important papers byBougerol and Picard(1992);
Whang and Linton(1999); Shintani and Linton(2004) extended the concept to the econometrics
theory literature. Recently,Park and Whang(2012, p. 64) introduced a nonparametric test for
random walk against a chaos alternative. In their model the sample estimate for the Lyapunov






nBn(s))|ds, t ∈ [0,1] (3.2.5)
18In Appendix3.Fwe show how the robustness of Prelec’s model can be extended to other popular 2-parameter models like that
by Goldstein and Einhorn(1987) (which is analyzed extensively inLattimore et al.(1992)). We note in passing thatStott (2006)
found that Prelec’s 2-parameter pwf is “the best model” for pwfs in his metastudy of function forms in CPT.
19Refer toKaratzas and Shreve(1991, p. 185) for technical details on this concept.
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wheremon is the first derivative of a Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator for the nonparametric non-
linear functionmn(·), defined on the space of continuous functionC[0,1] on the closed unit in-
terval, endowed with the sup norm metric, andBn(t) ∈ C[0,1] is approximate Brownian motion.
BenSaı̈da(2012); BenSaı̈da(2014) applied the tests above to financial time series that include the
S&P 500 index and failed to find chaos in the data. In the sequel, our sample function for the
Lyapunov exponent process is also a Brownian functional ofBn(t) but its “kernel estimator”mon is
parametric.
3.2.2 Representation theorem for behavioural Lyapunov exponent process
Consider a large sample ofN heterogenous decision makers (DMs). Letεi , i = 1, . . . ,N be the
measurement error associated with the choice made by thei-th DM. Furthermore, assume that
εi ∼ iid(0,σ2). We assume a common core belief in (3.2.4) so heterogeneity in the model is
represented by appendingεi to (3.2.4)20 so that
a j(p;α,β ) = a(p;α,β )+ ε j (3.2.6)
ln[w′ j(p,α,β )] = a j(p;α,β ) (3.2.7)
Let [0,T] be the finite time interval for which Lyapunov exponents are observed for each DM.
Without loss of generality we normalize the time interval to coincide with[0,1] and letΠ(n) =
{0, t(n)1 , t
(n)
2 , . . . , t
(n)




Consider the cumulative effect of DMs measurement errors at timet ∈ [t(n)k , t
(n)
k+1) defined
20Technically, this is more like measurement error. However, we could model heterogeniety as a random effect such asαi =
µi +εi j whereµi ∼ (0,σ2) andεi j is a “treatment effect” (e.g.,Kutner et al.(2005, pg. 1031);Shi et al.(2012, p. 323)). Nonetheless,
in the sequel we provide interval estimates forα andβ which satisfy the heterogeneity criteriona fortiori (e.g.,Hey and Orme
(1994, p. 1301);Loomes(2005, p. 305)).
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where[nt] is the integer part ofnt. In the psychology and neuroscience literature (3.2.8) is the basis
for a random accumulator model (RAM) of decision making over time. Most important, RAMs
admit “changes of mind” or reversal when the partial sums hit a given threshold (Resulaj et al.,
2009). The random broken line connecting the points([nt],Sj[nt]) and(nt,S
j
nt) is given by
W jn (t) = S
j
[nt]+(nt− [nt])ε j([nt]+1) (3.2.9)
By Donsker’s Theorem, i.e., functional central limit theorem, we assumeW jn (t) is an approximate
Brownian motion in the space of continuous functionsC[0,1].22 Let w(t; p,α,β ) be the state of
the core pwf at timet. According toGikhman and Skorokhod(1969, pp. 370-371), by virtue of
(3.2.4), the incremental change in time dependent pwf for thej-th DM at timet can be written as
∆ ln[w′ j(t; p,α,β )] = a j(p;α,β )∆t+σ∆W jn (t) (3.2.10)
This paves the way for the following behavioural empirical local Lyapunov exponent (BELLE)
process
Theorem 3.2.4(BELLE process). Assume that DMs probabilistic risk attitudes are characterized
byPrelec(1998) 2-parameter pwf w(p) = exp(−β (− ln(p))α). For a given sample size N of DMs
whose preferences are measured with behavioural noiseε ∼ iidN(0,1), the behavioural stochastic
21The partial sums allow us to construct an approximate random function as follows. Supposeε ∼ (0,σ2). Divide the interval




































22This is a common assumption in econometrics theory (White, 2001, Ch. 7) and probability theory (e.g.,Serfling(1980, p. 41);
Knight (1962); Gikhman and Skorokhod(1969, pp. 452-453); andKaratzas and Shreve(1991, pg. 66)).
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Lyapunov exponent processλ̄N(t; p,α,β ) has the following representation
dλ̄N(t; p,α,β ) = ām,N(p;α,β )dt+σdWn,N(t), (3.2.11)
whereām,N(p;α,β ) is a drift term,σ is a volatility coefficient, andWn,N(t) is an approximate
Brownian motion.
Proof. See Appendix3.G.
Remark3.2.3. This is a behavioural manifestation of thePark and Whang(2012) Brownian
functional result in (3.2.5). The existence and uniqueness(Gikhman and Skorokhod, 1969,
Ch. VIII, §3) of λ̄N(t; p,α,β ) is implied by Definition3.2.1.
Stochastic stability condition
Definition 3.2.2 (Stochastic stability). (Gihman and Skorohod, 1972, p. 145). A stationary point
p⋆ will be called stable if for anyε > 0, there existδ > 0 such that forBδ (p⋆) = {p : |p− p⋆|< δ}
Pr{ lim
t→∞
ξp(t) = p⋆|ξp(t) ∈ Bδ (p⋆)} ≥ 1− ε (3.2.12)
whereξp(t) is a process (possibly stochastic) starting atp.
Remark3.2.4. In our model, the fixed point probabilityp⋆ is a stationary point. (3.2.12) imply that
initial values forξp(t) converge uniformly top⋆ over time (Arnold, 1984, p. 210).
After integrating the stochastic differential equation in Theorem 3.2.4 we get the behavioural
Brownian functional







= ām,N(p;α,β )t+σ(Wn,N(t)−Wn,N(0)) (3.2.14)
The stochastic Lyapunov exponent stability condition implies negative eigenvalues (e.g., (L onov
and Kuznetsov, 2007; Hommes and Manzan, 2006), andWiggins(2003, p. 7)) and it is given by
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the folowing
Lemma 3.2.5(Stochastic Lyapunov exponent stability condition).
sup
t







Thus, in the context of Definition3.2.2the stochastic stability condition for pwfs is characterized
by (3.2.15).
3.2.3 Estimating the probability of tail event instability







If φ(·) is the probability density function forWn,N(t), then the probability density function for
supt Wn,N(t) is proportional toφ(·) (e.g.,Gikhman and Skorokhod(1969, pg. 286) andKaratzas

















































wherec0 is a constant of proportionality, andΦ(·) is the cumulative normal distribution that con-
trols numerical probability. Here,Wn,N(t) induces a Lyapunov-Perron effect23 with tail event large
deviation probability (Dembo and Zeitouni, 1998) of instability given by (3.2.19) in a seemingly
23This effect stems from the notion of hyperbolic fixed points and unstable manifolds (Wiggins, 2003, pp. 12, 50). Cursory
inspection ofFigure 3.1andFigure 3.2show thatw(F) is hyperbolic in a sufficiently large neighbourhoodBδ (p
⋆) of the fixed point
p⋆. So it contains an invariant manifold inR2.
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stable system (Leonov and Kuznetsov, 2007, p. 1079).
Theorem 3.2.6(Probability of tail event instability for a seemingly stable pwf). Assume that a
large sample size N of DMs have local stochastic Lyapunov exponent process represented by The-



































whereΦ is the cumulative normal and c0 is a constant of proportionality.
Cursory inspection of (3.2.19) shows that givenα,β ,σ at time t the probability of instability
increases sinceΦ(·) gets smaller asN gets larger. The same also holds for fixedN and increasing
t. For technical details on large deviation analysis seeD mbo and Zeitouni(1998).
Chen and Xuefeng(2003, pp. 420, 423) introduced a market microstructure model of liq-
uidity in a stock market with fundamentalist and chartists who have different confidence levels in
prices reflected in their subjective probabilities. They show that the Lyapunov exponent, which
characterize chaotic dynamics in their paper, depends critically on the number of traders in the
system.Day and Huang(1990, Prop. 3, p. 319) refer to a critical mass of noise traders in such
a system as “market sheep”. Thus, there isinherent heterogeneityassociated withN in financial
markets. In this paper the Lyapunov exponent process also depends on the numberN of DMs
and probabilistic risk attitude factors. Thus, we establish a nexus between behavioural Lyapunov
exponent and probabilistic risk attitudes.
3.2.4 Impact of the drift term on sign reversal of BELLE process
To evaluate the impact of the other control variables on Lyapunov-Perron type probability of
instability we turn to comparative statics. Rewrite the drift term in Theorem3.2.4for given p so
that
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f (α,β ; p) = ln(αβ )+(α −1) ln(− ln(p))− ln(p)−β (− ln(p))α (3.2.20)
∂ f
∂α
= α−1+ ln(− ln(p))−β (− ln(p))α+1 (3.2.21)
∂ f
∂α











− (− ln(p))α , ∂ f
∂β
> 0⇒ 0< β < (− ln(p))−α (3.2.23)
The first order effects for increasing drift (and hence increased probability of instability) in (3.2.22)
and (3.2.23) is given by
0< β < max
{α−1+ ln(− ln(p))




Sinceα controls the curvature ofw(p), it determines the degree of DM’s confidence. Whereasβ
is an elevation parameter that controls (1) the location of fixed point probability in the underlying
probability distribution, and (2) degree of “cautiously hopeful” behaviour (Lopes, 1995, p. 187).
So (3.2.24) depicts the range of elevation that control the hyperbolic fixed points for invariant
manifolds that support stability and instability. Refer toChicone(1999, p. 28) andWiggins(2003,
Ch. 3) for details on hyperbolic fixed points.Chen and Xuefeng(2003, p. 423) used a similar
analytic apparatus to identify the conditions under which chaos appear in their model. In the case
of Prelec(1998) single factor model, i.e.,β = 1,0< α < 1, we find that the set of feasible values
in (3.2.24) for curvatureα are solutions to the nonlinear equation
α−1+ ln(− ln(p))
(− ln(p))α+1 > 1 (3.2.25)
⇒ (− ln(p))α+1−α−1− ln(− ln(p))< 0 (3.2.26)
We summarize the result above in
Proposition 3.2.7(Critical values of probabilistic risk factors). Given a large sample N of DMs
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with core Prelec (1998) 2-parameter pwfs (α and β ) in a dynamical system with behavioural
stochastic Lyapunov exponent process in psychological space characterized by Theorem3.2.4, the
tail event probability of instability in Theorem3.2.6depends on either of the following
1. growth in sample size N or time t or both;
2. curvature(α) and elevation(β ) of pwfs that induce the range of critical probabilistic risk
attitude factors
0< β (p)< max{ϕ1(α, p),ϕ2(α, p)};
3. increased precision in the diffusion coefficientσ for classifying measurement error or be-
havioural noise by DMs;
whereϕ1(α, p) =
α−1+ ln(− ln(p))
(− ln(p))α+1 andϕ2(α, p) = (− ln(p))
−α .
3.3 Market instability identified by behavioural Lyapunov exponent process
In this section we plot and describe the source functions, i.e., pwfs, implied by option prices from
parameter estimates inPolkovnichenko and Zhao(2013). We calibrate analytic expressions from
our criterion function for market instability in Proposition3.2.7, and compare the predictions of
the theory to historic events in option price behavior.24 The following definition is adapted from
Wakker(2010, p. 320) and it plays a key role below.
Definition 3.3.1 (Source function). Assume that all uncertainties can be quantified in terms of
probabilities, and that a source is a specific set of events. For each eventE defineW(E) as
wS(PS(E)) whereS is the source from whichE obtains,PS is a probability measure onS, and
wS is the pwf corresponding toE. We callwS asource function.
24Constantinides(1990) and Abel (1990) used a similar calibration methodology for analytic expressions in their models to
illustrate their resolution of the equity premium puzzle.
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Figure 3.6: Duke/CFO Magazine Global Optimism Index
Figure 3.7: Duke/CFO Magazine US Optimism Index
Source: Duke/CFO Business Outlook Survey athttp://www.cfosurvey.org/.
Cursory inspection ofFigure 3.7plotted from the Duke/ CFO Magazine Survey on optimism
shows that US CFOs optimism scores are uniformly higher for their firms’ prospects compared
to that for the economy. Evidently CFOs are more uncertain about the economy than they are for
their own firms. Therefore, we would expect CFO source function for the economy to be above that
for their firms. Cf. Hogarth and Einhorn(1990). CFO Global optimism in Europe, Japan, Latin
America and Africa also show distinct patterns inFigure 3.6. Therefore, the source functions for
those CFOs will be different.
3.3.1 Calibrating credit risk sources of pwfs implied by S&P 500 index option
Polkovnichenko and Zhao(2013, pg. 595, Fig. 5) derived estimates ofPrelec(1998) 2-parameter
pwf for shape parameterα and elevation parameterβ assuming CRRA utilityu(x) = x
1−γ
1−γ and
γ = 2.0, for S&P500 option price data over the sample period January 1996 to December 2008.
The source functions with thoseα andβ values are plotted inFigure 3.8for p= 0 to p= 1 in steps
of 0.01. We describe them as follows.
On June 19, 1997 there was pessimism in the option market depicted by the concave-
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convex inverted S-shape curve(α = 0.56, β = 0.93) in Figure 3.8. This was around the time of
the Asian currency crisis (Mishkin, 1999; Corsetti et al., 1999) so we label thatcredit risk source
function WAsiacurrency= w
Asia
1997(p; α = 0.56, β = 0.93).
By April 21, 2005 the state changed to optimism depicted by the convex-concave skewed
S-shape curve(α = 1.6, β = 1) in Figure 3.8. This time there was a real estate bubble in the US
(Zhou and Sornette, 2006) driven by sub-prime loans and asset securitization.25 So we label that
credit risk source function WUSRealEstateCDO= w
US
2005(p; α = 1.6, β = 1.0).
Early warning critical values of probabilistic risk factors
Undeniably, option market sentiment had aphase transition from pessimism to optimismbe-
tween 1997 and 2005. Theβ (p)-instability distribution predicted by Proposition3.2.7is plotted
in Figure 3.9for β (p) = min{max{ϕ1(α, p),ϕ2(α, p)},βc} whereϕ1(α, p) =
α−1+ ln(− ln(p))
(− ln(p))α+1
andϕ2(α, p) = (− ln(p))−α andβc is the observed pwf elevation parameter, i.e., theβ parame-
ter estimated byPolkovnichenko and Zhao(2013) for WAsiacurrency andW
US
RealEstateCDO. We construe
βc as the “true value”. The plot excludes values ofβ (p) > βc since they are inadmissible, so
it is truncated accordingly as depicted. A quadratic curve inp was fitted forβ (p) as indicated.
According toFigure 3.9, the region of instability for both curves inFigure 3.8is supported by
probability values less than the fixed point probabilityp∗ = 0.4. For example, 0< p ≤ 0.4 for
WAsiacurrencyandW
US
RealEstateCDO. This is the probability support for low ranked option prices. It reflects
low quality assets, long shot bias, and high risk assets.Figure 3.9shows that DMs withα = 1.6
and 0.26≤ β (p) < 0.74 are prone to induce instability in states of optimism or overconfidence
whenβc = 1. In contrast, DMs
25Adelson(2013) argues that sub prime loans and mortgages “may have served asthe spark that ignited the powder keg” of
underlying causes of the Great Recession of 2008 but it was not the cause. TheFinancial Crisis Inquiry Comission(2011, Ch. 10)
referred to this period as “The Madness”.
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Figure 3.8: Source functions implied by
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Figure 3.9:β (p)-instability distribution

















alpha=1.6, b=1 alpha=0.56, b=0.93
Figure 3.10:β (p) instability (0.6, 0.2) for
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Figure 3.11:β (p)-instability (0.7, 0.5) for
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Figure 3.8is calibrated withPolkovnichenko and Zhao(2013) estimates forPrelec(1998) 2-parameter
source functions for 1997 Asian currency crisis(α = 0.56,β = 0.93) and 2005 US real estate and CDO
bubble(α = 1.6,β = 1) for CRRA parameterγ = 2. Figure 3.9depicts the distribution of critical values
for early warning and tipping point for market crash when p=0.4 for each source function.Figure 3.10and
Figure 3.11depict source functions for market crash for 2005 US real estate and CDOβ (p) = 0.2 and 0.5
resp., and market instability for 1997 Asian currencyβ (p) = 0.6 and 0.7 resp.
with α = 0.56 and 0.63≤ β (p) < 0.93 are prone to induce instability in states of pessimism or
underconfidence when the trueβc = 0.93. According toPolkovnichenko and Zhao(2013, p. 585)
β shifts the distribution andα mainly affects the tails.
140
3.3.2 Calibrated source functions predicted by tipping pointvalue
In the analysis that follows we reiterate that pwfs are identified with the source of credit risk so
they are source functions in accord with Definition3.3.1. Table 3.1presents parameter values used
in the analysis below.
Table 3.1: Parameter values for credit risk source functions
Parameter Asia 1997 Currency Crisis US 2005 Real Estate & CDO Bubble
α-curvature 0.56 1.60
β -elevation 0.93 1.00
p⋆-fixed point 0.40 0.40
β (p)-instability 0.60 0.20
0.70 0.50
β (p)-tipping point 0.93 0.67
The plots corresponding to the parameter values above are depicted inFigure 3.8,
Figure 3.9, Figure 3.10andFigure 3.11. Tipping point values forβ (p⋆) are depicted
in Figure 3.9.
Source function for US real estate and CDO bubble circa 2005
To illustrate our theory for US real estate and CDO source functions, we selectβ (p)-
instability valuesβ = 0.25 andβ = 0.5 from the distribution of critical values predicted by Propo-
sition 3.2.7to characterize dynamics of the underlying source functions.The orientation of the
skew S-shaped source functionWUSRealEstateCDOfor (α = 1.6,β = 1.0) in Figure 3.8switched to an
all concave shape inFigure 3.10depictingex ante WUS, crashRealEstateCDO(p; crit (α = 1.6,β = 0.2)) for
fixed α = 1.6, and critical valueβ = 0.2. So the relative strength of DMs confidence is such that
they are now uniformly fearful and pessimistic over the entire range of rank ordered option prices.
Similarly, in Figure 3.11theex antesource functionWUS, crashRealEstateCDO(p; crit (α = 1.6,β = 0.5)) is
concave forα = 1.6 and critical valueβ = 0.5. Cursory inspection ofFigure 3.10andFigure 3.11
showWUS, crashRealEstateCDO(p; crit (α = 1.6,β = 0.2)) > W
US, crash
RealEstateCDO(p; crit (α = 1.6,β = 0.5)). Ac-
cording toHogarth and Einhorn(1990, Fig. 2, Fig. 4, pp. 786-787) the higher curve implies greater
ambiguity in the market. Nonetheless, each of those functions symbolize market crash since DMs
are uniformly pessimistic.
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Source function for Asian currency crisis circa 1997
The elevation of the inverse S-shaped source functionWAsia1997(p; α = 0.56, β = 0.93) in Fig-
ure 3.8for α = 0.56,β = 0.93 has a fixed point probabilityp∗ = 0.4. However, whenβ = 0.6 the
fixed point probability jumped from 0.4 to aboutp∗ = 0.75 in Figure 3.10. According toHogarth
and Einhorn(1990, Fig. 2, pp. 785-786), this northeast movement of the fixed point p∗ = 0.75, as-
sociated withex antesource functionWAsia1997(p; crit (α = 0.56, β = 0.6)), implies larger anticipated
losses. In this case the market was more cautious than hopeful. In contrast, whenα = 0.56 and
β = 0.7 the fixed point probability forex antesource functionWAsia1997(p; crit (α = 0.56, β = 0.7))
falls to aboutp∗ = 0.7 in Figure 3.11. In this case, the market was less cautious and more hopeful
compared to whenp∗ = 0.75. Each one of the source function plots inF gure 3.10andFigure 3.11
depict probabilistic preference reversal relative to the corresponding plots inFigure 3.8. Evidently,
β (p) elevation shifts the underlying distribution for given sentiment reflected byα curvature.
Out-of-sample prediction of 2008 Great Recession market crash
Figure 3.10and Figure 3.11show that DMs in the market are pessimistic over most or
all option prices. Financial market crash is predicted by theex anteconcave source functions
WUS, crashRealEstateCDO(p; crit (α = 1.6,β = 0.2)) andW
US, crash
RealEstateCDO(p; crit (α = 1.6,β = 0.5)) for the crit-
ical β (p) values 0.2, 0.5. In Figure 3.5those fixed points are unstable attractors. They coincide
with the case of fixed point probabilities 0 or 1 in Proposition3.2.1. So we would
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Reported Bullish Reported Neutral Reported Bearish
Poly. (Reported Bullish) Poly. (Reported Neutral) Poly. (Reported Bearish)
1990 Japanese Real 
Estate Crisis 
2008 US Real Estate 
Crisis 
“The AAII Investor Sentiment Survey measures the percentage of individual investors who are bullish,
bearish, and neutral on the stock market for the next six months; individuals are polled from the ranks of
the AAII membership on a weekly basis. Only one vote per member is accepted in each weekly voting
period.” Source:http://www.aaii.com/SentimentSurvey?adv=yes. A 5th-degree polynomial smoother was
used to generate sentiment waves.
expect a small volume of trade or no trade at all, because the market breaks down since all traders
are uniformly pessimistic about asset quality (e.g.,Akerlof (1970); Harris and Raviv(1993) and
Stiglitz and Grossman(1976, p. 250)). The uniform fear predicted by ourβ (p)-instability criterion
function is characteristic of market crashes of the type that led to the Great Recession of 2008. Al-
ternatively, it signifies heightened uncertainty in the market.26 For example, on or about September
13, 2008 just before Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy there was tremendous uncertainty about
whether the Federal Reserve Bank of New York would step in and bail them out and credit markets
froze to a halt (De Haas and Van Horen, 2012).
Figure 3.12supports the market crash scenarios represented by our sourcefunction anal-
ysis. It depicts 5th-degree polynomial smoothers for weekly sentiment data for Bulls, Bears, and
26 Abdellaoui et al.(2011, p. 706) depicted this phenomenon with a convex dashed line curve over gains whileHogarth and
Einhorn(1990, Fig. 4, p. 787) depicted this phenomenon as a concave functionover losses. The latter depiction is consistent with
WUS2005crit(α,β (p)) in Figure 3.10andFigure 3.11. Charles-Cadogan(2016b, Appendix A.1) shows how the curvature of pwfs
reflect probabilistic risk attitudes like loss aversion for pessimists (concave) and risk seeking for optimists (convex).
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Risk neutral survey participants for American Association ofIndividual Investors data for the pe-
riod June 1987 to June 2011. During the Great Recession of 2008, induced by the US Real Estate
market failure, there was very little difference of opinion between Bulls and Bears. In fact, the
Bears were slightly more bullish than the Bulls! Similarly, during the 1990 Japanese Real estate
crisis (Peek and Rosengren, 2000) there was no difference of opinion between Bulls and Bears
and markets crashed. Ourβ (p)-instability analysis predicts that those scenarios are represented by
uniformly concave source functions like those inFigure 3.10andFigure 3.11.
Polkovnichenko and Zhao(2013, Fig. 6, p. 593) provide a time series plot of Prelec’s
(α, β ) reproduced inFigure 3.13. By eyeballing the plot around when the market crashed in
2008, one finds thatα ≈ 1.2 andβ ≈ 0.93 for γ = 0 which corresponds to risk neutrality over
outcomes. So the bulk of the risk preference load is carried by the shape of the underlying source
function(s). According to Proposition3.2.7, Figure 3.15predicts that the tipping point value for
β (p)-instability is β (p) = 0.904095 whenα = 1.2 and p = 0.4. Furthermore, the fixed point
probability p∗ = 0.4 in Figure 3.8moved South-West along the diagonal towardsp = 0. This is
consistent with the prediction for unstable pwf inFigure 3.5where the fixed pointp∗ = 0.4 was
perturbed and the iterative function system converged to the South-West cornerp= 0. Ourβ (p)-
instability distribution makes the strikingout-of-sampleprediction that forα = 1.2 the market will
crash at tipping pointβ (p) = 0.9.27
27That tipping point value is different from the tipping point valueβ (p) = 0.65 whenα = 1.6 in Figure 3.9sinceβ depends on
α as input in Proposition3.2.7.
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Figure 3.13: Time series plot forPrelec(1998) (α ,β )































Figure 3.13is a reproduction ofPolkovnichenko and Zhao(2013, Fig. 6, p. 593) time series plot forPrelec
(1998) (α , β ). The valueα = 1.2 in 2008 is for CRRA parametersγ = 0,1.
Figure 3.14: Source function for 2008
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Figure 3.15:β (p)-instability for 2008
Great Recession Market Crash


















a=1.2, b=1 Poly. (a=1.2, b=1)
b(0.4)=0.92564 
Figure 3.15depicts the predictedβ (p)-instability out-of-sampleearly warning and tipping point market
crash value ofβ (p) = 0.9 at p=0.4 forWUS2005crit(α = 1.2,β = 1). Figure 3.14depicts the concave source
function for the crash value ofβ (p) = 0.9 for α = 1.2. The fixed point shifted to the left (Cf.Figure 3.5).
Eyeballing the plot inFigure 3.13shows that when the market crashed in 2008 theex-postvalue was
β (p)≈ 0.93 for α = 1.2 andγ = 0. So ourβ (p)-instability out-of-sampletipping point value 0.9 in 2005
predicted the crash value 0.93 realized in 2008.
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Theex-postvalue inFigure 3.13is β ≈ 0.93 when the market crashed in 2008.Figure 3.14depicts
the source function forWUS2008crit(α = 1.2,β = 0.9). Qualitatively, the curve is almost uniformly
concave–a prerequisite for market crash.28 Moreover, the market appears to be well calibrated for
low ranked option prices since the source function coincides with linear probability weighting for
p≤ 0.2. Cf. Corollary 3.2.3. We reiterate thatFigure 3.13provides time series plots whereas our
β (p)-instability number was generated by the closed form expression in Proposition3.2.7.
3.4 Conclusion
We contribute to the literature on financial market instability with a behavioural Lyapunov expo-
nent process for stochastic stability of probability weighting functions (pwfs) implied by index
option prices. We show how the shape of pwfs depend on the prevailing source of credit risk in
the market so they are “source functions”. While our model cannot predict the precise date of a
market crash, it predicts critical out-of-sample tipping point values for a single output parameter
that predict market crash for given market sentiment input parameter(s). We illustrated the model’s
robustness across different credit risk sources, e.g., the Asian currency crisis in 1997, US real estate
and CDO bubble in 2005, and its striking out-of-sample performance which would have predicted
the Great Recession of 2008. Thus, we provide new tools for identifying early warning signals
for market instability. Further research includes calibrating the model to provide estimates for the
probability of market crash.
3.A APPENDIX
3.B Constructing probabilistic risk attitudes with pwfs: Example
LetU(x) =
√
x be a concave utility function depicted inFigure 3.16, x= (4,9,16) be a distribution
of outcomes ranked from worst to best, andp = (1/2, 3/8, 1/8) be a probability distribution over




8) bea lottery constructed from the pair(x, p).
28Our model is based on the assumption thatγ = 2. However,Polkovnichenko and Zhao(2013) reports that there is very little
qualitative difference in their empirical pwfs for 0≤ γ ≤ 2.
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Choice under expected utility theory
The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953) is the expected





piU(xi) = (1/2)(2)+(3/8)(3)+(1/8)(4)= 21/8= 2.625 (3.B.1)
In this contrived example, the actuarial value ofL is E[x] = 59/8 andU(E[x])≈ 2.7. SoU(E[x])>
E[U(x)] =V(p) andU(xCE) = 2.625⇒ xCE ≈ 6.89 wherexCE is certainty equivalent. Risk averse
decision makers (DMs) prefer to receive 6.89 for certain rather than play the lotteryL. Their
required risk premium to playL is ϖ = E[x]−xCE = 0.485.
Choice under rank dependent utility
Rank dependent utility (RDU) byQuiggin (1982, 1993) posits the existence of a probability
weighting function (pwf) w(p) that does not sum to 1 and from whichdecision weightsπ
are constructed as follows.π1 = w(1/2); π2 = w(1/2+ 3/8)− w(1/2) = w(7/8)− w(1/2);
andπ3 = 1−w(7/8). Wakker(2010, Ch. 5) provides details on the decision weight procedure.





πiU(xi) = π1×2+π2×3+π3×4 (3.B.2)
If we sum the decision weights we getπ1+π2+π3 =w(1/2)+w(7/8)−w(1/2)+1−w(7/8) = 1.
However nonlinearity ofw impliesw(7/8)+w(1/8) 6= 1.
Assumption 3.B.1.Assume w(7/8)+w(1/8)> 1 and either (A) w(1/8) < 1/8 or (B) w(1/8) >
1/8.
Under assumption3.B.1(A) we have 1−w(7/8) < w(1/8) < 1/8 and w(7/8) > 7/8. Under
assumption3.B.1(B) we havew(1/8)> max{1/8, 1−w(7/8)}=⇒ w(1/8)> 1/8 andw(7/8)<
7/8.
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The inequality in assumption3.B.1(B) implies that decision makers (DMs) arep ssimistic
about the lower ranked outcomes because they weight the cumulative probability of those outcomes
occurring as if they are greater than they really are. However, even thoughw(7/8) weights the sum
of p1 = 1/2 andp2 = 3/8 it tells us nothing about the individual weightsw(1/2) andw(3/8). For
example, it is possible that even thoughw(7/8) > 7/8 in assumption3.B.1(A) we can still have
w(3/8)< 3/8 andw(1/2)> 1/2 orw(3/8)> 3/8 andw(1/2)< 1/2. (Wakker, 2010, Ch. 7) refers
to related scenarios as pessimism and likelihood insensitivity. Substitution ofw(1/8) for π3 =
(1−w(7/8)) in (3.B.2) highlights the implication of nonlinearity. So nowRDU(p) = 2w(1/2)+
3(w(7/8)− w(1/2)) + 4w(1/8) implies RDU(p) > 3(w(7/8) + w(1/8)) + w(1/8)− w(1/2) >
3+1/8−w(1/2) under assumption3.B.1(B). If RDU(p)< E[U(x)] =V(p)<U(E[x]), then we
must have the valuation 3+1/8−w(1/2) < 21/8⇒ w(1/2) > 1/2. Thus, DMs arepessimistic
andrisk averseaboutx= 4. If RDU(p) >U(E[x])> E[U(x)] =V(p), thenw(1/2)< 1/2. Thus,
DMs are
Figure 3.18: Empirical probability weighting functions
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optimisticandrisk seekingaboutx= 4 even though the underlying concave utility functionU(x)
only supports risk averse preferences overx. Thus, DMsentiment, i.e., pessimism and or optimism,
is driven by the pwf which picks up convexity in preferences whereasU(x) in Figure 3.16does
not. Thus, forπ2 = w(7/8)−w(1/2) we have either (a)π2 < 3/8 or (b)π2 > 3/8. For scenario
(a) we havew(7/8)−w(1/2)< 3/8⇒ w(7/8)< 3/8+w(1/2). Recall thatw(7/8)> 7/8 under
assumption3.B.1(A). Thus, we get 7/8<w(7/8)< 3/8+w(1/2)⇒w(1/2)> 1/2. So now DMs
are pessimistic aboutx= 4 . However, by hypothesisw(1/8) > 1−w(7/8) satisfies assumption
3.B.1(A) whenw(1/8)< 1/8. So we have{w(1/8)< 1/8, w(1/2)> 1/2, w(7/8)> 7/8}.
For scenario(b) we havew(7/8)−w(1/2) > 3/8⇒ w(7/8) > 3/8+w(1/2). Under as-
sumption 3.B.1(B) w(7/8)< 7/8 and w(1/8)> 1/8. So combining scenario(b) with assumption
3.B.1(B) we get 3/8+w(1/2) < w(7/8) < 7/8. This implies thatw(1/2) < 1/2. So we have
{w(1/8) > 1/8, w(1/2) < 1/2,w(7/8) < 7/8}. The fixed point probabilityp⋆ is the same for
each scenario above. Scenarios (a) and (b) imply that the underlying shape of the pwf is as fol-
lows:
(a) Concave-convex inverse S-shape:{w(1/2)> 1/2; w(7/8)> 7/8; w(1/8)< 1/8}
(b) Convex-concave S-shape: {w(1/2)< 1/2; w(7/8)< 7/8; w(1/8)> 1/8}
These pwfs shapes inFigure 3.18are not exhaustive. They are simply two of many that reflect the
latent heterogeneity in probabilistic risk attitudes towards the lotteryL for given utility functionU .
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3.C The stable manifold theorem and preliminaries
This appendix provides some preliminaries and an elementary statement of the stable manifold
theorem.
3.C.1 Preliminaries
Definition 3.C.1 (Qualities of a dynamical system).
A dynamical system is a system that evolves in time through the iterated application
of an underlying dynamical rule. That transition rule describes the change of the ac-
tual state in terms of itself and possibly also previous states. The dependence of the
state transitions on the states of the system itself means that the dynamics is recursive.
In particular, a dynamical system is not a simple input-output transformation, but the
actual states depend on the systems own history. In fact, an input need not even be
given to the system continuously, but rather it may be entirely sufficient if the input is
only given as an initial state and the system is then allowed to evolve according only
to its internal dynamical rule. This will represent the typical paradigm of a dynamical
system. (Jost, 2005, p. 1).
Definition 3.C.2 (Dynamical system). (Rebaza, 2012, p. 327).
Let E be an open set inRn, i.e.,E ⊂Rn. The functionφ : R×E →E defined byφ(t,x) = exp(At)x
defines a dynamical system onE. Specifically, if ẋ = Ax with initial valuex(t0) = x0, then its
solutionx(t) = exp(At)x0 defines how a statex ∈ E evolves over time. Ifx = f (x) is a nonlinear
system, thenA=D f (x) is the Jacobian for a local linearization.
Definition 3.C.3 (Invariant subspace). (Rebaza, 2012, p. 338).
A subsetS⊂ Rn is called invariant with respect to the systemẋ= Ax if exp(At)S⊂ S. For instance,
for any initial valuex(t0) = x ∈ S, the solutionx(t) = exp(At)x0 stays inS for all t ≥ 0.
Definition 3.C.4 (Eigenvalue criterion for stability). (Rebaza, 2012, p. 338).
Let λ j = a j + ib j , j = 1, . . . ,n be a complex valued eigenvalue ofA in Definition 3.C.2 with
eigenvectorsu j = v j + iw j . Then we define
Es = span{v j ,w j : a j < 0} (stable subspace)
Eu = span{v j ,w j : a j > 0} (unstable subspace)
Ec = span{v j ,w j : a j = 0} (center subspace)
All three subspaces are invariant with respect to the system. Furthermore, they induce the identity
Es⊕Eu⊕Ec = Rn (3.C.1)
The⊕ symbol means that for anyx∈ Rn we have the decompositionx=u+v+w with u∈Es, v∈
Eu,w ∈ Ec.
Definition 3.C.5(Homeomorphism). A homeomorphism is a functionh : A→B that is a bijection,
is continuous and whose inverse is also continuous.
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Definition 3.C.6 (Differentiable manifold). A differentiable manifold of dimension as a set that
is locally homeomorphic to the usual Euclidean spaceRn. A differentiable manifold is in fact
a topological space that generalizes the intuitive and geometric notion of a curve or a surface.
Consider for example the one-dimensional spaceR. (say, the usual x axis). Then a differentiable
manifold homeomorphic to it, is the cubic parabolay= x3: It is a continuous deformation of thex
axis.
3.C.2 Statement of stable manifold theorem
In the case of pwfs in this paper the fixed point probabilityp⋆ is an equilibrium point and the
neighbourhoodBδ (p
⋆) is differentiable manifold. Without loss of generality, we consider the
equilibrium point to be the origin in the following.
Theorem 3.C.1(Stable manifold theorem). (Rebaza, 2012, p. 343).
Let E ⊂ Rn be open containing the origin, let f∈C1(E), and letφt be the floẇx = f (x). Suppose
the origin is a hyperbolic equilibrium point and that A= D f (0) has k eigenvalues with negative
real part and the remaining n−k eigenvalues have positive real part. Then,
(a) There exists a k-dimensional differentiable manifold S tangent to Es at the origin, such that
φt(S)⊂ S,∀t ≥ 0 and limt→∞ = 0,∀x∈ S.
(b) There exists a(n−k)-dimensional differentiable manifold S tangent to Eu at the origin, such
that φt(U)⊂U,∀t ≤ 0 and limt→∞ = 0,∀x∈U.
3.D Proof of invariant manifold Proposition 3.2.1
Proof. By construction we can rewritew(F) = exp(− Fw(F)). The distribution function(s)F which
solves that nonlinear equation represents fixed probability distributions that satisfy the equation.
By definition,F represents a continuum of probabilities. Specifically,
1. let ξp be thep-quantile ofF. Define the set of probabilitiesX(p) = {p| −w(p) ln(w(p)) =
p, F(ξp) = P(X ≤ ξp) = p, F ∈C(F)}. By constructionX(p) is a cluster set of probabilities
since it contains the accumulation or fixed pointsp that satisfy the entropy equation, and by
constructionX(p)⊆C(F). HenceC(F) is a hereditary cluster set.
2. SupposeF ∈C(F), andp /∈X(p). The latter relation implies that−w(F(ξp)) ln(w(F(ξp))) 6=
F(ξp) andF(ξp) /∈C(F). This contradicts our incipient hypothesisF ∈C(F). In which case
F(ξp) = p∈ X(p) andC(F)⊆ X(p).
The results of 1. and 2. imply thatC(F)=X(p). In which caseC(F) is a cluster set of probabilities.
The restrictionW(F(ξp)) = F(ξp) = p produces the fixed point solutionW(F) = F = exp(−1).
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3.E Proof of linear probability weighting operator Corollary 3.2.3
Proof. Let C(F) be the domain of definition of an operatorT̂ that mapsC(F) into itself. Vizly,
D(T̂) =C(F) andT̂ : C(F)→C(F). Let h1, h2 ∈C(F) and choose constantsθ1 andθ2 such that
θ1h1+θ2h2 ∈C(F). Thusθ1h1+θ2h2 has a fixed point representation so by hypothesis
T̂(θ1h1+θ2h2) = θ1h1+θ2h2 = θ1T̂(h1)+θ2T̂(h2) (3.E.1)
Sinceθ1h1+θ2h2 ∈ D(T̂), the relationship in (3.E.1) implies thatT̂ is a linear operator by defini-
tion.
3.F Robustness ofPrelec (1998) 2-parameter pwf and other 2-parameter
pwfs
In this appendix we provide a simple first order correspondence exercise betweenPrel c(1998)
2-parameter pwf and other popular 2-parameter pwfs byGoldstein and Einhorn(1987) (GE) and
















w(p) = exp(−β (− ln p)α) (Prelec)










w(pm)≈ 1−β (− ln pm)α (3.F.2)






















whereβ andα are elevation and curvature parameters.Lattimore et al.(1992, Figure 1a, pp.˙380-
381) provide examples of how the shapes generated by (Goldstein Einhorn) model correspond to
those inPrelec(1998, Figure 2).al Nowaihi and Dhami(2006) show how (3.F.4) can be modified
to find α values for what they call “higher order Prelec” pwfs that cut the diagonal (45o line)
more than once.Cavagnaro et al.(2013) provide a mechanism for selecting among competing
pwfs. Additionally,Blavatskyy(2013, p. 15) conducted robustness checks between a 2-parameter
cubic pwf he introduced, a 1-parameter Prelec pwf, power function for pwf, Goldstein-Einhorn
pwf, and Tversky-Kahneman pwf. He found that “[f]or a great majority of subjects the goodness
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of fit” between between his cubic function “is not significantlydifferent from that of [the other]
functions”. Thus, we conclude thatPrelec(1998) 2-parameter specification is robust.
3.G Proof of representation theorem for behavioural stochastic Lyapunov
exponent process Theorem3.2.4












∆W jn (t) (3.G.1)
Substituting∆ ln[w′ j(t; p,α,β )] for ln|w′(p j)| in (3.2.2), and by virtue of the continuous mapping
theorem (White, 2001, Thm. 7.20, p. 178) replacing∆t and ∆Wn with dt anddWn, respectively, we



























dW jn (t) (3.G.2)
Dividing left hand side (LHS) and right hand side (RHS) byN and using “bar” to represent sample
average, we get the stochastic Lyapunov exponent process
























W jn (t) (3.G.4)
29There is nopr term on the LHS by definition.
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Chapter 4
Harmonic Probability Weighting Functions
And The Preference Reversal Puzzle
“The gamble has been to decision research what the fruit fly has been to biology - a
vehicle for examining fundamental processes with presumably important implications
outside the laboratory”. Paul Slovic.
4.1 Introduction
The contributions of this chapter are threefold. First, we extendHogarth and Einhorn(1990)
seminal descriptive probability weighting function to a coherent harmonic probability weighting
function (HPWF) via maximum entropy methods. Second, we show how that probability model
theoretically resolves the preference reversal puzzle by identifying an observer effect in the prefer-
ence reversal phenomenon. That is, observers report preference reversal even when the true state
is procedure invarianceand transitive preferences because their (observers) very act of measure-
ment disturbs subjects probability cycles before they are complete. This is a manifestation of the
“uncertainty principle” or “observer effect” explained at length inVon Neumann(1955, Ch. VI).
Third, we show how the HPWF decomposes regret theory and rank dependent utility theory into
core expected utility theory (EUT) plus functionally equivalent stochastic error addends.
Preference reversal (PR) is a phenomenon which arises when subjects in an experiment are
asked to choose between pairs of bets with similar expected values, one bet has a high probability
of winning a relatively small sum of money (theP-bet), and the other has a low probability of
winning a large amount of money (the $-bet). Subjects typically choose theP-bet but when they
are shown each bet in insolation and asked to state a reservation price if they were to sell each bet,
they typically choose to sell the $-bet for more.1
1The PR phenomenon is not exclusive to binary choice over bets.Irwin et al. (1993) find PR in environmental choices, and
Amiel, Cowell, Davidovitz, and Polovin(Amiel et al.) find it in policy decisions involving income inequality.Hinvest et al.(2014)
collects references to non economics contexts where the PR phenomenon is observed.
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The following example is taken fromGoldstein and Einhorn(1987, pp. 236-237). Suppose
subjects choose between the following bets, one of which has a high probability of winning a small
amount of money (P-bet) and the other, which has a low probability of winning a large amount of
money ($-Bet):
P-bet: Win $4 withp= 0.97, Lose $l withp= 0.03
$-bet: Win $16 withp= 0.31, Lose $1.5 withp= 0.69
When subjects are asked to choose which gamble they prefer to play, approximately half choose
the P-bet over the $-bet. When each gamble is presented singly and subjects are asked to state
the lowest selling price for the gamble if they owned it, the $-bet receives a higher price than the
P-bet. If selling prices reflect preferences, then preference reverses depending on whether subjects
chooses or states selling prices.
The PR phenomenon is of concern because of its implication for policy and resource al-
location. For example, imputed values for non-tradeable items may be elicited from surveys and
policymakers may use the responses to inform resource allocation. If the preference ranking ex-
trapolated from survey responses do not reflect the choices that respondents would actually make,
then the survey elicited valuation is unreliable and policy is misinformed. According toSeidl
(2002) the literature identifies four causes of preference reversal:
• elicitation mode of certainty equivalent (CE);
• intransitivity of preferences;
• overpricing of $-bet and/or underpricing ofP-bet;
• nonlinear probabilities.
In this paper our focus in on (1) intransitivity of preferences, and (2) nonlinear probabilities. We
do not consider elicitation mode such as probability equivalent, and pricing issues, and we know
of no single model that addresses all four causes of PR simultaneously. Specifically, we prove that
even if preferences are transitive, and procedure invariance is not violated, an observer may still
observe preference reversal if she measures choice behaviour before subjects’ probability cycles
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are completed. This theoretical result is in contrast toTversky et al.(1990) who find that violation
of procedure invariance is the leading cause of observed preference reversal.
PR was first published byLichtenstein and Slovic(1971); Lindman(1971) and confirmed
in an “artefactual field study” with casino players in real betting situations inLichtenstein and
Slovic (1973). It has proven to be quite robust (Slovic, 1995).2 Interest in the phenomenon lies
in its relation to intransitivity of preferences. The latter implicates the transitivity axiom–a cor-
nerstone of decision theory and preference based economic theory3 in particular (Tversky(1969,
p. 31),Tversky et al.(1990), Loomes et al.(1991, p. 430) andWilcox (2008, pp. 198-200)).
In the [in]transitivity context, PR implies that given a binary preference relation (where
≻ means strictly preferred and∼ means indifferent to), a set of outcomesx,y,zsuch that a decision
maker (DM) expressesx ≻ y andy ≻ z, if she is prepared to pay a feeε to acquirex, and if her
elicited preferences arex≻ y≻ z≻ x, then that DM is vulnerable to a money pump or Dutch book
that extracts an amountε at the end of each cycle (Fishburn, 1988, p. 44). Evidently, violation
of the transitivity axiom involves some kind of cyclic behaviour.4 For example,Tversky(1969,
p. 31) surmised “that the observed inconsistencies reflect inherent variability or momentary fluc-
tuation in the evaluative process. This consideration suggests that preference should be defined
in a probabilistic fashion.” (emphasis added).Loomes and Sugden(1982); Bell (1982); Loomes
and Sugden(1983) introduced regret theory which accommodatessome intransitive preferences
(Loomes et al., 1991). Lichtenstein and Slovic(1971) proffered aninformation processinghy-
pothesis as the cause of PR. Even though several other hypotheses have been offered to explain the
PR phenomenon (seeLichtenstein and Slovic(2006) for a review), to the best of our knowledge,
the “information processing” hypothesis has not been explored in “a probabilistic fashion” in the
context of information theory.5
This paper fills a gap in the literature by presenting a new approach toSeidl(2002, p. 637)
2The opening paragraph of the oft cited paper byGrether and Plott(1979) states that that “paper reports the results of a series
of experiments designed to discredit the psychologists’ works as applied to economics.”. Instead, their experiments reaffirmed
preference reversal.
3For instance, if extant preference based economic theory is unable to resolve personal equilibrium pricing (Kősze i and Rabin,
2006) within a DM, how much more likely is it to resolve the indifference pricing puzzle among DMs? Cf.Mataramvura(2015).
4Rubinstein and Segal(2012, p. 2485) claim the maximal probability that a random samplingprocedure yields such cycle is827.
5In cognitive science, Jerome Busemeyer and his co-workers resolve the preference reversal puzzle in the context of quantum
information processing which employs quantum probability tools borrowed from quantum mechanics (Busemeyer and Diederich,
2002; Busemeyer and Wang, 2007; Pothos and Busemeyer, 2009; Busemeyer et al., 2011).
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observation that “it seems that the explanation of preferencerev rsals by intransitive preferences
is still an open issue.” It introduces an information theory of preference reversal by an through a
coherent harmonic probability weighting function (HPWF) derived from applyingJaynes(1968)
principle of maximum entropy to a distribution of outcomes.6 Conceptually, it synthesizes the
information processing, probabilistic choice, and momentary fluctuation hypotheses of preference
reversal and intransitive preferences. The HPWF extendsHogarth and Einhorn(1990) descriptive
outcome dependent pwf as indicated in the sequel. We use simulation to confirm that a simple
affine transformation of our maximum entropy induced HPWF produces a sinusoidal inverted S-
shaped probability weighting functional consistent with likelihood insensitivity7 reported inTver-
sky and Wakker(1995), and in recent source function theory of uncertainty byAbdellaoui et al.
(2011).8 However, to the best of our knowledge the inherent HPWF result predicted by maximum
entropy is new.9
We assume two procedurally invariant experiments with the same DMs are temporally
spaced. Preference functions are the same in each experiment. Thus the preference reversal burden
is carried by probability distributions over outcomes. In that way, “preferences are defined in
a probabilistic fashion”. We prove that DMs appear to violate the transitivity axiom when the
probability cycles10 of their HPWF are incomplete. To the best of our knowledge, the probability
cycles resolution of the PR puzzle is new. We prove that experimenters interfere with thein er nt
HPWF induced by a statistical ensemble of outcomes in a lottery, when they assign probabilities to
outcomesex ante. The interference causes them to observe PR in the lab when the true state is no
PR. This is a manifestation of the “uncertainty principle” or “observer effect” explained at length
6In the neuroeconomics and psychophysics literatureTakahashi(2006) introduced a stylized pwf based on the difference be-
tween perceived probability and Claude Shannon’s entropy measure of uncertainty for probabilities. The pwf is maximized when
entropy is minimum.
7Geometrically, this concept refers to flatness in the central portion of a pwf relative to its extremes.
8Harrison(2011) derived maximum likelihood estimates of parameters from a structural model with normally distributed mea-
surement error which rejected the findings in this paper.
9 al Nowaihi and Dhani(2010) introducedcomposite cumulative prospect theory(CCP), andcomposite Prelec probability
weighting functions(CPF) to ”address events close to the boundary of the probability interval[0,1]”. Their Figure 5.1 depicts a
piecewise harmonic probability weighting function based on heuristics of observed behaviour.Maccheroni et al.(2006, pg. 1448)
used the concept ofrelative entropyto address issues related to variational utility representation of probabilistic preferences. A
paper with tangentially related results like that reported here isBusemeyer et al.(2006) who used a quantum “superposition state”
with respect to basis functions to analyze their quantum wave functions.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































in Von Neumann(1955, Ch. VI).11
Loomes and Pogrebna(2015) conducted experiments which seem to support aspects of
our model. Their model involved Weak Stochastic Transitivity12 (WST) by eliciting certainty
equivalents (CEs) from a set of candidate CEs for given bets. Thus, subjects underlying preferences
were modeled as a probability distribution over the set of CEs. They find that “when certainty
equivalent values are inferred from repeated binary choices, the classic PR phenomenon largely
disappears”. In other words, subjects eventually complete their inherent probability cycles in a
repeated choice context over a distribution of certainty equivalents.
The intuition behind our model is depicted inFigure 4.1andFigure 4.2. The latter fig-
ure depicts plots of pwfs, in a unit square[0,1]× [0,1], observed in an experiment conducted by
Wilcox (2011) to compare the predictive performance of three probabilistic choice models: two
context dependent,13 and one context free. One of his main results is that context dependent prob-
abilistic choice models explains “switching behavior” among subjects.Figure 4.1depicts string
harmonics in a unit square[0,1]× [0,1]. One can imagine a dense function space of pwfs inFig-
ure 4.2mimicking the string harmonics inFigure 4.1. So probability weighting functions admit
harmonics. This paper provides a coherent model that supports that observation and its implication
for preference reversal.
4.1.1 Positioning the paper in the literature on probabilistic preferences
The literature on preference reversal is huge (see e.g.,Slovic and Lichtenstein(1983); Slovic
(1995); Seidl (2002); Lichtenstein and Slovic(2006) for reviews, andHinvest et al.(2014) for
a succinct collection of the literature). Thus, as a practical matter we review select papers to put
the instant paper in the perspective of probabilistic preferences.
Karni and Safra(1987, p. 679) introduced an EUT based model that predicts preferenc
11Stewart et al.(2015) conducted a set of experiments which confirm the experimentereff ct on the instability of subjects’
choices. They did not proffer an information theory.
12Let≻ be a preference order relation and{a,b,c}. WST implies that if Pr(a≻b)≥ 0.5 and Pr(b≻ c)≥0.5, then Pr(a≻ c)≥ 0.5.
13“Context dependence” implies that “the relative attractiveness ofx c mpared toy often depends on the presence or absence of
a third optionz” For example, an individual who prefersx overy in a binary choice cannot selecty from the set{x,y,z}. But even
if each individual satisfies [value maximization] we could obtainP(x;y) > P(y;x) andP(x;y,z) < P(y;x,z) if those who preferx
overy also preferzoverx.” whereP(x,S) is the proportion of subjects choosingx from a setS(Tversky and Simonson, 1993). This
contextual influence on preferences implies that DMs construct preferences during an experiment (I win et al., 1993, p. 6).
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reversal. They used a piecewise linear probability weightingfu ction (PWF), and piecewise linear
utility function to estimate the maximum rank dependent expected utility (RDEU) due toQuiggin
(1982) for several lotteries. They showed that the maximum RDEU for say lotteryB exceeded
that of lotteryA even though the certainty equivalent (CE) or selling price ofA exceeded that of
B in the Becker et al.(1964) (BDM) auction mechanism for sellingP-bets (highp low x) and
$-bets (lowp and highx).14 Tversky et al.(1990, pp. 207, 210) criticized theKarni and Safra
(1987) model on grounds that experiments that employ elicitation schemes which do not depend
on the independence axiom also find preference reversal. They argue that violation of procedure
invariance15 is the source of PR.Loomes et al.(1991, p. 430) show that regret theory can explain
somePR patterns but not all. They made the grim conclusion that the results of their experiments
“raise serious doubts about the descriptive validity of the transitivity axiom,”ibid at 438.
Regenwetter et al.(2011) dispute reported findings of preference reversal in laboratory
experiments. They conducted a meta study of the PR literature and re-examined several data sets.
They found that PR reported in the papers they examined disappeared up to a Type I error rate of
5% when a mixture model was used to analyze the data. In fact, they state (p. 43):
The mixture model assumes that choices vary because the decision maker is in different
mental states * * * at different points in time. That is, the decision maker has some
probability distribution over mental states and choosesx overy if and only if her or his
current mental state is one in which she or he prefersx to y.
The authors’ statement is motivated by the following model. LetC be a set of choice alternatives,
(A,≻) be a strict partially ordered set16 onC which binary relation is a strict partial order≻, and
T be the collection of all binary preference relations onC . DefinePxy to be the probability thatx
is strictly preferred toy, andP≻ is the probability that a person is in transition state of preference
≻ in T . Additionally, P≻ need not be a homogenous probability measure for it admits mixture
14The overlapping endpoints in Karni-Safra piecewise PWF and utility function induce bias in estimates of their criterion func-
tions. Furthermore,Harrison(1986, p. 8) shows that DMs could strategically game the sequential pricing feature of the BDM in
early rounds and bias experimental results.
15Roughly, “equivalent procedures for assessing preference should yield the same choices”Hinv t et al.(2014).







Regenwetter et al.(2011, p. 47) points out “thatT includes, for example, transitive, but in-
complete, partial orders”. Furthermore, “[a] mixture model of transitivity states that an axiom-
consistent person’s response at any time point originates from a transitive preference but that
responses at different times need not be generated by the same transitive preference state,”Re-
genwetter et al.(2011, p. 47).17 In other words, transitive preference orders include incomplete
partial orders. They did not provide a parametric form for the probability distribution over mental
states.18
Cubitt et al.(2004) modified the “standard” PR experiment based on a monetary valuation
(MV) task by adding a probabilistic valuation (PV) task. They used an ordinal payoff scheme
in their experimental design, and subjects were randomly assigned to MV and PV. In the latter,
subjects choose the probability to be associated with a fixed monetary value such that it is the
certainty equivalent of a gamble. They found that subjects in the PV task experiment exhibited
“marked difference” in PR patterns compared to those in the MV task. Furthermore,reversals
were found within the PV group compared to within the MV group. None of the psychology or
economic hypotheses they reviewed could explain the phenomenon.19 Butler and Loomes(2007)
proposed a model of “probability equivalent” (PE) that extended theCubitt et al.(2004) study.
Theirs is a “model of imprecision” that “provides a framework that can accomodate the “strong”
[certainty equivalent] reversals observed in many studies” (p. 293).20
Blavatskky(2009) extendedButler and Loomes(2007) with a model that accounts for
PE and CE. In his model certainty equivalents are random variables. For example, the certainty
17Loomes and Sugden(1995, p. 643) introduce a tangentially related model, which they call “r ndom preference model” that
contains “core theory” (i.e., an axiom-consistent response) plus a stochastic addend.
18Theorem4.H.1in section 4.Hshows how our model applies to mental states by its extension toquantum information processing
and quantum probability models championed byPothos and Busemeyer(2009) andBusemeyer et al.(2011).
19A recent study byViechnicki (2015) use eye-tracking experiments which confirm that preference rev rsals are accompanied
by differential attention to gamble attributes (probability of winning versus amount to win).
20Strong preference reversal occurs “when an individual chooses theP-bet over the $-bet in a direct binary choice even though
the certainty equivalent of the $-bet is strictly greater than the highest possible outcome of the P-bet” (Blavatskky, 2009, p. 238).
See also,Fishburn(1988, §2.8 p. 46).
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equivalent (CE) of a bet is distributed over the maximal range of its prize. The certainty equivalent
of the $-bet is positively skewed but the certainty equivalent of theP-bet is negatively skewed.
Hence, a DM always values the $-bet more frequently than theP-b t. The diametric skewness
allows the model to explain overpricing of the $-bet.
Hogarth and Einhorn(1990) developed a descriptive model of probability weighting that
depends on the sign and size of payoffs. They assumed that DMs first anchor on a stated probability
pA, and then adjust by mentally simulating other values. In their model (p. 783) the pwf is:
w(pA) = pA+k, where k= kg−ks (4.1.2)
kg represents the weights given to possible decision weights (in this case probability weights) above
pA, andks represents weighted values belowpA, andk is the net adjustment factor. Hogarth and
Einhorn surmised:
For decisions involving good or positive payoffs, values greater than the anchor are
given less weight than those below; moreover, the degree of differential weighting
increases with the size of the payoffs. Conversely, bad or negative payoffs imply that
greater weight is accorded to values above rather than below the anchor, and the extent
of differential weighting increases with the absolute size of the negative payoffs.
They describe the weight functions as follows:




















∂ |v(x)| > 0,
∂ks
∂ |v(x)| > 0 (4.1.5)
whereσ is a measure of uncertainty, i.e., standard deviation of outcomes;θ is a measure of ambi-
guity; pA is anchor probability; andv(x) is a value function preferred byKahneman and Tversky
(1979). Hogarth and Einhorn state that “[t]he absolute size ofv(x) increases bothkg andks and
together with its sign, determines the extent to which more weight is given in imagination to values
above or below the anchor”. Thus, in (4.1.2) w(pA) is a pwf that depends on the distribution of
outcomesx, its first and second moments throughσ , and for whichk fluctuatesaroundpA.
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Our HPWF is a coherent version of theHogarth and Einhorn(1990) model because it
was derived from maximum entropy analysis of the distribution of outcomesx. For instance, we
derive the following outcome dependent HPWF21 by employing the maximum entropy principle,22
popularized byJaynes(1968), to a distribution of outcomes construed as a realization of arandom
field or statistical ensemble.
w(x,p) = η0p+η1 tan(ψ(z)) (4.1.6)
whereη0 andη1 are elevation and curvature parameters (Abdellaoui et al., 2010), x = [x1, . . . ,xn]
is a vector valued rank ordered statistical ensemble or random field of outcomes,p is the cor-
responding set or probability distribution,p ∈ p, andz = {z1, . . . ,zn} is a corresponding set of
Z-scores forx, x j = µx+zjσx, andψ(z) is a phase function. Imposing the identifying restriction
0≤ w(x,p)≤ 1 on (4.1.6) guarantees that tan(ψ(z)) does not blow up even though the function is
not well behaved at the endpoints, i.e., it fluctuates–an empirical regularity of pwfs.23 The fixed
point probability in our model isp⋆ = e−1–the same fixed point derived inPrelec(1998) axioma-
tized model.24 So our model is admissible.
In (4.1.6) p corresponds to the anchor probabilitypA in Hogarth and Einhorn(1990) model
in (4.1.2). The fluctuations ink in the latter model is captured by the phase function relation
ψ(z)∼ (2k−1)π+ψ(z) in our model.25 Moreover, the distribution of outcomes and their variance,
represented byv(x) and σ in (4.1.2), are incorporated inz and ψ(z) in (4.1.6). Our model is
distinguished fromHogarth and Einhorn(1990) by its identification of probability cycles in so
caled “mental simulation”. A probability cycle is the greatest common divisord(k) of the setK
21Dillenberger et al.(2013) also introduced outcome dependent probability weighting fuctions but theirs are not harmonic.
22Good(1963, pg. 911) asserts:
PRINCIPLE OF MAXIMUM ENTROPY. LetX be a random variable whose distribution is subject to some set of
restraints. Then entertain the null hypothesis that the distribution is the one of maximum entropy, subject to these
restraints.
23Kahneman and Tversky(1979, pp. 282-283) characterized this as follows: “Because peopleare limited in their ability to
comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities, highly unlikely events are either ignored or overweighted, and the difference
between high probability and certainty is either neglected or exaggerated. Consequently, [the pwf] is not well-behaved near the
end-points.” (emphasis added).
24Lattimore et al.(1992) also introduced a flexible 2-parameter pwf. However, the fixedpoint probability in their model seems
to bep= 0.5 (pp. 381, 382) and it does not fluctuate near the end point (p. 382).
25Herek is a number different from the adjustment factor in (4.1.2).
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of valuesk on which the phase function relation holds. The intuition behind our model is that if
preferences are observed before a cycle is complete, i.e., at times other thand(k), then probabilistic
preferences will be intransitive. For example,MacCrimmon(1968) found that a sample of business
executives exhibited preference reversal in experiments he designed to test several postulates of
Savage(1972) subjective expected utility (SEU) theory. When confronted with their behaviour
in a post-experimentinterview, the executives attributed their behaviour to carelessness or not
reading the instructions carefully, and most indicated that they wouldreversetheir behaviour. In
other words, their probability cycles were completed during thepost-experimentinterview.26
We use the RDEU transformation scheme fromQuiggin (1982) to compute decision
weights
π(k)j (x,p) = η0p j +η1ϕ
(k)(z j), ∑
j
π(k)j (x,p) = 1 (4.1.7)
wherep j is the probability associated with thej-th ranked outcome, andz j is a vector of Z-scores
for the first j ranked outcomes, andϕ(k)(z j) is a harmonicoutcome weighting functioncontrolled
by jumps sin(∆ψ(z)) in the phase function. The identifying restriction in (4.1.7) implies that
∑ j ϕ(k)(z j) = (1−η0)/η1. In that setup,RDEU= ∑ j π
(k)
j (x,p)U(x j) = EU ⊕WU. When DMs
focus only on linear probabilities, i.e., probability cycles are complete, they areEU maximizers.
When they focus only on outcome weighting they are weighted utility (WU) maximizers (Chew
and Waller (1986, p. 59)). Jointly, they are RDU maximizers.Figure 4.3provides a sketch of
a decision weight in (4.1.7). It depicts fluctuations ofϕ(k)(z j) around an “observed” probability
p j . The former is based on probability cycles that vanish when a cycle is complete at which point
π(k)j (x,p) = p j (whenη0 = 1) at the fixed points where DMs haveVon Neumann and Morgenstern
(1953) type preferences. See also,al Nowaihi and Dhami(2006, pp. 5-7) who propose a higher
order Prelec pwf that also fluctuates around the diagonal.
26Resulaj et al.(2009) study on bounded accumulation time mimics this process. Over tim as a subject accumulates information
in a stochastic choice experiment. She may change her mind from the initial decision when the accumulation of noisy evidence
reaches a certain threshold. SeeW bb(2015) for a review of the literature.
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Sketch of Quiggin-type decision weightsπ(k)j (x,p) = η0p j +η1ϕ (k)(z j) assuming
η0 = 1 for a HPWF. The fixed point probabilities (enclosed by circles) coincide with
EUT. Preference reversal is supported by incomplete probability cycles (dark regions)
of decision weights.
According to theBecker et al.(1964) (BDM) auction mechanism, under EUT the expected
value of a bet should be the same in the choice phase(C), and bid phase(B), i.e.,EUTC = EUTB.
















where the superscripts 1 and 2 correspond toC andB respectively, ando is for “observation”. The




where∆(k)ϕ WU is a quantity that vanishes when probability cycles are complete.∆
(k)
ϕ WU consti-
tutes theinherent variability or momentary fluctuation in the evaluative process” anticipated by
Tversky(1969, p. 31).27 It also mimicsRegenwetter et al.(2011, p. 47) “incomplete partial or-
der” hypothesis because the DM’s response originates from a transitive preference state before the
experimenter broke her probability cycle and observed a different state.
27Tversky(1969, p. 43) introduced a theorem based on an “additive differencemodel” which shows that the transitivity axiom is
satisfied for a multidimensional utility function if the difference in utility for each component part is linear. (4.1.9) implies some of
those features.
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Our analysis ofKarni and Safra(1990, p. 491) (KS1990) show that their preference rever-
sal model contains a harmonic function tan(α ′′)− tan(α ′), where tan(α ′′) = (1−w(p′′)/(1− p′′)
and tan(α ′) = (1− w(p′)/(1− p′) and w(·) is a “standard” PWF. Since tan(α ′′)− tan(α ′) =
sin(α ′′−α ′)sec(α ′′)sec(α ′), preference reversal is controlled by theangular jump(α ′′−α ′) in
sin(α ′′−α ′), which is similar to sin(∆ψ(z)) in our model. The KS1990 model is distinguished
from ours in several ways.
First, the underlying PWF in their model is not harmonic. The harmonic feature of their
result is based on our interpretation of their analysis. Second, they restrict the fixed pointθ in their
model to the interval12 < θ < 1 and assume that “a typical probability transformation function” is
inverted S-shape. Refer to (Quiggin, 1993, pp. 60-61) for pwf shapes. The interval forθ implies
that DMs in their model may be inordinately pessimistic. If so, then the selling price in the BDM
auction mechanism used in their model maybe inflated due to probabilistic loss aversion (Schmidt
and Zank, 2008). Third, the KS1990 model resolves preference reversal in theBDM auction
framework. In contrast, our model resolves it in the context of choice over at least three outcomes
when the same experiment is repeated with the same DMs. So our result is robust to experimental
procedures. Moreover, we make no assumptions about the shape of the PWF or the location of
the fixed point. The fixed point in our model depends on curvature and elevation parameters of
the underlying PWF. Finally, our HPWF is a bivariate function of outcomes and theirinherent
probabilities.
There is a burgeoning literature on quantum cognition in which methods of quantum
physics are applied to address,inter alia, preference reversal.28 For example,Trueblood and Buse-
meyer(2011) use a quantum probability paradigm to show how order effects introduce a dimension
of uncertainty because they influence the computed probability of an event. See also,Busemeyer
28The problem addressed in this paper was described thus:
Interference is the effect that is typical of all those phenomena which are described by wave equations. Following
the Bohrs idea [] of describing mental processes in terms of quantum mechanics, one is immediately confronted
with the interference effect, since the physical states in quantum mechanics are characterized by wave functions.
The possible occurrence of interference in the problems of decision making has been discussed before on different
grounds []. However,no general theory has been suggested, which would explain why and when such a kind of effect
would appear, how to predict it, and how to give a quantitative analysis of it that can be compared with empirical
observations. In our approach, interference in decision making arises only when one takes a decision involving
composite intentions. The corresponding mathematical treatment of these interferences within QDT is presented. . .
[Citations omitted, emphasis added].Yukalov and Sornette(2009, pp. 1088-1089). I thank Jerome Busemeyer for directing me to
this reference. See also,Khrennikov and Haven(2009).
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et al. (2011, pg. 198). This is similar to our “experimenter interference”r sult described above.
In fact, Theorem 4.H.1 in section 4.Hcharacterizes DMs preference states in a HPWF setting.
However, the results produced in this paper are distinguished because they were derived from mi-
crofoundations of prospect theory using a bottom-up approach.29 As opposed to extant literature
which use a top down approach by fitting quantum mechanics models to behavioural phenomena.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Insection 4.2we set up the maximum entropy
problem of probabilistic preferences over probability distributions. There, we derive an abstract
harmonic probability weighting function (HPWFs) under rubric of representation Theorem4.2.2.
That is followed bysection 4.3where we identify the HPWF by identifying restrictions and use
it in section 4.4to resolve preference reversal phenomena. Insection 4.5we provide a simple
calibration and simulation exercise to provide a rough estimate of our HPWF model. Insection 4.6
we conclude with perspectives for further research.
4.2 Maximum entropy and the inherent distribution of outcomes
This section provides preliminary motivation insubsection 4.2.1for our use of the entropy device
to characterize the degree of uncertainty associated with a gamble or bet. Insubsection 4.2.2we
employ the canonical principle of maximum entropy to derive an abstract HPWF. In subsequent
sections identifying restrictions allow us to provide applications.
4.2.1 Preliminaries
In this paper, entropy is comprised of the expected value (average) of the information contained in
a sample drawn from a distribution or data stream. Entropy thus characterizes our uncertainty30
about our source of information, and increases for more sources of greater randomness. The source
is also characterized by the probability distribution of the samples drawn from it. The idea here is
that the less likely an event is, the more information it provides when it occurs.
29Stutzer(1996) also used a bottoms up maximum entropy approach to asset pricing theory. However, he did not posit asset
prices as random fields nor did he identify a behavioural quantum wave as we do here.
30We use the term “uncertainty” in its most general sense. The economics literature distinguishes between risk and uncertainty.
The former pertains to the case when the underlying probability distribution is known. The latter, when it is unknown (K ight,
1921).
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Consider the following example adapted fromKhincin (1957, p. 3). LetL1 and L2 be two
bets comprised of common eventsA1 andA2 but with separate probability distribution 0.5, 0.5 and
0.999, 0.001, such thatL1 = (A1, 0.5; A2, 0.5) andL2 = (A1, 0.999, 0.001). In L2 the outcome
of the bet is almost surely eventA1 while the outcome inL1 is less certain. A third betL3 =
(A1,0.3; A2, 0.7) contains an intermediate level of uncertainty about outcomes. In information
theory, “entropy” is a measure of the uncertainty in each bet. It is an “inverse probability” measure.
That is, the lower the probability, the more uncertain the event.
The principle of maximum entropy popularized byJaynes(1968) provides a mechanism
for deriving a coherent prior probability distribution for a distribution of outcomes when the cor-
responding probability distribution is unknown. The mechanism is characterized by identifying
restrictions based on what information, if any, is known about the unknown probability distribu-
tion. This typically involves assumptions about moment conditions. The position taken in this
paper is that a decision maker has a subjective probability distribution that she associates with a
given distribution of outcomes. And that she uses a computation mechanism, in this case maxi-
mum entropy, to arrive at that distribution. This hypothesis finds some support in the neuroeco-
nomics literature whereHinvest et al.(2014) surmised that “[t]he combination of behavioral and
neuroimaging data may suggest that participants used a mathematical approach to formation of
valuations but choices were subject to emotional influence. These findings may provide support
for a biological procedural invariance view of gambling preference”. Moreover, since outcomes
a measured with respect to some scale, the inherent probability distribution can be derived from
maximum entropy considerations (Frank and Smith, 2010).
Motivated by the above, we provide a formal definition for entropy.
Definition 4.2.1(Entropy). Cover and Thomas(1991, pg. 13)




Remark4.2.1. H(X) = 0 implies either certainty, i.e.p(x) = 1 for all x, or null event, i.e.p(x) = 0
for all x. So largeH implies uncertainty, and smallH implies more certainty.
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Good(1963, pg. 911) also gives an implicit definition where he states “LetX be a random variable
whose (physical) probability distribution is not completely given. Of all the available distributions
there will usually be one of maximum entropy, i.e. maximum uncertainty”.
4.2.2 Maximum entropy with partial information about distribution of outcomes
Let X be a space of outcomes andf be an unknown continuous probability distribution over
X. Since f is unknown, it admits complex values. The canonical constrained maximum entropy
problem over probability densities is stated as follows:31










r i(x) f (x)dx= αi , 1≤ i ≤ m
(4.2.1)
whereK is a compact subset ofX such thatf (x) vanishes onX/K. (4.2.1) representm moment
conditionsimposed on the optimality problem. InJaynes(1968, pg. 234) moment conditions are
used to establish acorrespondence principlefor maximum entropy distributions and “frequency
distributions”. To account for the probability weighting phenomenon inTversky and Kahneman
(1992) cumulative prospect theory, followingBochner(1955, pg. 12), and by abuse of notation,
for random variableX, we define a set functionF(A) as follows





(w◦P)(X ≤ x| x∈ A) = (w◦F)(A) (4.2.3)
31See Cover and Thomas(1991, Ch. 11, pp. 266-267) andAvellaneda(1998) for further details on constrained maximum en-
tropy. Stutzer(1996) credited Josiah Willard Gibbs and Edwin T. Jaynes with incipient formulation and subsequent popularization,
respectively, of the optimality approach. SeeAbbas(2006) for applications to utility theory.
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Furthermore, on the whole space of all gamblesX wewrite symbolically





Assume that the composite relation holds under the integral so that we assign the functional re-
stricted toA the value
(w◦F)(A) = (w◦P)(X ≤ x| x∈ A) =
∫
A
(w◦ f )(x)dx (4.2.5)
Thus we write the entropy function over some compact setK in X as
H̃(F) =−w(F) ln(w(F)) (4.2.6)
In the sequel we writew(F) for w(F(x)) and so on, unless indicated otherwise. The optimality
problem is one of maximum entropy with respect to probability weighting. LetJ be the Lagrangian
or criterion function andλi be the Lagrange parameters coresponding tom moments restrictions











r i(x) f (x)dx (4.2.7)
Let µ be a measure of information on some measureable setA ∈ B(X). So that for integration
over the setA we have










Remark4.2.2. Kullback (1968, pg. 5) uses measures likeF(A) = 1µ(A)
∫
A f (x)µ(dx) to represent
“averages” over the given setA in his information theory models.
By abuse of notation, to find the inherent probability weighting function onX we solve the problem
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w(F) = argmaxf J(w(F)). The results are formalized in the following:
Theorem 4.2.2(Maximum Entropy Harmonic Probability Weighting Functional Representation).
Let X be an outcome space,B(X) be theσ -field of Borel measureable subsets of X, andµ be
σ -finite measure. Let F be the distribution function for the underlying probability density in the
maximum entropy problem, w(F) be the corresponding maximum entropy probability weighting
functional, E be an expectation operator, and{E[r i(x)]}mi=1 be a moment generating sequence
defined on X. Then for arbitrary A∈B(X), the maximum entropy probability weighting functional













where e−1 is the fixed point probability,̃wm(F) = ∑mj=1a jeiω jx, andã j is a scaled coordinate with
respect to the measureµ(A) and the orthogonal basis{eiω jx}∞j=1 in L2(X,B(X),µ).
Proof. See Appendix4.D.
Remark4.2.3. The functional form forw(F) is well defined. Notice that it includes the fixed point
probabilitye−1 axiomatized byPrelec(1998); the harmonic or sinusoidal componentw̃m(F) which
approximates the moment conditions imposed on the underlying nonparametric probability density
function; thegivenslope or rate at whichw(F) changes with respect to underlying probabilities;
and the information scaleµ(A) for “spreading information mass” over the setA. This suggests that
the analysis extends to Lebesgue-Stieltjes measures.
Corollary 4.2.3 (Phase functional representation).
There exist phase functionalsϑ(F) such that









Proof. Substitute the De Moivre representation ofw̃m(F) in the exponent forw(F) in Theorem
4.2.2.
4.3 Identifying restrictions for harmonic probability weigh ting function
In this section we show how the abstract theory ofsection 4.2applies to theZ-transformation of
the joint distribution of outcomesx1, . . . ,xn in a lottery. Whereupon we derived the parametric
representation of the HPWF employed later in the paper.
4.3.1 HPWF andZ-transformation of outcomes
Consider the following application. Without making anya priori assumptions about func-
tional form, letX be a random variable with meanµ and varianceσ2 and unknown distribution
function F. Among several other examples,Cover and Thomas(1991, pg. 268) shows that the
normal distribution has maximum entropy for probability density functions with finite first and
second moment. However, under auspice of the Central Limit Theorem, we can always construct
a standard normal random variablez= (x−µx)/σx for any distribution with finite first and second
moments, and extend the problem to the distribution functionF. Thus, our constrained optimiza-
tion problem in (4.2.1) turns to characterizing maximum entropy probability weighting functions
w(F) when the underlying outcome distribution has finite mean and variance.32 In that case,








32Stutzer(1996) used maximum entropy methods to show thatλ0,λ1, . . . are the market price of risk in a mean-variance efficient
portfolio.
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wherez = (x− µ)/σ is the standard normal random variable andF = Φ(z) is the cumulative
normal distribution.33 So Φ(z) mimics rank ordered probability quantiles. For some constantk
added to equalize the right hand side of (4.3.2), after substitution and integration of both sides of





















Even though the domain of definition of the probability weighting functionw(Φ(z)) is [0,1] in
(4.3.5), the righthand side equation is afunctionalin z. So we have to transform thez-axis isomor-
phically into the unit interval[0,1] in order for (4.3.5) to be a harmonic pwf.
To make that transformation, we impose the following restrictions. By virtue of Linde-
berg’s condition34 applied to the tails of a normal distribution, we use an arbitrary cutoff z-score of
-4 to approximate−∞; and +4 to approximate+∞.
Assumption 4.3.1(Lindberg normal approximation). We assume the normal distribution is a mol-




∼ t(n−2)α , n ≥ 3 in small samples of sizen
wherex̄n is sample mean,s is sample standard deviation, and(n−2) is the degrees of freedom (df), andt(n−2)α is thet-distribution
with (n−2) df for a one-sidedα level test. Refer toFrank and Smith(2010) for a rationalization of this result.
34This is a uniform integrability condition that characterizes the tail of a distribution. According toGikhman and Skorokhod









the random variableξni is said to satisfy Lindeberg’s condition.
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lifier or bump function on the compact set[−4,4]⊂ [−∞,+∞] such that




y2Φ′(y)dy, |z|≤ 4 (4.3.7)
Φ(z) = 0, |z|> 4 (4.3.8)












Assumption4.3.1“calibrates” the HPWF to a fixed range of values forz, and that led to (4.3.10).
However, (4.3.10) should extend to values ofz that are not restricted by Assumption4.3.1. We
rectify that in the following
Assumption 4.3.2(Generalized Lindberg normal approximation). We assume that the normal dis-
tribution is a mollifier or bump function on the interval|z|≤ zh < ∞ so that








Φ(z) = 0, |z|> zh (4.3.13)

On the basis of Assumption4.3.2 we generalize (4.3.10) which process is summarized in the
following
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Theorem 4.3.3(HPWF–Harmonic Probability Weighting Function). Let x= [x1, . . . ,nn] be a vec-
tor valued statistical ensemle of ranked outcomes, and zz be the corresponding vector of Z-scores
for the ranked outcomes such that xj = µx+zjσx whereµx and sigmax are the mean and standard
deviation of xx, respectively. The inherent HPWF of a DM is given by
w(p,x) = η0p+η1 tan(ψ(z)) (4.3.14)




4.3.2 Reconciling HPWF fixed point and endpoints
The phase functionψ(z) is a realization of the phase functionϑ(F) in Corollary 4.2.3on page
170. According to Theorem4.3.3, for fixed point probabilityw(p⋆) = p⋆ we have





Thus, the fixed point depends on elevationη0 and curvatureη1. Restrictions imposed on the HPWF
in Theorem4.3.3imply that it fluctuates near its end points. That is,
p= 0⇒ η1 tan(ψ(z)) = 0⇒ ψ(z) = nπ , n= 0,1, . . . (4.3.16)
p= 1⇒ tan(ψ(z)) = 1−η0
η1





So we provide a theoretical explanation for the observation that probability weighting is not well
behaved near the end points.35
Additionally, tan(ψ(z)) is an outcome orprize weighting functionthat overweighs out-
comes over suitably defined “small probabilities”; and underweighs outcomes over “large proba-
35
Because people are limited in their ability to comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities, highly unlikely events
are either ignored or overweighted, and the difference between high probability and certainty is either neglected or
exaggerated. Consequently,[w] is not well behaved near the end points.
Kahneman and Tversky(1979, pp. 282-283).
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bilities”. In other words, tan(ψ(z)) is a “quantal effect’36 that captures diminishing sensitivity (in
the middle part of the curve) reported inTversky and Wakker(1995, pg. 1257).Figure 4.5depicts
the impact of tan(ψ(z)) in a calibration of our HPWF. Substitution of the relationships
tan(ψ(z)) =−i tanh(iψ(z)) (4.3.18)
w(p,x) = η0p− iη1 tanh(iψ(z)) (4.3.19)
show thatw(p,x) has the form of a complex valued trigonometric polynomial consistent with the
prediction of Theorem4.2.2.
4.4 Rank dependent utility and preference reversal over probability cycles
In this section we employQuiggin(1993, §5.2, p. 57) RDEU model and our HPWF to resolve the
PR puzzle. We provide some preliminaries that include definition of the probability cycle concept.
In subsection 4.4.1we decompose the decision weights obtained from the HPWF by usingQuiggin
(1982) transformation procedure. Insubsection 4.4.2we introduce a model in which procedure
invariance is imposed on an experiment and show how the HPWF resolves PR in that context. In
subsection 4.4.3we provide analytics which show that experimenters interference with a DM’s
probability cycle lead them to misperceive PR.
Preliminaries
Consider the probabilistic rank dependent expected utility (RDEU) specification37 n Wakker
(1994, pg. 10) for a simple rank ordered lotteryp1,x1; . . . ,xn, pn. For utility U(x j) of outcome
36Kahneman and Tversky(1979, pg. 282)
37In order not to overload the paper with issues pertaining to framing effects in decision weights, we did not employ cumulative
prospect theory (CPT). CompareTversky and Wakker(1995, pg. 1259).
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x j we have




π jU(x j) (4.4.1)
π j = w(p1+ . . .+ p j)−w(p1+ . . .+ p j−1) (4.4.2)
π1 = w(p1), ∑
j
π j = 1 (4.4.3)
wherew : [0,1] → [0,1] is a probability transform function, andπ j is a decision weight. In this
case, we letw be our inherent HPWF. Since tan(ψ(z)) is cyclic in Theorem4.3.3, we have the
periodic relationship
tan(ψ(k)(z))) = tan(ψ(z)), k= 1,2, . . .
where ψ(k)(z) = (2k−1)π +ψ(z)
(4.4.4)
Unless otherwise stated in the sequelπ is 180o in radians.π with subscripts (or superscripts) is a
decision weight. This leads to the following
Definition 4.4.1 (Probability cycle). Kemeny et al.(1976, p. 144). Letw(p,x) be as in Theo-
rem 4.3.3andK = {k| ψ(k)(z) = (2k−1)π +ψ(z)} be a set of periodic phase functions. The
probability cycle forw(p,x) is the greatest common denominatord(k) of K . 
The identityp j = Φ(zj) implies that there exist̃Z j such that∑
j
k=1 p j = Φ(Z̃ j). It follows from
Theorem 4.3.3 that for some pair of values(Z̃ j−1, Z̃ j) to be determined, we have the decision
weight
π(k)j = π(Z̃ j−1, Z̃ j ; k) =
w
(














tan(ψ(k)(Z̃ j))− tan(ψ(k)(Z̃ j−1))
)
(4.4.5)
= η0p j +η1
(
tan(ψ(k)(Z̃ j))− tan(ψ(k)(Z̃ j−1))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
harmonic component of decision weight
(4.4.6)
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Thus, the decision weightπ(k)j is cyclic by virtue of (4.4.4) and the harmonic term in (4.4.6).
38
Even if it was not cyclic, it depends nonlinearly onZ̃ j−1 and Z̃ j as indicated. Additionally, ifk
is not an integer in (4.4.4), i.e. the cycle is incomplete, equality does not hold so probabilistic
choice is different for the same set of stimuli. The results above extend naturally toTversky and
Kahneman(1992) cumulative prospect theory (CPT) because the latter employsthe ame decision
weight scheme as RDU. We note that in (4.4.6) the harmonic component of decision weights
vanishes wheñZ j = Z̃ j−1 soπ
(k)
j = π j and RDU collapses to EUT due toη0p j . We say more on
that next.
4.4.1 Decomposition of decision weights obtained from HPWF
By virtue of (4.4.6), we decomposeπ(k)j as follows. Let













tan(ψ(k)(Z̃ j))− tan(ψ(k)(Z̃ j−1))
= tan(∆ψ(k)(Z̃ j))
[
1+ tan(ψ(k)(Z̃ j)) tan(ψ(k)(Z̃ j−1))
] (4.4.8)
= sin(∆ψ(k)(Z̃ j))sec(ψ(k)(Z̃ j))sec(ψ(k)(Z̃ j−1)) (4.4.9)
π(k)j = η0p j +η1sin(∆ψ
(k)(Z̃ j))sec(ψ(k)(Z̃ j))sec(ψ(k)(Z̃ j−1)) (4.4.10)
In (4.4.10) the decision weight is decomposed into a part(η0p j) that reflects DM confidence
(due to elevationη0) about the inherent probabilityp j associated with outcomex j , and a harmonic
partη1ϕ(k)(z j) (defined next) controlled by the curvature parameterη1 and jump in phase function
∆ψ(k)(Z̃ j) at x j based on the Z-scoresz1, . . . ,z j that compriseZ̃ j . Because sin(∆ψ(k)(Z̃ j)) is
cyclic, the decision weight is cyclic. Let
ϕ(k)(x j |µx,σx) = ϕ(k)(z j) = sin(∆ψ(k)(Z̃ j))sec(ψ(k)(Z̃ j))sec(ψ(k)(Z̃ j−1)) (4.4.11)
38Karni and Safra(1990, p. 491, eq(5)) also depends on a harmonic component like the one in (4.4.6).
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wherex j = (x1, . . . ,x j) andz j = (z1, . . . ,z j). Rewrite (4.4.1) and (4.4.10), respectively, as
π(k)j = η0p j +η1ϕ
















ϕ(k)(x j |µx,σx)U(x j) (4.4.14)
whereEU is Von Neumann and Morgenstern(1953) utility functional andWU(k) is a weighted
utility expression (Chew and Waller(1986, pg. 59, eq (2.6))) that depends on thek-cycle for
ϕ(k)(x j |µx,σx) in (4.4.11). When∆ψ(k)(Z̃ j) = 0, WU(k) = 0 so there is no weight given to the
inherent distribution of outcomes andRDEU is reduced toEU. Thus, we have just proven the
following
Theorem 4.4.1(Inconsistent probabilistic preferences). Let xj , j = 1,2, . . . ,n for n≥ 3 be a statis-
tical ensemble of outcomes, andΦ(·) be the inherent cumulative normal distribution function pre-
dicted by the Good-Jaynes Max-Ent principle (Cover and Thomas(1991, p. 268)). Letz j =
x j−µx
σx
be a standardized score andµx andσx be the mean and standard deviation of the distribution xj ’s.
Let
w(p) = η0p+η1 tan(ψ(z))
be a representation of theinherentHPWF predicted by Theorem4.2.2and Corollary 4.2.3for
standardized scorez andmonotone phase functionψ(z), wheretan(ψ(z)) is a weighting function
for outcomes satisfying Theorem4.3.3. So that w(·) operates on a “k-cycle” fortan((2k−1)π +
ψ(z)) = tan(ψ(z)), k= 1,2, . . . . As in(4.4.12), definedecision weights




Suppose thatprobabilistic preferencesare represented by rank dependent utility (RDU) so that for
von-Neuman utility U(x j) and inherentprior probabilityp j = Φ(z j), we have, for the correspond-
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Then subjects will make different probabilistic choices when faced with the same stimuli because
decision weights are cyclic unless their choices coincide with a probability k-cycle. Furthermore,
we have the decomposition RDEU(x,p) = EU(p)⊕WU(x). 
Remark4.4.1. The RDU decomposition result above was anticipated byWakker(1994) who ax-
iomatized decomposition of RDU preferences into probabilistic risk attitude and utility based com-
ponents. In Appendix4.I we show how the decomposition analysis extends to regret theory as well
(Loomes and Sugden, 1983). Thus, the HPWF decomposes RDEU and regret theory into core
EUT plus functionally equivalent addends.
Theorem 4.4.2(Almost sure inconsistent probabilistic preferences). Probabilistic preferences in-
duced by non-expected utility decision weights are different for the same stimuli almost surely.

Proof. According to Theorem4.4.1probabilistic preferences are consistent iffπ(k)j = π j for every
j in a “k-cycle”. However, for fixedj the Lebesgue measure of the set{k : π(k)j = π j ,∀k ∈ R+}
is zero. Thus, for eachj probabilistic preferences are inconsistent except on a set with Lebesgue
measure zero.
If probabilistic preferences are cyclic, then subjects will make different choices with different
probabilities when repeatedly presented with the same or similar stimuli over time by breaking
the cycle. In which case, choice depends on subjects’ location in the probability cycle and not
so much on stimuli. This point was made byRegenwetter et al.(2011, pg. 43) who introduce a
mixture model in which choice vary because DMs are in different mental states. Our result has
implications for the “probabilistic loss aversion” concept, introduced inSchmidt and Zank(2008,
pg. 213), based on a ratio of decision weights.
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4.4.2 Resolution of preference reversal phenomenon in experiments
In this section we show how PR is characterized and resolved in an abstract experiment. Let
x= {x,y,z} be a set of non negative outcomes,U(·) be a utility function that satisfiesVon Neumann
and Morgenstern(1953) axioms, andp= {px, py, pz} bethe corresponding probability distribution
of x. We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 4.4.3(Experimental tasks). E1 and E2 are two temporally spaced experimental pro-
cedures that elicit preferences. Subjects choose in E1 and bid in E2 over the same lotteries.
Assumption 4.4.4(Procedure invariance). The expected value of a lottery under a choice or bid
procedure is the same.
Assumption 4.4.5(Observed preference reversal). In E1 our DM expresses the preference x≻ y≻
z, and in E2 she reverses preference such that y≻ z≻ x.
Let π ij , i = 1,2; j = x,y,z be the decision weights computed via Quiggin’s transformation
procedure in each experiment. For example,π1x andπ2x are a DM’s decision weights forx in E1
andE2, respectively. In principle, DMs choose underE1 and bid underE2 from each of three
lotteries which can be displayed as follows:
L1 ≡ (x, px; y, py; 0,1− px− py) (4.4.15)
L2 ≡ (y, py; z, pz; 0,1− py− pz) (4.4.16)
L3 ≡ (x, px; z, pz; 0,1− px− pz) (4.4.17)
There are 3! ways in which the lotteries can be ordered. A simple experiment design39 for our
purposes may be to choose a compound binary choice experimentE1 as a baseline such that
E1≡ {As,θ ; L,1−θ} (4.4.18)
whereAs is a conveniently selected reward with probabilityθ , andL ≡ {L1,L2,L3} is a lottery
to be played out if selected with probability 1− θ . We assume that ifL is chosen, then DMs
39See Harrison and Rutström(2008) for a comprehensive survey and taxonomy of experimental designs and econometric ap-
proaches.
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choosex≻ y in L1; choosey≻ z in L2; choosex≻ z in L3. This choice pattern is consistent with
transitivity. LetAv = xpx+ ypy+ zpz be the actuarial value of the lottery so that the probability
θ = AvAv+As equalizes the expected value of DMs choices betweenAs and the lotteryL.
In the second experiment procedureE2, the rewards can be scaled by a common factor
and subjects can be randomly assigned to any of the following experiments:






cL̂ means that the outcomes are scaled byc. Since a constant scale does not affect transitivity
E2 will be effectively “identical” toE1 up to randomization.40 For the purpose of exposition we
assume that for a given̂L in E2 DMs reverse the choices they made inL1 in L3, i.e., they bid such
thatz≻ x. The analysis that follow applies only to those DMs that chooseL in E1 andL̂ in E2. In
principle, preference reversal is also manifest if a DM chooseAs in E1 andcL̂ in E2 or vice versa.
We address that in (4.4.22) and (4.4.23) below.
Preference reversal in E2
(i) The simple lottery representation. In E2 DMs weigh probilities byw(θ) and(1−w(1− θ))
(Quiggin, 1993, p. 57). Since we assumed that{θ ,cAs} ∼ {1− θ ,cL̂}, under EUT we expect
θU(cAs) = (1− θ)U(cL̂). In particular, according to RDU (a generalization of EUT (Quiggin,
1993)) under the experimental design inE2
w(θ)U(cAs) = (1−w(1−θ))U(cL̂) (4.4.21)
In the context of our HPWFw(θ) = η0θ +η1+ tan(ψ(z)). So (4.4.21) reduces to
η1[tan(ψ(ZcAs))U(cAs)− tan(ψ(ZcAv))U(cL̂)] = η0[θU(cAs)− (1−θ)U(cL̂)] (4.4.22)
40Holt and Laury(2002) report an increase in risk aversion when stake size is scaled.
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After applying EUT toE2 in (4.4.19), the RHS in (4.4.22) vanishes. So we are left with
tan(ψ(ZcAs))U(cAs) = tan(ψ(ZcAv))U(cL̂)⇒ tan(ψ(ZcAv)) = cu tan(ψ(ZcAs)) (4.4.23)
wherecu =U(cL̂)/U(cAs). The harmonic relationship in (4.4.23) holds only for complete proba-
bility cycles. That is,k∈ K must be divisible byd(k) according to Definition4.4.1. If that cycle
is broken, then we would expect PR inE2 for those DMs who choseL in E1 and bidAs in E2.
However, that type of PR does not address Assumption4.4.5. Thus, our interest lies in those DMs
who bid cL̂ in E2 and satisfy Assumption4.4.5.
(ii) Compound lottery representation. Under the transitivity axiom hypothesis, DMs ordinal
selection inL1 should be preserved in̂L. So we can setc = 1 without loss of generality. We
assume that the decision weights for the rank ordered outcomes inE1 : x≻ y≻ z in (4.4.18) and
E2 : y≻ z≻ x in (4.4.19) are computed as follows:
π1z = w(pz); π
1
y = w(pz+ py)−w(pz); π1x = 1−w(pz+ py) (4.4.24)
π2x = w(px); π
2
z = w(pz+ px)−w(px); π2y = 1−w(pz+ px) (4.4.25)
According to received theory, under the principle of procedure invariance (Tv rsky et al., 1990,
p. 204) RDEU should be the same forE1 andE2 by virtue of Assumption4.4.3. Let RDEU1 and











Under Assumption4.4.5, preference reversal impliesRDEU1 6= RDEU2, In which case
(π1x −π2x )U(x)+(π1y −π2y )U(y)+(π1z −π2z )U(z) 6= 0 (4.4.28)
SinceU preserves ordinality, underE1 we can normalizeU by settingU(y) = 0 andU(x) = 1
to simplify the analysis (Anscombe and Aumann(1963, p. 201),Karni and Safra(1990, p. 493),
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Quiggin(1993, p. 63)). Thus, (4.4.28) reduces to




Since the underlying probabilitiespx andpz do not change inE1 andE2, we have for





























2,z(Zz) are the cyclic components ofπ in Theorem 4.4.1,
and PR is driven by those components. In (4.4.10), the decision weight is controlled byϕ(k)
through the jump sin(∆ψ(k)(Z̃ j)). So under Theorem4.4.2and the inequalities in (4.4.31), (4.4.32)
wehave
sin(∆ψ(k)i, j (Z̃ j)) 6= sin(∆ψ
(k)
i, j ((2k−1)π + Z̃ j)), i = 12; j = x,y,z (4.4.33)
According to (4.4.33) d(k) is not a gcd ofk ∈ K in Definition4.4.1, i.e., probability cycles are
broken. Because we assumed procedure invariance betweenE1 a dE2, the preference reversal
in (4.4.30) is due to incomplete probability cycles. Moreover, for smalljumps sin(∆ψ(k)i, j (Z̃ j)) ≈
∆ψ(k)i, j (Z̃ j). So the PR phenomenon is a momentary fluctuation in the evaluative process. Thus, PR
is eventually resolved as∆ψ(k)i, j (Z̃ j)→ 0. We summarize this result in
Theorem 4.4.6(Temporal PR). Preference reversal is due to momentary fluctuations of the evalu-
ative process and it is resolved when probability cycles are complete. 
4.4.3 Experimenter interference of HPWF and misperception of preference reversal
In practice, the experimenterassignsan observedprobability distribution tox. Call it po. In
which case we havepoj = p j +e
o
j . So the inherent probabilityp j is unobserved and disturbed by
eoj . Cf. Busemeyer et al.(2011, p. 193)(“drawing a conclusion from one judgment changes the
183
context, which disturbs the state of the cognitive system”). Substitution of the observed values in
the equations above do not alter the analysis since we simply substitutep j = poj −eoj . However, the
inherent probability distribution isdisturbedand that may cause experimenters to report PR when
there is none (Regenwetter et al., 2011, p. 44). To evaluate that hypothesis we make the following
Assumption 4.4.7(Transitivity). The transitivity axiom holds.




j ) for someZ-score
zoj 6= z j . Thus, the HPWF in Theorem4.3.3is altered by imposition ofexanteprobabilitiespoj as
follows (with x suppressed)
w(p j) = η0p j +η1 tan(ψ(zj)) (4.4.34)
w(poj ) = η0(p
o
j −eoj )+η1 tan(ψ(zoj )) (4.4.35)
Let πoj be the observed decision weight, andπ j be the true decision weight. In the sequel super-
script (k) implies thatk-cycles are in play for a given variable. According to Theorem4.4.1and
(4.4.35) we have




j = η0(poj −eoj )+η1ϕ(k)(zoj ) (4.4.37)
⇒ πo(k)j = π
(k)
j +η1(ϕ
(k)(zoj )−ϕ(k)(z j)) (4.4.38)
Let πo1j , π
o2
j , j = x,y,z be the observed decision weights inE1 andE2 respectively. Under
Assumption 4.4.7 for a givenk we haveπ1(k)j = π2
(k)
j so there is no preference reversal. By

















2 (z j)) (4.4.39)







1 (z j) = ϕ
(k)




















Because of experimenter interference, there is no guarantee that the expression in brackets in the











even though the true but unobserved relationship in (4.4.40) is based on the transitivity axiom
Assumption 4.4.7. Thus we conclude with
Theorem 4.4.8(Observer effect of experimenter misperception of PR). Experimenter assignment
of ex ante probabilities to the elements of a statistical ensemble or random field of outcomes inter-
feres with the inherent PWF for those outcomes, and induces observed PR when the true state is
no PR.
Theorem 4.4.8manifests the “uncertainty principle” or “observer effect” articulated inVon Neu-
mann (1955, pp. 418-420). Specifically, “we must always divide the world into two parts, the one
being the observed system, the other the observer. In the former, we can follow up all physical pro-
cesses (in principle at least) arbitrarily precisely. In the latter, this is meaningless. The boundary
between the two is arbitrary to a very large extent,”ibid p. 420.
4.5 Model simulations and estimates
In this section we provide a simple calibration exercise and simulation of the HPWF, and report on
observed characteristics including but not limited to likelihood insensitivity, and fix point probabil-
ity dynamics. Insubsection 4.5.1we show how our model accommodates likelihood insensitivity.
In subsection 4.5.2we analyze the entropy implications of fixed point probabilities.
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4.5.1 Likelihood insensitivity of HPWF
For the purpose of exposition we calibratew(Φ(z)) in (4.3.10). As shown in (4.E.9) in the ap-














































A plot of the probability weighting function in (4.5.2) is depicted inFigure 4.4on page199.













Ỹ = max(3.7×Z∗, 1) (4.5.5)
We usez to denote given values ofZ. The last equation (4.5.5) is a ray from the origin or probability
adjustment that cuts through the fixed pointe−1. The inverted S-shape is retained so thatw(z∗) in
(4.5.3) is indeed a probability weighting function over thepsuedo-probability axis Z∗ in (4.5.4)–as
depicted inFigure 4.5on page200. The estimated HPWF has the following characteristics.
• The shape of the curve is similar toTversky and Fox(1995, Fig. 5), andAbdellaoui et al.
(2011, Fig. 1c) likelihood insensitivity source function. Specifically, the relatively flat portion
of the HPWF (less than 45◦ incline from horizontal) compared to the 45◦ line for linear proba-
bilities, suggests that prospect theory is insensitive, in this case very insensitive, to changes in
uncertainty compared to expected utility theory (Tversky and Fox(1995, pg. 276)). Thereby
suggesting that entropy methods can be used to derive probability weighting functions in
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ambiguous situations that include unobserved inherent probability distributions.
• The probability weighting plots indicate that the process is slow varying in roughly the
middle third, and heavily weighted in each of the two other thirds that correspond to over
weighting low ranked outcomes and underweighting high ranked outcomes. This depicts
“the principle of bounded subadditivity” introduced inTversky and Fox(1995, pg. 270) and
Tversky and Wakker(1995). In this case, the lower third “possibility gap”, and upper thi d
“possibility gap”, are consistent with empirical research (Tversky and Fox(1995, pg. 276)).
Wenote that the class of flexible two-parameter pwfs introduced byLattimore et al.(1992, p. 382)
is also able to generate likelihood insensitivity.
4.5.2 Fixed point probability of pwfs has maximum entropy
The maximum entropy associated with the underlying unobserved probability distribution is de-
picted inFigure 4.6on page201. The value forP= e−1 ≈ 0.38 depicts maximum entropy. This
is the fixed point probability that separates over weighting and under weighting regimes in cu-
mulative prospect theory. By comparison, the maximum entropy for the affine transformation of
probability weighted functionals is as indicated inFigure 4.7on page202. Here the maximum
entropy pointP= 0.38 is the same as before. The fact that maximum entropy occurs at the fixed
pointe−1 is puzzling. Because it implies that that invariant point axiomatized by (Prelec, 1998) is
the point of highest uncertainty or least information in a given distribution.
Nonetheless, we superimpose entropy and probability weighting functionals on the
psuedo-probability axisas depicted inFigure 4.8on page203. There, thepsuedo-probability
Z∗ has to be adjusted as indicated in (4.5.5) so that it cuts the probability weighting functional
at the fixed pointe−1. Otherwise, the fixed point for the psuedo-probability is derived from
w(z∗) = z∗. This suggests that the psuedo-probability fixed point occurs aroundz∗ = 0.5125
with entropy around 0.34, which corresponds toZ = 0.1 and−pln(p) = 0.33 in Table 4.1.
This result is still consistent with prospect theory because there exist “a more general form,
w(p) = exp(−β (− ln p)α) due to (Prelec, 1998, pg. 499), which is not constrained to the 1/e
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fixed point value”.41 It should be noted that “[a]n inverse S-shaped weighting functio can be
completely below the 45-degree line depicting non-transformed probabilities, or it can be com-
pletely above it,”Abdellaoui et al.(2010, pg. 41). Also, “a linear weighting function is seen as
the benchmark for measuring optimism and pessimism,”ibid at p. 49. So the linear probability
weighting function in (4.5.5) is that of a pessimist. To see this consider a subject with expected
utility E[U ] and probability weighting function
w̃(p) = max{α p, 1}, 0< p< 1, α > 1 (4.5.6)
The transformed expected utilitỹE[U ] along the line above the diagonal is given by
Ẽ[U ] = αE[U ]> E[U ] (4.5.7)
This shows that under EUT, for a given probability distributionP a subject with utility functionU
and weighting functioñw(P)> P will have more probabilistic risk aversion (Wakker, 1994, p. 10),
i.e., the pwf in (4.5.5) and (4.5.6) is piecewise concave. So (4.5.5) is the weighting function for a
pessimist. Even so, thepsuedo-probabilityweighting function is slightly greater than the pessimist
weighting function over low ranked outcomes, and they coincide at the point of maximum entropy
as indicated inFigure 4.8. Evidently, maximum entropy provides a robust estimate of thefixed
point probability in cumulative prospect theory. This result is not surprising because our model
predicted that maximum entropy of unconstrained unobserved inherent probability distributions
yields Von Neuman-Morgenstern preferences which are linear in probabilities–in this case even by
a constant scale factor. Thus, we close with the following
Proposition 4.5.1(Maximum entropy and cluster set of fixed points).
Let F be a cumulative probability distribution, and w(F) be a probability weighting functional.
Define the set
C(F) = {F| −w(F) ln(w(F)) = F, 0≤ F ≤ 1} (4.5.8)
41Refer to Abdellaoui et al.(2010, pg. 49) (“Empirical studies, using more general weighting functions, suggests that this
intersection is around 1/3”).
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Then C(F) is a cluster set of fixed point functions for probability weighting. Moreover, in the
restricted case when w(F) = F the set C(F) is a singleton comprised of theTversky and Kahneman
(1992) fixed point e−1.
Proof. See Appendixsection 4.F.
Remark4.5.1. McLennan(2012) identified sets likeC(F) asanessential setof fixed points. Al-
ternatively,C(F) is an invariant subspace of[0,1]. That is,w : C(F)→C(F)⊂ [0,1].
Corollary 4.5.2 (Linear probability weighting on essential set of fixed points). The probability
weighting function w is alinear operatoron the essential cluster set of fixed points C(F) separating
expected and nonexpected utility theories.
Proof. See Appendixsection 4.G.
This result suggests that there is an invariant linear segmentof every probability weighting
scheme which separates “optimists” from “pessimists” in the sense ofTversky and Wakker(1995,
pg. 1264) andAbdellaoui et al.(2010, pg. 41). Perhaps more important, it provides a theoretical
foundation for mixture preference models (Harrison and Rutström(2009)). For the cluster set of
fixed point probabilities is a linear subspace that support von-Neuman-Morgenstern (VNM) utility,
seeVon Neumann and Morgenstern(1953). Whereas the complementary subspace is nonlinear so
it supports nonexpected utility theories.
4.6 Conclusions
This paper treats the outcome dimension of a gamble or lottery as an underlying statistical
ensemble. Whereupon it employs the principle of maximum entropy to identify the probability
weighting function (pwf) based on a DM’s information about the moments of the outcome. By
so doing, it characterizes a DM’s inherent pwf for a distribution of outcomes. We find that prob-
abilistic preference is explained by an inherent harmonic probability weighting function (HPWF).
Furthermore, we introduce an abstract representation theorem for HPWF that has implications for
the quantum probability strand of decision theory literature outside the scope of this paper. Our
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theory also shows how decision weights, obtained from Quiggin’s rank dependent utility trans-
formation procedure, can be decomposed into a part due to linear probabilities and a part due to
harmonic weighting of outcomes. That sets the stage for the identityRDU = EU ⊕WU. RDU
collapses toEU when probability cycles are completed.
The HPWF theory is applied to resolve the preference reversal puzzle. We find that experi-
menters interfere with the inherent HPWF when they assign probabilities to outcomesex ante, and
that that interference breaks the probability cycles of subjects in the experiment. This causes exper-
imenters to misreport intransitivity of preferences, i.e., preference reversal, when the true state is
no preference reversal. Because subjects behaviours are transitive once their probability cycles are
completed. We show that the HPWF fixed point probability ise−1–the same value axiomatized in
the literature. However, that fixed point has maximum entropy. Our preliminary analysis suggests
that that result is explained by the existence of a cluster set of fixed points or fixed probability
distribution. And, preferences over the cluster set of fixed points are linear in probabilities. In
other words, every point on the diagonal of a unit square is an admissible fixed point probability.
Thus casting doubt on the axiomatized fixed point ofe−1. The HPWF in this paper is limited to
concave-convex shape. However, for further research, in principle one should be able to derive
convex-concave shape by imposition of suitable identifying restrictions on the HPWF. This pa-
per adds to the literature by virtue of extending probability weighting functionals to the complex
domain by and through harmonics in probability weighting. It provides “new” analytic tools that
portend further research on the issue of probability cycles and intransitivity of preferences.
4.A APPENDIX
4.B Order relations
The material in this section is drawn fromWillard (1970, p. 5). A binary relationR on a setA is
any subset ofA×A. The relation(a,b) ∈ R is denotedaRb. A relationR is reflexiveiff aRa for
a ∈ A, symmetriciff aRb impliesbRa for all a,b ∈ A, antisymmetriciff aRb andbRa implies
a= b for all a,b∈ A, and transitive iffaRb andbRc impliesaRc for all a,b,c∈ A.
Partial order . A relationR on A is a partial order providedR is reflexive, antisymmetric and
transitive. Thus, is a partial order onR.
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4.C Proof of Lemma 4.2.1functional Gâteaux derivative
Proof. Technically, we are using a Gâteaux type derivative (Siddiqui, 2004, §5.2). LetTµ( f ) =∫
A f dmu(dx) be a linear operator,‖ ‖ be a norm defined onTµ , andDTµ( f )h be the value of the








impliesDTµ( f ) = Tµ for every f (Siddiqui, 2004, Rem. 5.2.1). Chooseh to be the identity function
direction so thatTmu(h) =
∫
Ahµ(dx) = µ(A). Thus,DTµ( f ) = µ(A) where
∂F
∂ f
= DTµ( f ).
4.D Proof of Theorem 4.2.2HWPF existence
The proof of the theorem rests on first and second order optimality criteria and transformation of
the underlying moment problem.






= w′(F)µ(A)[1+ ln(w(F))] (4.D.1)






















Undeniably, the quantitye−1 constitutes the fixed point for compound invariance inPrelec(1998,
pp. 503-504). Furthermore,λ0µ(A)+∑mi=1λir i(x) represents an affine transformation of the mo-
ment conditions imposed on the nonparametric probability density functionf in (4.2.1). And
w′(F) and µ(A) are scale parameters. The shape ofw is characterized by sign(w′(F)).
It is known that forµ(A) < ∞, the moments 1, x, x2, . . . can be orthogonalized to form
a basis for the canonical Hilbert spaceL2µ(A) with norm‖ ‖L2µ . And that the harmonic sequence
{eiω jx}∞j=1 is a canonical basis for that space(Akheizer and Glazman(1961, pp. 27-28)). There-
fore we can replaceλ0µ(A)+∑mi=1 λir i(x) with some complex valued functioñw(F) induced by







wherea j is the coordinate of̃w(F) with respect to the orthogonal basis. It is a so called abstract
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Fourier coefficient derived from the canonical inner product for L2 (Dunford and Schwartz(1957,




f ḡµ(dF), a j =
< w̃(F),eiω jx>
< eiω jx,eiω jx>
(4.D.6)










µ(A) is the scaled coordinate with respect to the measureµ(A).
4.E Proof of Theorem 4.3.3HPWF identification
The proof of the theorem is organized as follows. We calibrate a HPWF with numerical values and
then generalize the result.
Proof. The restriction 0≤ w(Φ(z))≤ 1 implies that (4.3.10) reduces to
(3Φ(z)−2)≤ I(z)≤ 3Φ(z) (4.E.1)
Cursory inspection indicates that forP= Φ(z) = 13, in (4.E.1) we have−1≤ I(z)≤ 1. Moreover,
P = 13 is near to the fixed pointe
−1 so equation (4.3.10) is well defined. Negative values ofz
suggests that the cubic term in the evaluated integralI(z) is dominant negative, and vice versa for
positive values.42 So in (4.3.10) w tends to be higher for small negativez. For positive values
of z the cubic term is dominant positive andw tends to be lower. So the weighting function in
(4.3.10) [weakly] retains inverted S-shape characteristics of the probability weighting function
(Prelec(1998) andTversky and Kahneman(1992)).
Weturn now to evaluate (4.3.10). We begin with a very rough linear approximation for the







































42Blavatskyy(2013, p. 15) introduced a 2-parameter cubic pwf which performs justas well as several other popular pwfs.
192





































Writing p = Φ(z), z = Φ−1(p), and replacingz with a “residual”monotone phase functionθ(z)























Recall thatx = µx + σxz so (4.E.9) is a bivariate function of p and x. A more parsimonious
























Since the choice ofz= 4 in Assumption4.3.1is arbitrary, in its most general form (4.E.10) can
berewritten to accomodate all values ofz as follows
w(p,x) = η0p+η1 tan(ψ(z)) (4.E.12)
whereη0 andη1 are elevation and curvature parameters respectively. In the sequel we use this
more general form. The term tan(ψ(z)) dominates the harmonic PWF in (4.E.10). It is known
that that term is cyclic, and that it has an inverse S-shape consistent with the probability weighting
function popularized byTversky and Kahneman(1992) cumulative prospect theory (CPT). For
(4.E.12) to be a pwf we impose the following identifying restrictions:






p= 0⇒ η1 tan(ψ(z)) = 0⇒ ψ(z) = nπ , n= 0,1, . . . (4.E.14)
p= 1⇒ tan(ψ(z)) = 1−η0
η1





4.F Proof of Proposition 4.5.1maximum entropy of fixed pt cluster set
Proof. By construction we can rewritew(F) = exp(− Fw(F)). The distribution function(s)F which
solves that nonlinear equation represents fixed probability distributions that satisfy the equation.
By definition,F represents a continuum of probabilities. Specifically,
1. let ξp be thep-quantile ofF. Define the set of probabilitiesX(p) = {p| −w(p) ln(w(p)) =
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p, F(ξp) = P(X ≤ ξp) = p, F ∈C(F)}. By constructionX(p) is a cluster set of probabilities
since it contains the accumulation or fixed pointsp that satisfy the entropy equation, and by
constructionX(p)⊆C(F). HenceC(F) is a hereditary cluster set.
2. SupposeF ∈C(F), andp /∈X(p). The latter relation implies that−w(F(ξp)) ln(w(F(ξp))) 6=
F(ξp) andF(ξp) /∈C(F). This contradicts our incipient hypothesisF ∈C(F). In which case
F(ξp) = p∈ X(p) andC(F)⊆ X(p).
The results of 1. and 2. imply thatC(F)=X(p). In which caseC(F) is a cluster set of probabilities.
The restrictionW(F(ξp)) = F(ξp) = p produces the fixed point solutionW(F) = F = exp(−1).
4.G Proof or Corollary 4.5.2linear weighting on essential cluster set of fixed
points
Proof. Let h1, h2 ∈ C(F) and choose constantsα andβ such thatαh1+ βh2 ∈ C(F). Thus by
hypothesisαh1+βh2 is a fixed point if
w(αh1+βh2) = αh1+βh2 = αw(h1)+βw(h2)
In which casew is a linear operator by definition.
4.H Harmonic pwf and quantum probability models of decision
In this appendix we briefly digress from the main theme in the paper to show how our HPWF
theory extends to the quantum probability models popularized by Jerome Busemeyer and his co-
workers. See e.g.,Busemeyer and Wang(2007); Pothos and Busemeyer(2009); Busemeyer et al.













Sincew̃m(F) is complex valued, for internal consistency of real(Re) and imaginary(I m) parts,
we must have for the numerator above





−1=−(1+ log(w(F)))> 0 (4.H.3)
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However, there is a quantum probability interpretation as well. L t ψ(x) be a wave equation such


















Specifically, there exist some unit state functionψ̂ which satisfies the Schrödinger equation (Pothos











‖ψ̂(x)‖2L2µ µ(dx) = 1 (4.H.8)
The underlying “Born rule” probability density is given by
ρ(x) = ‖ψ̂(x)‖2L2µ (4.H.9)
In which case the probability of finding the wave function in some setB is given by







The foregoing analysis gives rise to the following
Theorem 4.H.1(Quantum preference states).
Let (X,B(X),µ) be outcome measure space, F be an unknown probabilistic distribution, and
w̃m(F) be a complex valued functional of F. For some B∈ (X), let ψ(x) represent the state of
uncertainty about outcome x∈ B, and w(F) represent the maximum entropy probability weighting



















Remark4.H.1. The simplest time separable Schrödinger wave equation is typically written as
ψ(x, t)=ψ(x) f (t)whereHΨ= ih̄∂ψ∂ t for some [Hamiltonian] operatorH (Szekeres, 2004, p. 383).
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f = E. So even
though our equation does not include time it can be extended to do so.
Remark4.H.2. The “information” restrictions imposed in (4.H.2) implies that we can replace
w̃m(F) with µ(B) in the theorem. In that case,µ(B) is a measure of the information content of the
setB∈ B(X). Thus,P(B) is a subjective probability estimate based on the perceived information
content ofµ(B).
4.I Harmonic pwf, regret theory, and core theory plus noise
This appendix sketches the relationship between regret theory and the HPWF. To fix ideas we
sketch the Regret Theory (RT) model described inLoomes and Sugden(1983). Let Ai andAk be
two actionsavailable in abinary choicesituation. Theconsequenceof choosingAi if state j occurs
is xi j , and thestate dependent probabilityis p j . Let C(·) be achoicelessutility function such that
C(xi j ) = ci j . That is,ci j is the utility a DM would experience if she did not have to make any
choices. Assume that our DM is faced with the choice of either acceptingAi andsimultaneously
rejectingAk or else acceptAk and simultaneously rejectA j . According to this model, should the
j-th statee occur, our DM experiencesxi j but she misses out onxk j. Recall thatC(xi j ) = ci j and
C(xk j) = ck j, so relative toci j she derives an incremental increase in utility ifci j > ck j and rejoices
or she experiences a decrement in utility ifci j < ck j and regrets. Let the rejoice-regret function
beR(·). We can think ofR(ci j −ck j) as a function whose argumentswitchesbetween positive (if
rejoice) and negative (if regret). In other words,R(·) is a weak rejoice-regret switching-function
whereR(0) = 0. We write the modified utility function that accounts for rejoice or regret as:
mki j = ci j +R(ci j −ck j) (4.I.1)























The following assumptions are required for internal consistency, and for reconciling empirical
reality with our theoretical specifications.
Assumption 4.I.1 (Exchangeability). Let Q be a probability measure which characterizes rank
dependent utility and P be a probability measure that characterize other generalized expected
utility models. We assume that there exist a probability weighting function w(Q) hich generates
Quiggin(1982) type decision weightsΠ = {π j}1≤ j≤n such thatΠ coincides with P.
This exchangeability assumption is technical. It allows us totake expectations with respect to
the same probability measure under rank dependent utility and other generalized expected utility
theory specifications. Refer toBerger(1985, p. 105) for further details on exchangeability concept.
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π(k)j = 1 (4.I.3)
wherek controls the period of the harmonic component of the decision weight(s). The follow-
ing lemma states a known relationship between harmonic analysis andbinary (e.g. rejoice-regret)
switching functions. It is the essential ingredient that ties the addends in the decomposed general-
ized EUT functions above together.
Lemma 4.I.2 (Switching Functions and Harmonic Analysis). Let Qk(x) = exp(2π ikx/2) =
(−1)kx = ±1 for k = 0,1 and integer values of x, be a Fourier kernel or harmonic basis func-






R⋆j Q j(x) (4.I.4)
where R⋆j = ∑xR(x)Q j(x) is an abstract Fourier coefficient.
Proof. SeeLechner(1971, pp. 130-131)
According to Lemma4.I.2, and exchangeability Assumption4.I.1, the harmonic component in
(4.I.3) is related to the switching component in (4.I.2) up to a constant. Thus, we prove the follow-
ing:
Proposition 4.I.3 (HPWF and Rejoice-Regret). Harmonic addend for HPWF decomposition of
RDEU is functionally equivalent to weak switching function addend for RT decomposition.
The question arises as to whether or not any of the representations above are consistent with a
“core theory” plus stochastic error. Cf.Loomes and Sugden(1995); Hey (2005). For example,
(4.I.2) and (4.I.3) are examples of “generalizations of the expected utility preference functional”
tested inHey and Orme(1994). They find that there is not much statistical difference betwen the
performance of those models and classic EUT in economic experiments. Thus, we embark on a
theoretical explanation of their results. That is, we claim that if EUT is a core theory in all of the
above, i.e., RDEU and RT, then the switching addend component for RT decomposition, and the
harmonic component addend for RDEU decomposition, are functionally equivalent to stochastic
error terms. To support this claim we introduce the following
Definition 4.I.1 (Radamacher function). (Katznelson, 2004, p. 276). Radamacher functionsrn are
a sequence of independent random variables taking the values 1 and−1 with probability 1/2 for
each.
By definition, a Radamacher function (1) is a binary switching function so it satisfies Lemma4.I.2;
(2) has a harmonic representation; and (3) is a random variable, i.e., it can be treated as a stochastic
error. Refere toDe Guzmán(1981, pp. 23-24) andFolland(1992, p. 201) for technical details. For
the sake of exposition one can assume that the stochastic error term in say,Hey (2005), has a
Radamacher function representation. In which case the next proposition follows from Proposition
4.I.3:
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Proposition 4.I.4(EUT core plus stochastic error). The harmonic addend of HPWF decomposition
of RDEU, and the switching function addend for RT decomposition, satisfy a core expected utility
theory (EUT) plus stochastic error decomposition.
This proposition shows that the HPWF produces a theoretical explanation for whyHey and Orme
(1994, p. 1301) failed to find statistically significant difference btween core EUT and generalized
EUT models in their study. According to our HPWF analysis, the difference between core EUT and
generalized EUT models is functionally equivalent to stochastic error. A result verified empirically
by the Hey-Orme experiments. The HPWF is axiomatized inCharles-Cadogan(2015a) where the
generalized EUT decomposition result is further illustrated with prospect reference theory (Viscusi,
1989), disappointment aversion (Gul, 1991), reference dependent preferences (Kőszegi and Rabin,
2006) and weighted expected utility (Chew, 1983; Chew and Waller, 1986). Cox et al.(2013)
also decomposed generalized EUT in the context of stake and probability calibration exercises
to examineRabin(2000) calibration critique of EUT.Fehr-Duda and Epper(2012) decomposed
disappointment aversion and prospect reference theory. However, none of those authors considered
probability harmonics.
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4.J APPENDIX OF PLOTS AND SIMULATED HPWF DATA
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Plot of w(φ(z)) vs. z with respect toZ-transform of outcome spaceX. Negative values ofZ corresponds to
points below the mean 0. Those points are over weighted. Values above the mean are under weighted.
Likelihood insensitivity is depicted by the relatively flat portion of the plot.
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This is a scale and affine transformation of the plot inFigure 4.4. The horizontal axis is a
pseudo-probability measure from that transformation.
200















Probability       P 
H(P) = -Plog(P) 
-Plog(P)
This is a plot of the maximum entropy associated with the probability weighting functional inFigure 4.4.
Maximum entropy occurs at the pointe−1. This corresponds to the fixed point probabilityp⋆ = e−1.
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Max Ent Affine PWF 
H(P)=-W(φ(Z*))ln(W(φ(Z*))) 
-W(φ(Z*))ln(W(φ(Z*))) 
This is a plot of the maximum entropy associated with the probability weighting functional inFigure 4.5.
Maximum entropy occurs at the pointe−1. This corresponds to the fixed point probabilityp⋆ = e−1.
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max (3.7*Z* , 1) 
This is a cross plot of the maximum entropy associated with the probability transformation in (4.5.4) and
(4.5.5). Maximum entropy occurs at the pointe−1. This corresponds to the fixed point probabilityp⋆ = e−1.
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Table 4.1: Table of Simulated Vales and Estimates
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Table 4.2: Table of Simulated Vales and Estimates (cont’d)
 !"#$%#&'()
Z * + ,)) Y Z* * + ,-)) Y* P ./0"1 /) * + ,-)) * + ,-))0# * + ,-))
0.6 17.24626992 18.4 0.575 0.538945935 0.575 0.725746882 0.232641046 0.538945935 0.333144051
0.7 17.28806127 18.8 0.5875 0.540251915 0.5875 0.758036348 0.209994217 0.540251915 0.332643768
0.8 17.32517053 19.2 0.6 0.541411579 0.6 0.788144601 0.187636503 0.541411579 0.332196888
0.9 17.35767733 19.6 0.6125 0.542427417 0.6125 0.815939875 0.165974091 0.542427417 0.331803391
1 17.38593429 20 0.625 0.543310446 0.625 0.841344746 0.145345484 0.543310446 0.331459793
1.1 17.41058767 20.4 0.6375 0.544080865 0.6375 0.864333939 0.126016501 0.544080865 0.331158842
1.2 17.43259535 20.8 0.65 0.544768605 0.65 0.88493033 0.108179512 0.544768605 0.330889265
1.3 17.45324258 21.2 0.6625 0.545413831 0.6625 0.903199515 0.091956371 0.545413831 0.330635564
1.4 17.47415621 21.6 0.675 0.546067381 0.675 0.919243341 0.077404337 0.546067381 0.330377811
1.5 17.49731799 22 0.6875 0.546791187 0.6875 0.933192799 0.064524175 0.546791187 0.330091437
1.6 17.52507755 22.4 0.7 0.547658673 0.7 0.945200708 0.053269607 0.547658673 0.329746955
1.7 17.5601655 22.8 0.7125 0.548755172 0.7125 0.955434537 0.043557333 0.548755172 0.329309564
1.8 17.60570734 23.2 0.725 0.550178354 0.725 0.964069681 0.035276952 0.550178354 0.328738594
1.9 17.66523837 23.6 0.7375 0.552038699 0.7375 0.97128344 0.028300235 0.552038699 0.327986687
2 17.74271984 24 0.75 0.554459995 0.75 0.977249868 0.022489363 0.554459995 0.326998671
2.1 17.84255667 24.4 0.7625 0.557579896 0.7625 0.982135579 0.017703893 0.557579896 0.325710003
2.2 17.96961655 24.8 0.775 0.561550517 0.775 0.986096552 0.013806344 0.561550517 0.324044714
2.3 18.12925049 25.2 0.7875 0.566539078 0.7875 0.98927589 0.0106664 0.566539078 0.321912727
2.4 18.3273148 25.6 0.8 0.572728588 0.8 0.991802464 0.008163844 0.572728588 0.319206466
2.5 18.5701941 26 0.8125 0.580318566 0.8125 0.993790335 0.006190345 0.580318566 0.31579664
2.6 18.86482535 26.4 0.825 0.589525792 0.825 0.995338812 0.004650308 0.589525792 0.311527127
2.7 19.21872266 26.8 0.8375 0.600585083 0.8375 0.996533026 0.003460957 0.600585083 0.306208881
2.8 19.64000264 27.2 0.85 0.613750083 0.85 0.99744487 0.002551863 0.613750083 0.299612822
2.9 20.13741011 27.6 0.8625 0.629294066 0.8625 0.998134187 0.001864072 0.629294066 0.291461711
3 20.72034403 28 0.875 0.647510751 0.875 0.998650102 0.001348987 0.647510751 0.281421046
3.1 21.39888351 28.4 0.8875 0.66871511 0.8875 0.999032397 0.000967135 0.66871511 0.269089057
3.2 22.18381376 28.8 0.9 0.69324418 0.9 0.999312862 0.000686902 0.69324418 0.253985943
3.3 23.08665197 29.2 0.9125 0.721457874 0.9125 0.999516576 0.000483307 0.721457874 0.235542497
3.4 24.11967297 29.6 0.925 0.75373978 0.925 0.999663071 0.000336872 0.75373978 0.213088333
3.5 25.29593474 30 0.9375 0.79049796 0.9375 0.999767371 0.000232602 0.79049796 0.185839907
3.6 26.62930367 30.4 0.95 0.83216574 0.95 0.999840891 0.000159096 0.83216574 0.152888529
3.7 28.13447968 30.8 0.9625 0.87920249 0.9625 0.9998922 0.000107794 0.87920249 0.113188567
3.8 29.82702108 31.2 0.975 0.932094409 0.975 0.999927652 7.23454E-05 0.932094409 0.065545972
3.9 31.72336928 31.6 0.9875 0.99135529 0.9875 0.999951904 4.80952E-05 0.99135529 0.008607236
4 33.84087336 32 1 1.057527292 1 0.999968329 3.16707E-05 1.057527292 -0.059151139
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Chapter 5
Prospect Theory’s Cognitive Error About
Bernoulli’s Utility Function
5.1 Introduction
A recent survey byBarberis(2013, p. 173) describesKahneman and Tversky(1979) original ver-
sion of prospect theory (OPT), and its amendment, cumulative prospect theory (CPT) (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992) thusly. “Prospect theory is still widely viewed as the best avail ble description of
how people evaluate risk in experimental settings”, while duly noting that “there are relatively few
well-known and broadly accepted applications of prospect theory in economics”. Prospect theory
was proposed in response to purported anomalies from experiments in psychology and behavioral
economics which led to revisions ofVon Neumann and Morgenstern(1953) expected utility theory
(EUT) model, and utility theory more generally.
In the context of applications,Blavatskyy(2005); Rieger and Wang(2006); Pfiffelmann
(2011) reexamined the St. Petersburg Paradox (first featured inBer oulli (1738) EUT setting)
in a CPT framework. This paper goes a step further. It argues thatBernoulli (1738) original
utility function, which “resolved” the St Petersburg Paradox and which falls under rubric of EUT,
explicitly satisfies several characteristics of CPT’s value function. In a recent paper,Cha les-
Cadogan(2016b) provides a more sophisticated analysis which shows how one caderive a loss
aversion index in an EUT framework. We claim “cognitive error”1 as the cause of some analysts’
misperception of Bernoulli’s utility function specification. We also provide evidence that under
mild assumptions Bernoulli’s utility function accommodates global loss aversion, and a Fisherz-
transformation test for loss aversion index. Moreover, the index follows anα-stable law. These
findings are important in their own right.
1 Also known as a cognitive bias, a cognitive error is a pattern of deviation in judgment that occurs in particular situations, which
may sometimes lead to perceptual distortion, inaccurate judgment, illogical interpretation, or what is broadly called irrationality.
See e.g.,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitivebias.
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This paper is motivated by Daniel Kahneman Nobel Prize lecture, a significant part of
which is devoted to what he deemed “Bernoulli’s error”. He states in relevant part:
Perception isreference-dependent: he perceived attributes of a focal stimulus reflect
the contrast between that stimulus and a context of prior and concurrent stimuli.
* * * * * * * * *
[Amos Tversky and I] noted, however, that reference-dependence is incompatible with
the standard interpretation of Expected Utility Theory, the prevailing theoretical model
in this area. This deficiency can be traced to the brilliant essay that introduced the first
version of expected utility theory (Bernoulli, 1738).
One of Bernoulli’s aims was to formalize the intuition that it makes sense for the
poor to buy insurance and for the rich to sell it. He argued that the increment of utility
associated with an increment of wealth is inversely proportional to initial wealth, and
from this plausible psychological assumption he derived thate utility function for
wealth is logarithmic. He then proposed that a sensible decision rule for choices that
involve risk is to maximize the expected utility of wealth (the moral expectation). This
proposition accomplished what Bernoulli had set out to do: it explained risk aversion,
as well as the different risk attitudes of the rich and of the poor. The theory of expected
utility that he introduced is still the dominant model of risky choice. The language of
Bernoulli’s essay is prescriptive it speaks of what is sensible or reasonable to do but
the theory is also intended to describe the choices of reasonable men (Gigerenzer et al.,
1989). As in most modern treatments of decision making, there is no acknowledgment
of any tension between prescription and description in Bernoulli’s essay. The idea
that decision makers evaluate outcomes by the utility of final asset positions has been
retained in economic analyses for almost 300 years. This is rather remarkable, because
the idea is easily shown to be wrong; I call itBernoulli’s error.
Bernoulli’s model is flawed because it is reference-independent: it assumes that
the value that is assigned to a given state of wealth does not vary with the decision mak-
ers initial state of wealth[Footnote in original][What varies with wealth in Bernoulli’s
theory is the response to a given change of wealth. This variation is represented by
the curvature of the utility function for wealth. Such a function cannot be drawn if the
utility of wealth is reference-dependent, because utility then depends not only on cur-
rent wealth but also on the reference level of wealth.]. This assumption flies against a
basic principle of perception, where the effective stimulus is not the new level of stim-
ulation, but the difference between it and the existing adaptation level.Th analogy to
perception suggests that the carriers of utility are likely to be gains and losses rather
than states of wealth, and this suggestion is amply supported by the evidence of both
experimental and observational studies of choice(s e Kahneman & Tversky, 2000).
[Emphasis added]. (Kahneman, 2002, pp. 460-461).
This paper provides a critical review of theBernoulli (1738) model, and compares it to the claims
made against it in the Kahneman lecture above. Insection 5.2we compare the geometry of
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Figure 5.1: Bernoulli Utility of Wealth Function
Reproduction of utility function sketched inBernoulli (1738, p. 26).
Bernoulli’s utility function to that of Kahneman-Tversky skew S-shape value function. For ex-
ample, Bernoulli’s sketch of his log concave utility function cuts the horizontal axis at an incipient







and so on. Thus, generating log growth in wealth relative to AB where-




It is known that the logarithm of 1 is zero. So the log of points to the left of 1 is negative, and log
of points to the right of 1 is positive. Thus, 1 (the relative wealth level point B) is ade factoref-
erence point. So loss aversion is latent in Bernoulli’s specification. Approximation of Bernoulli’s
specification also accommodates higher order risk attitudes that include a preference for skewness.
In section 5.3we show how Bernoulli’s specification supports a closed form globa loss aversion
index, that the index isα-stable, and we characterize its relation to Fisher’sz-transformation test.
We conclude insection 5.4.
5.2 Prospect theory value function vs Bernoulli utility function
In this section we emphasize the geometric properties ofBernoulli (1738) utility function, identify
itsde factoreference point, and contrasts it to the qualitative and geometric properties ofKahneman
and Tversky(1979) value function.
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5.2.1 Thede facto reference point in Bernoulli’s log concave utility function
We begin this subsection withBernoulli (1738, pg. 26) description of thegeometryof his
utility of wealth function reproduced inFigure 5.1:
“[ L]et AB represent the quantity of goods initially possessed. Then after extending
AB, a curve BGLS must be constructed, whose ordinatesCG,DH,EL,FM, etc., desig-
nate utilities corresponding to the abscissasBC,BD,BE,BF, etc., designatingains in
wealth. Further, letm,n, p,q, etc., be the numbers which indicate the number of ways
in whichgains in wealth BC,BD,BE,BF, etc., can occur”. [Emphasis added]
The pointB in Figure 5.1is Daniel Bernoulli’s de facto reference pointagainst which other wealth
levels are compared. Furthermore,Bernoulli (1738, pg. 29) states:
First, it appears that in many games, even those that are absolutely fair, both of the
players may expect to suffer a loss; indeed this is Nature’s admonition to avoid the dice
altogether. . . This follows from theconcavity of curve sBSto BR. For in making the
stake,Bp, equal to theexpected gain, BP, it is clear that thedisutility powhich results
from a loss will always exceed the expected gain in utility, PO. [Emphasis added]
It is indisputable that the italicized text in Bernoulli’s analysis above involves gains and losses
relative to thede factoreference pointB. Furthermore, he compared “utility” of expected gainBP
to the “disutility” of a loss of an equal amountBp, and plainly concludes that “loss will always
exceed the expected gain in utility”. In other words, “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979, p. 279) in Bernoulli’s utility function specification. Nonetheless,Kahneman
and Tversky(1979, pg. 276) states:
“[ Markowitz(1952)] was the first to propose that utility be defined on gains and losses
rather than on final asset positions, an assumption which has been implicitly accepted
in most experimental measurements of utility”.
5.2.2 Bernoulli’s forgotten numeraire wealth level and risk-return tradeoff
Given Bernoulli’s log-concave specification, the reference wealth level can only cut the horizontal
axis atx = 1. In other words, Bernoulli normalized wealth levels so that a given wealth level
Wx, say, isnumeraire–the reference wealth. In which case, any other wealth level, sayWz, is
represented byWzWx . Thus, the points in his graph arechanges in wealthrelative to thenumeraire.
This fact may have been obscured by his use of “analytic geometry” as opposed to “algebraic
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geometry” to represent the geometric mean.Stigler (1950, pg. 374) also analyzed Bernoulli’s
utility function by introducing the notion of a “subsistence level atc” where
U(c) = k ln(c)+a= 0⇒ a=−k ln(c)⇒U(x) = k ln (x
c
) (5.2.1)
Using Stigler’s interpretation,U(c) = 0 at precisely where “subsistence wealth level”x = c and
relative wealthxc = 1. Ironically, there is evidence that those at “subsistence levels” of income are
more prone to purchasing lottery tickets (Friedman and Savage, 1948; Light, 1977; Beckert and
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which is aweighted geometric meanrelative to thereference wealth level AB(see e.g.,Stearns,
2000, p. 221)(“Bernoulli taught us how to measure risk with the geomtric mean”). SinceAP<AB
in Figure 5.1, APAB < 1 if and only if at least one or all of the fractions on the right hand side in (5.2.3)
is much smaller than 1(≪ 1). Let {WP,WB,WC,WD,WE,WF , . . .} be aranking of nominal wealth
where the subscripts coincide with the corresponding letters in Bernoulli’s model. So that we have















∼ AF, . . .
(5.2.4)
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This is an implicit assumption in Bernoulii’s model. LetN = m+ n + p + q + . . . and WCWB =




























r2j )⇒ rP ≈ limN→∞ rN = r




up to a second order approximation.Stearns(2000, p. 224) provides applications of Bernoulli’s
utility model to genetics and posits thatr⋆ = µr − σ
2
r
2µr is the most widely used approximation of
the geometric mean in (5.2.7) whereµr andσ2r are the mean and variance of the distribution of
r j , j ∈ {C,D,E,F, . . .}.
Lemma 5.2.1(Bernoulli’s reference dependent change in wealth).
Bernoulli normalized his wealth levels with a numeraire so that reference wealth x= 1 where
his log-concave utility cuts the horizontal at the de facto numeraire. All other points on the axis
represent percent changes in wealth relative to x= 1. So that points to the left of x= 1 correspond
to percent loss in wealth and points to the right correspond to percent gain in wealth.
Lemma 5.2.2(Bernoulli’s risk-return tradeoff).
The numeraire wealth level in Bernoulli utility function induces a geometric mean r⋆ that is ap-
proximated by risk-return tradeoffs in(5.2.7).
Remark5.2.1. This seemingly over looked result has implications for asset pricing models as well
(Campbell et al., 1997, §1.4).
5.2.3 Bernoulli utility function vs. Kahneman-Tversky latent skew S-shaped utility function
with loss aversion
Next we examine the shape ofKahneman and Tversky(1979, pg. 279) value function sketched
in Figure 5.2, and the specification inTversky and Kahneman(1992) and its implication for the
ubiquitous loss aversion index. According toKahneman and Tversky(1979, pg. 279) (KT79)
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In summary, we have proposed that the value function is(i) defined on deviations from
the reference point; (ii) generally concave for gains and commonly convex for losses;
(iii) steeper for losses than for gains. A value function which satisfies these properties
is displayed in Figure 3. Note that the proposed S-shaped value function is steepest at
the reference point, in marked contrast to the utility function postulated by Markowitz
which is relatively shallow in that region. [Emphasis added]
Figure 5.2: Prospect theory’s value function
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Sketch of Prospect Theory’s bifurcated utility function withkink at reference point at the origin, and value
functionsVg concave over gain domain andVℓ convex and steeper over loss domain.
We now show that Bernoulli utility function satisfies(i)− (iii ) in the KT79 quote above.
Case (i): Deviations from the reference point
From the outset, we note thatFigure 5.3depicts Bernoulli’s utility function with reference point
B. TheBernoulli (1738, pg. 29) quote above satisfies KT79 condition(i). Bernoulli conducted his
analysis over positive valuesAB and beyond inFigure 5.3. However, if we shift (i.e. translate)
Bernoulli’s axis Qq in Figure 5.1so that it passes throughB, then his lossBq is negative while
his gainBQ is positive. Ironically, this change of axes involves a translation2 of relative wealth by
−1 so that the reference pointB is now 0–the same as Kahneman and Tversky’s reference point–
as shown inFigure 5.3. To see this, note that according toStigler (1950, pg. 374) Bernoulli’s
2Eeckhoudt et al.(1995, Fig. 1, p. 335) shows that Bernoulli type utility is a concavefunction of translation in wealth.
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Sketch of Bernoulli’s original utility functionSsfor ln(1+x) for changex in reference wealth at reference
point B and sub-utilityVg over gain domain.BQ′ is a translation of axis so thatB coincides with Prospect
Theory’s reference point at the origin. NowBL is a loss relative toB andBL′ is a gain.VBℓ is Bernoulli’s
negative sub-utility function (steeper thanVg) over loss domain represented by the arcBsor ln(1−x)
without kink at the origin.VKTℓ is Prospect Theory’s negative sub-utility (value function) over loss domain
represented by the dashed arcBs′ which is Bernoulli’s arcBs induced by multiplying Bernoulli’sB with a
loss aversion index to induce a kink atB and convexity over loss domain.
In the sequelx is change in relative wealth. Replacingx by X = x− 1 generatesu(X) = ln(X)
for gains. However, that change of axis induces undefined concepts like the logarithm of negative
terms whenX < 0 for losses. So in Bernoulli’s model, a “pure utility” of loss is undefined under the
translation scheme and ther flection effectis unobservableunder that transformation(Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). Tversky and Kahneman(1992) “resolved” this problem by writing−X when
X < 0 and they “hardcoded” a loss aversion indexλ to account for the skew. However, theutility
of loss can be recovered in Bernoulli’s specificationwithout resort to “hardcoding” as evidenced
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by the following approximations whenreturn on [reference] wealth x> 0:



















, for loss (5.2.10)
In each case,ug(0) = uℓ(0) = 0 when the reference point is zero. This is semantics because under
the original specification ln(1+0)= 0. However, we introduce (5.2.9) and (5.2.10) for comparison
with Tversky and Kahneman(1992) model of loss aversion.3 Note that the curve ismoothat the
reference point 0–there is no kink–contrary to Kahneman and Tversky’s specification, infra. The
translation does not affect the [absolute] magnitude(x) of Bernoulli’s relative gains or losses in
wealth. But it does change the orientation of his curve from the solid concave portionBs t the
dottedconvex portion Bs′ as shown inFigure 5.3to accommodate the fact that now points to the
left of B are negative, and so the curve is in the negative quadrant with a longer tail because of the
asymmetric response to gains and losses. This point is explained in detail later in the paper. For
the purpose of illustration, we provide a numerical example inTable 5.1which brings us to Case
(ii).
Case(ii): Generally concave for gains and commonly convex for losses
The asymptotic expansion of Bernoulli’s utility function in (5.2.9) and (5.2.10) to higher moments
introduces risk attitude concepts like prudence, temperance, etc (e.g.,E ckhoudt et al., 1995). For
example,u′′′′g (x) < 0 implies that a decision maker (DM) with Bernoulli utility over gains is tem-
perate (Eeckhoudt et al., 1995, Cor. 2). Applying an expectation operatorE to (5.2.9) and (5.2.10)
implies the following higher risk attitudes (Noussair et al., 2014, p. 326, fn.1). For example, the
higher order terms are analogized to measures of dispersion and⊕ is treated as an abstract conjoint
operation.
3Kelly (1956) used a product specificationVN = uWg u
L
ℓV0 involving (5.2.9) and (5.2.10) which relatesVN to Shannon’s entropy,
whereVN is a gambler’s capital afterN bets,V0 is initial capital andW andL signify numbers of wins and losses.
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Table 5.1: Hierarchical risk attitudes:
Prospect value vs. Bernoulli utility
x Y1(x) Y2(x) Y3(x) Y4(x) YPT(x)a
-1.0 -1.0 -1.500 -1.833 -2.083 -2.250
-0.9 -0.9 -1.305 -1.548 -1.712 -2.051
-0.8 -0.8 -1.120 -1.291 -1.393 -1.849
-0.7 -0.7 -0.945 -1.059 -1.119 -1.644
-0.6 -0.6 -0.780 -0.852 -0.884 -1.435
-0.5 -0.5 -0.625 -0.667 -0.682 -1.223
-0.4 -0.4 -0.480 -0.501 -0.508 -1.005
-0.3 -0.3 -0.345 -0.354 -0.356 -0.780
-0.2 -0.2 -0.220 -0.223 -0.223 -0.546
-0.1 -0.1 -0.105 -0.105 -0.105 -0.297
0 0 0 0 0 0
0.1 0.1 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.132
0.2 0.2 0.180 0.183 0.183 0.243
0.3 0.3 0.255 0.264 0.266 0.347
0.4 0.4 0.320 0.341 0.348 0.446
0.5 0.5 0.375 0.417 0.432 0.543
0.6 0.6 0.420 0.492 0.524 0.638
0.7 0.7 0.455 0.569 0.629 0.731
0.8 0.8 0.480 0.651 0.753 0.822
0.9 0.9 0.495 0.738 0.902 0.911
1.0 1.0 0.500 0.833 1.083 1.000
a YPY = x0.88, x> 0; YPY =−2.25(−x)0.88, x< 0.
Higher order risk attitudes implied by approximation of Bernoulii’s sub-utility functions













domain, forreturn on wealth xrelative to a reference wealth levelB in Figure 5.3.
Hierarchical higher order risk attitudes
• E[Y1(x)]≡ mean=⇒ “risk neutrality”;
• E[Y2(x)]≡ mean⊕variance; =⇒ “risk aversion”;
• E[Y3(x)]≡ mean⊕variance⊕skewness=⇒ “prudence”;
• E[Y4(x)]≡ mean⊕variance⊕skewness⊕kurtosis=⇒ “temperance”
Table 5.1contains the distribution of those values for equally spaced values ofx. The underlying
premise is that the range of wealth is normalized by its maximum value. A plot of Bernoulli’s value
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Plot of higher order risk attitudes implied by approximationsfor Bernoulli’s sub-utility functionsVBg over
gain domain andVBℓ over loss domain relative to reference point 0 for return on wealthx. Compared to
Prospect Theory’s value functionVPTg over gain domain andV
PT
ℓ over loss domain.Y1 is risk neutral.V
B
ℓ is
steeper thanY1 in loss domain even thoughVPTℓ is uniformly steeper thanV
B
ℓ . In contrast,V
B
g is less steeper
thanY1 andVPTg over gain domain.
function with hierarchical higher order risk attitudes, and the Kahneman-Tversky value function
(in red) is superimposed inFigure 5.4.
Prospect theory’s artificial kink at the origin is due to experimenter bias
Kahneman-Tversky value function is a power functionxα which is concave over gains and convex
over losses. SoFigure 5.4is aqualitativecomparison. Each of the curves inTable 5.1represent hi-
erarchical risk attitudes, and they are subsets of (5.2.9) and (5.2.10). The “loss tail” for Bernoulli’s
construct is depicted byVBℓ (x) in Figure 5.4. Whereas the value function over losses,V
PT
ℓ (x), is
obtained by pre-multiplying the loss component byλ = 2.25–the median value of the loss aversion
index reported inTversky and Kahneman(1992). That introduces anartificial kink at the origin
where there is no kink in the Bernoulli construct. Undeniably, forx< 0 we haveE[x]>VBℓ (E[x]).
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Thus, a DM would prefer to take risk over losses rather than receiv the sure payment (Machina,
1987b, p. 538). This implies thatVBℓ should be convex over losses despite its appearance in the
sketch. This is depicted byBs′ in Figure 5.3. Because Kahneman-Tversky hard coded−2.25 or
−λ if you will in their (loss) tail specification their model is confounded.
Preference for skewness
In gain domains Bernoulli preferences are strictly risk averse. The schema for that is depicted in
Figure 5.5. However, the exception isY4 (with kurtosis) which exceeds the expected value near
the tail, i.e., for 0.9 < x ≤ 1 as indicated in the last row ofTable 5.1and the black curve inFig-
ure 5.4. This suggests the existence of aconvexsegment of the curve consistent with gambling over
gain domain depicted inFigure 5.6.4 So an otherwise risk averse DM faced with the prospect of
doubling her wealth5 is willing to take risks if she has kurtosis preferences. Interestingly,E[Y4(x)]
implies that a DM presented with a high kurtosis gamble would be gain seeking in gain domains for
a sufficiently large increase in relative wealth. [S]he is less temperate when given an opportunity
to double her wealth.
According toMenezes and Wang(2005) DMs with skewness preference (like inFig-
ure 5.6) take probability mass from the mean and transfers it to the tail of the distribution. Recent
experiments byEbert and Wiesen(2012) confirms the existence of the behaviours characterized
above for higher moments. In particular, Bernoulli’s DMs are risk seeking over gain and loss
domains in this veritable “preference for skewness” setting that has implications for asset pric-
ing outside the scope of this paper (Kraus and Litsenberger, 1976; Harvey and Siddique, 2000;
Dittmar, 2002; Barberis and Huang, 2008; Polkovnichenko and Zhao, 2013).
4Markowitz (1952, p. 155) extendedFriedman and Savage(1948) utility function to include a convex-concave segment in
gain domain to account for insurance (concave) and gambling (convex) choices of DMs. Our analysis is more primitive since the
Bernoulli approximations inTable 5.1do not generate convex-concave curves.
5Recall that the numeraire wealth level is 1.0 so 0.9< x≤ 1 in (5.2.9) almost doubles or doubles the numeraire wealth level.
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Figure 5.5: Risk averter utility function
  
0 
    




Left tail skew distribution projected by risk averter inFigure 5.5. It implies risk averter avoids losses from
tail risk. Right tailed skew distribution projected by risk seeker inF gure 5.6. It implies risk seeker
attracted to gains from long shot bias.
Case(iii): Steeper for losses than for gains
According toH́ospital’s rule (Apostol, 1967, pp. 292-293) Bernoulli’s loss aversion index at
the origin is





When we imposeTversky and Kahneman(1992) reported median loss aversion index estimate of
2.25 we introduce a kink at the “reference point” where there was none before. The tails are now
longer and the loss aversion index is a lot larger than it is under Bernoulli’s specification. Perhaps
most important,Tversky and Kahneman(1992) “interference” with the value function induced
a kink at 0 so local loss aversion is now undefined there. Instead ofλ B above, we now get the






which spawned a whole literature around estimation of the loss aversion index (Wakker, 2010).
In the sequel we show how a simple global loss aversion index can be derived and provide some
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estimates.
More on point, inFigure 5.3 Bernoulli’s analysis is invariant to the orientation of Bs or
Bs′ since wealth levels are not affected by the orientation. I a nutshell, the curveBs′ is latent
in Bernoulli’s analysis because he did not place hisreference point for changes in wealthat the






xα , x> 0
−λ (−x)β , x< 0
(5.2.13)
There,α and β are shape parameters andλ is the celebrated loss aversion index that captures
asymmetric responses to symmetric gain and loss. More on point, ifx < 0 then−x > 0. So
the value function segment(−x)β is positive and concave for 0< β < 1 (β = 0.5 is Gabriel
Cramer’s specification) and functionally equivalent to Bernoulli’sBs. Thus, Bernoulli satisfied
KT79 condition(ii). By pre-multiplying the concave segment(Bs) by −λ (for λ > 1), Tversky
and Kahneman in effect reorientedBsso that it is convex (sayBs′). In the context ofbehavioural
operator theory, that is a “spin”–no pun intended. Thus, but for the power law specification, the
value function in (5.2.13) is qualitatively the same as Bernoulli’s utility function. In that case, if
a sufficiently small gain and loss are equidistant from the reference pointB, .e., BL′ andBL in
Figure 5.3, we would expect to findα ≈ β .
Lemma 5.2.3(Equality of shape parameters). For a sufficiently small symmetric gain and loss
equidistant from the reference point B in Bernoulli’s utility function shape parameters are approx-
imately equal. 
Thus, it is no surprise thatTversky and Kahneman(1992, pg. 311) upholds Lemma5.2.3when
they report in the italicized text below:
[I]t is common to assume a parametric form (e.g., a power utility function), but this
approach confounds the general test of the theory with that of the specific parametric
form. For this reason, we focused here on the qualitative properties of the data rather
than onparameter estimates and measures of fit. However, in order to obtain a parsi-
monious description of the present data, we used a nonlinear regression procedure to
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estimate the parameters of equations (5) and (6), separately for each subject.The me-
dian exponent of the value function was 0.88 for both gains and losses, in accord with
diminishing sensitivity. [Emphasis added]
Perhaps more important, one need not premultiply the curve by−λ to capture the effect of
the loss aversion parameterλ since the reoriented curve represented by the dotted lineBs′ already
captures asymmetric skew evidenced byVBℓ (−x) > VBg (x), where the former is Bernoulli’s value
for loss(ℓ) and the later is value for gain(g). That is,λ is a latent parameter in Bernoulli’s model.
Thereby, causing Bernoulii’s latent analysis ofBs′ under auspice ofBs to satisfy KT79(iii ). In
fact, a cursory inspection ofTable 5.1shows that at points equidistant from the origin 0, Bernoulli
utility is larger in loss domain compared to gain domain. This is evident inFigure 5.2where
Vℓ(−x) > Vg(x). By virtue of satisfying(i)− (iii ) in Kahneman and Tversky(1979, pg. 279) we
proved
Proposition 5.2.4(Bernoulli’s value function). Bernoulli (1738) value function isqualitatively
equivalentto Kahneman and Tversky(1979) value function. 
The geometry of Proposition5.2.4 is depicted inFigure 5.7andFigure 5.8. It is based on
juxtaposition ofFishburn and Kochenberger(1979, Fig. 1, pg. 504), and an annotated sketch of
Bernoulli (1738, pg. 26) representation in the context of our prior analysis.
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Figure 5.7: Fishburn-Kochenberger utility
with reference point












Figure 5.7is a reproduction ofFishburn and Kochenberger(1979, Fig. 1, p. 504) juxtaposed toFigure 5.8
which reproducesFigure 5.3for convenience and comparison.Fishburn and Kochenberger(1979)
conducted a metastudy based on “changes in wealth or return on investment” (similar to thex in (5.2.8)) by
fitting separate utility functions in loss and gain domains using linear, power and exponential
specifications. In the context ofFigure 5.8, they multipliedBsby −1 to getBs′ and concluded thatBs′ was
convex and steeper thanBS. However, they noticed that regardless of specification “below-target utility ...
is almost always steeper than above-target utility”. This is consistent withBsbeing steeper thanBSin
Bernoulli’s specification.
5.3 A global loss aversion index formula from Bernoulli utility
In this section, we use the geometry of Bernoulli’s utility function to derive a global utility loss
aversion index and establish its relation to Fisher’sz-transform statistic.6 Cursory inspection of










Thus, the “disutility” of loss in either case is such that it is greater than the “utility” of an equal
nominal gain. LetAVKTℓ ,AVKTg ,AVBℓ ,AVBg be theimpact of an incremental change in wealthη under
the Kahneman-Tversky (KT) and Bernoulli (B) value functions. Thus, from (5.2.8) and (5.2.13),
6Cohen(2014, Fig. 1, p. 9) introduced a “state dependent loss aversion Bernoulli utility” function that is kinked at the reference
point. However, he used aKőszegi and Rabin(2006) type specification to characterize his loss aversion index.
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dy= ln(x+η)− lnx (5.3.5)
Inasmuch as Lemma5.2.3suggests that shape parameters are equal for sufficiently small sym-
metric gain and loss, the loss aversion indexλ KT derived from the impact of a change in wealth in














Our ratio-of-areas approach to deriving the loss aversion index differs from that in the literature
which favors first derivatives and ratio of utilities (Wakker, 2010, p. 239). Nonetheless, it is a
valid measure as shown by (5.3.6).7 Undeniably, the loss aversion index in (5.3.7) depends on the
reference wealth levelx (depicted byB in Figure 5.3) and the amount of lossη (depicted by BL in
Figure 5.3). Thus we proved
Theorem 5.3.1(A reference dependent loss aversion index for Bernoulli). The loss aversion index
λ B(x,η) in (5.3.7) computed from Bernoulli’s value function is reference dependent. In particular,
λ B(x,η) is a global loss aversion index over the distribution of change in relative wealth x and
lossη.
5.3.1 Global loss aversion index, its conjugate, and Fisher’sz-transform
Without loss of generality, in the sequel we replacechange in relative wealth xwith the corre-
sponding gain and loss amountη. Given the relationships in (5.3.1), (5.3.6) and (5.3.7) we have
7Wakker(2010, p. 268) addresses the effect on local utility loss aversion index measures whenα 6= β .
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numeraire or reference point driven loss aversion index relationships:





⇒ ln(1−η2)< 0⇒ |η|< 1 (5.3.9)
Sinceη > 0, the operational inequality is 0< η < 1. That inequality implies that the absolute
nominal change in wealth must be less than the reference wealth level for loss aversion to be
upheld. Beyond that point, the formula breaks down. It is an open question as to what happens
when wealth increases by a factor of 2 or more. Perhaps most important, Kahneman and Tversky’s
loss aversion indexλ KT in (5.3.6) is uniformly distributed over their value function for all changes
in wealth. So in theory, there is no bound on the magnitude of changes relative to the reference
point–it is irrelevant. By contrast, the loss aversion indexλ B in (5.3.7) and (5.3.8) is reference
dependent and responsive to all changes in wealth less than the reference wealth level. To wit, it is
“global”. Thus, we proved
Theorem 5.3.2(A Global Loss Aversion Index Formula).
A global loss aversion index formula for a lossη (expressed as a percent change in wealth relative
to a numeraire), when utility is log concave, is given by
λ B(η) =− ln(1−η)
ln(1+η)
where0< η < 1, 0≤ λ B ≤ ∞. 
The conjugate loss aversion index formula is derived when utility is not logconcave but when it is
the “antilog”. That is Bernoulli’s logconcave function is now transformed toU(y) = exp(y). See
Figure 5.11, infra. Recall that ifyr is numeraire wealth theny = (1±η)yr . In which case for a
nominal symmetric gain\lossη in a neighbourhood of reference wealth levelyr , the conjugate loss






= exp(−2η yr) (5.3.10)
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Here, 0< λ ∗B ≤ 1 for 0≤ yr < ∞. In this case, for Bernoulli’s canonical reference point 1 we have
Corollary 5.3.3 (Conjugate global loss aversion index formula).
The conjugate global loss aversion index formula for a lossη (expressed as a percent change in







where0≤ η ≤ 1.
The literature shows thatKőszegi and Rabin(2006, 2007) formulated stylized models of reference
dependent preferences, based on concave utility functions, but failed to proffer a closed form loss
aversion index formula. Thus, the loss aversion index is robust to criticism against the application
of logconcave utility to all wealth levels. Because a log concave utility function is just a special case
of the abstract concave utility inKőszegi and Rabin(2006). Perhaps more important, assuming
bivariate normality between reference wealth Theorem5.3.2suggests thatλ B is related to Fisher’s
z-transformation8 if we treat symmetric gain and loss(η) as a pseudo correlation coefficient, i.e.,
|η|≤ 1.9 That is, it transforms the (truncated) interval, normalized by “reference wealth”, from
[0,1] for η to [0,∞], so that 0≤ λ B ≤ ∞. We summarize this artefact in the following
Theorem 5.3.4(Fisherz-transform test for loss aversion). Assume that W1, . . . ,Wn are rank ordered
independent identically distributed wealth levels for n> 3. Let Wr be a reference wealth level
1 < r < n. Assume that Wj ,Wr are iid bivariate lognormaland that
Wj
Wr
= 1+ η̂ j , j 6= r. Let
η̃ = 1n ∑
n
j=1 η̂2j −1 be a random variable, z be Fisher’s z-transform, and|η̃|< 1be agiven truncated
symmetric gain and lossrelative to Wr . It is known that if E[η̃] = 0, then the population parameter




















(1+ λ̂ B) ln(1+η)
8Refer toCramér(1962, p. 241).
9(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, Table 5) provides means of the correlations between high andlow probability gains and losses
after transformation to Fisher’sz statistic.
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whereẑ is the sample Fisher z-transform for sample estimatesλ̂ B andη with test statistic
Ẑ =
(







Remark5.3.1. Berry and Mielke Jr(2000) show that the Fisherz-transform test would be valid
here only whenE[η] = 0. That condition is satisfied herea fortiori.
Example–Fisherz-transform test for utility loss aversion index
According to Theorem5.3.4we would reject an observed valueλ̂ atη percentage points from the
reference point if it was statistically significant different from theλ B expected inTable 5.2. For
example, at sample sizen= 30 if we observed a loss aversion estimateλ̂ = 0.9 located atη = 0.8,
i.e. 80% distance away from the reference point, then the test statistic isẐ=−2.807. So we would
rejectλ̂ = 0.9 as being too small since we would expectλ B= 2.738 inTable 5.1whenη = 0.8. For
small samples we use at-test withn−2 degrees of freedom, and sample variancesn = [n(n−3)]−1.
We obtain the sampleT-statistic by substitutingsn for
√
n−3 in the formula forẐ. For theλ̂ ,η
pair above, supposen= 10. We get the sample statisticT=-4.520 which is statistically significant
at p = 0.005 atν = 10− 2 = 8 degrees of freedom(t10−2.005 = −3.355). Again, we would reject
λ̂ = 0.9 as being too small, compared toλ B = 2.738 in the table, for location distanceη = 0.8
from the reference point.
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Table 5.2: Sample Distribution of Loss Aversion Index
for Bernoulli Utility
Loss Loss Aver. Index Conj. Loss Aver. Index


















* This value is for 0< λ B(η)≤ 0.99.
Loss columnη represents relative loss as a fraction of Bernoulli’s reference wealth level.λ B(η) is the
global loss aversion index we would expect to find for a subject with Bernoulli preferences.ηB⋆(η) is the
corresponding global gain seeking index for conjugate utility for that subject.
Figure 5.9is an unscaled plot of Fisher z-transform for the loss dataη in Table 5.2. The z-
transform is approximately linear for−0.5< z< 0.5 and it steepens fairly rapidly after that. It has
asymptotes atη =±1. Table 5.2provides a sample distribution forλ B(η) and its conjugateλ B∗(η)
based on equally spaced intervals between 0.1 and 0.9. The points 0.00001, 0.05, 0.99, 0.99999
were inserted to highlight the behavior of the distribution near
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Figure 5.10: Distribution of Global Loss
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In Figure 5.9|η |↑ 1⇒ Fisherz→ ∞. In Figure 5.10η → 1⇒ λ B → ∞. Intuitively, this implies that as an
agent approaches losing it all her loss aversion becomes quite high and explosive upon losing it all. In
contrastλ B∗ exhibits gain seeking. The smaller the number, the higher the gain seeking. So gain seeking is
highest when an agent is faced with losing it all, and it approaches the limiting valueλ B∗ = 0.135335 for
relative wealth. In (5.3.10) as reference wealthyr → ∞ , we haveλ B
∗ → 0.













Conjugate utility functionU∗(y) = exp(y) for risk seeking is the inverse of Bernoulli utility function
U(y) = ln(y) for risk aversion. For numeraire wealthyr , relative wealthis y\yr = 1+η , y> yr ;
y\yr = 1−η , y< yr , 0≤ η ≤ 1. Without loss of generality, inFigure 5.11we assumey is relative wealth.
A change of axes to “reference point”(1,e) inducesY = y−1, andÛ∗(Y) =U∗(y)−e for gainsY > 0,
Û∗(Y) = e−U∗(y) for lossesY < 0. SoÛ∗(η) =U∗(1+η)−e for gains and̂U∗(−η) = e−U∗(1−η)
for losses with no kink at the reference point(1,e)∼ (0,0).
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the edge. A plot ofλ B(η) is depicted inFigure 5.10. In Figure 5.11a conjugate Bernoulli function
is plotted to depict convex utility and risk seeking over gains.Köbberling and Wakker(2005,
p. 128) also constructed a normalizedconcaveutility function with a convex conjugateto show
how Arrow-Pratt risk aversion index relates to the loss aversion index. Here, we are only interested
in the loss aversion index. The plot shows thatη → 1 ⇒ λ B(η) → ∞ and thatλ B(η) is slowly
varying asη approaches 1.
Theory and evidence ofα-stable loss aversion











The following representation theorem implies thatλ B(η) is α-stable. It is a restatement ofDe
Haan and Ferreira(2007, Thm. B.1.6).
Theorem 5.3.5(α-stable loss aversion). If λ B ∈ RVα , then there exist measurable functions a:
R+ → R and c: R+ → R with
lim
t→∞
c(t) = c∗, 0< c∗ < ∞, andlim
t→∞
a(t) = α (5.3.12)
and t0 ∈ R+ such that for t> t0








Conversely, if(5.3.13) holds with a and c satisfying(5.3.12), thenλ ∈ RVα .
Proof. SeeDe Haan and Ferreira(2007, Thm. B.1.6, p. 365) orFeller(1970, p. 282).
We use sample data for the loss aversion indexes inFishburn and Kochenberger(1979) metas-
tudy to test the efficacy of Theorem5.3.5. Table 5.3presents the descriptive statistics. It shows that
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the underlying distribution has excess kurtosis (right skew)with large variance, relatively narrow
interquartile rangeQ1−Q3 and a long tail betweenQ3−Q4. Table 5.12depicts a Log Pearson
Type III (Log Gamma) distribution which was fitted to the data. Refer toKleiber and Kotz(2003,
§5.3 Log–Gamma Distribution) for details on Log Pearson Type III distributions. The specific












ln λ − γ
β
))
, 0< λ < exp(γ) β < 0;
exp(γ)< λ < ∞ β > 0
(5.3.14)
Table 5.3: Diagnostics for Fishurn-Kochenberger loss
aversion index data
Statistic Value Percentile Value
Sample Size 30 Min 0.8
Range 164.4 5% 1.295
Mean 12.34 10% 1.83
Variance 876.65 25% (Q1) 2.825
Std. Deviation 29.608 50% (Median) 4.85
Coef. of Variation 2.3994 75% (Q3) 7.725
Std. Error 5.4057 90% 22.96
Skewness 5.0684 95% 87.925
Excess Kurtosis 26.809 Max 165.2
Figure 5.12: Fitted Log Pearson 3
The descriptive statistics inTable 5.3are for the loss aversion index estimates for two-piece linear(L−L+)
local utility function inFishburn and Kochenberger(1979, Tales 1A, 1B, pp. 508-509). They show that the
index is leptokurtic and right skewed. The data were fitted to a Log Pearson Type III distribution
(p= 0.32514 for Anderson-Darling goodness of fit statistic) plotted inTable 5.12. Fishburn and
Kochenberger(1979) also reported extreme values for the loss aversion index, i.e., λ = 3300,λ = ∞ for a
two-piece exponential(E−E+) local utility function.




β = 1, and
△
γ = 0 whereα andβ are shape parameters. The distribution
is characterized by its mode which has the form exp((α −1)\(β +1)). Perhaps most important, if
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Thus, empirical evidence shows that theα-stable feature of the loss aversion index extends to its
probability distribution. Vizly, the composite function(p◦λ )(η)∈ [0,1] implies(p◦λ )(η) = η ∈
[0,1], andλ (η) = p−1(η). So thatp is an inverse function in the classRV1\α . See e.g.,De Haan
and Ferreira(2007, p. 368).
Curiously,λ B(η)+λ B∗(η)≈ 2.0, 0< η ≤ 0.5. Perhaps more important, themean value
for λ B(η)≈2.18, 0<η <0.99 inTable 5.2is close to the median value inTversky and Kahneman
(1992, pg. 311)(“[t]he medianλ was 2.25, indicating pronounced loss aversion”). UnlikeTversky
and Kahneman(1992) who posit a constant local loss aversion indexλ , the Bernoulli loss aversion
indexλ B(η) is monotone increasing in the amount of lossη. One major restriction of the Fisher
z-transform test is that it does not accommodate|η|> 1. So it only addresses gains or loss which
size is less that one hundred percent (100%) of the numeraire reference level.
The conjugate loss aversionλ ∗B(η) in Corollary 5.3.3depicts the case in when the slope
of the curve inFigure 5.11at pointsy> 1 is greater than the slope at pointsy< 1. That is, when the
utility curve is convex–the conjugate of concave–over gains and losses. This is an important result
becauseKahneman and Tversky(1979) only accounts for those cases when the utility curve is
concave overy> 1 and convex wheny< 1. However, laboratory results often report loss aversion
index estimates 0< λ < 1 which connotes gain seeking (Wakker, 2010, p. 239) and convexity over
gains and losses.10 It implies that low income are more prone to gamble since their util ty function
is convex near reference wealth (Light, 1977; Scott and Barr, 2012; Beckert and Lutter, 2012).
5.4 Conclusion
Close inspection of the geometry ofBernoulli (1738) original utility function specification show
that it accommodates gains and losses relative a reference point. Furthermore, it has a reference
10Refer toHarrison and Rutström(2008, Fig. 14, pg. 97) for a a distribution ofλ with values greater than and less than 1.
230
dependent feature that supports a global loss aversion index that is monotone increasing in the
magnitude of loss. Moreover, we introduce theory and evidence that this loss aversion index is
slowly varying so it isα-stable. So we extend the solution space for loss aversion toα-stable laws.
We show how Fisher’sz-transform test can be used in econometric tests of the loss aversion index.
According to our analysis, many of the results explained by prospect theory’s skew S-shaped value
function are explicable with Bernoulli’s incipient utility function specification or at least a suitable
high order approximation of it. Further research is needed to see whether results in this paper
extend to utility functions in general.
5.A APPENDIX
5.B Proof of Fisherz-transform test for loss aversion Theorem5.3.4
Proof. By hypothesis ifWj ,Wr are bivariate iid lognormal, theñη is a truncated random variable
(Greene, 2003, p. 757). To see this, letWj = exp(Xj) andWr = exp(Xr) whereXj , Xr are nor-





= ln(1+ η̂ j) ≈ η̂ j = Xj −Xr , and the











= 1=⇒ E[η̃] = 0. Recall that|η̃|< 1 is a truncated ran-
dom variable by hypothesis. In which case, according toCramér(1962, eq(18.3.3), p. 242) we can
write thez-transforme2z=
1+η
1−η for the population parameterη with sample estimatẽη. However
from Theorem5.3.2we get− ln(1−η) = λ̂ B ln(1+η). After taking log ofe2z and substituting
the foregoing expression for ln(1−η) in the formula we get the desired result.
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Kőszegi, B. and M. Rabin (2007). Reference-dependent risk attitudes.American Economic Re-
view 97(4), 1047–1073.
Khrennikov, A. Y. and E. Haven (2009). Quantum mechanics and violations of the sure-thing
principle: The use of probability interference and other concepts.Journal of Mathematical
Psychology 53(5), 378 – 388. Special Issue: Quantum Cognition.
Kilka, M. and M. Weber (2001, Dec). What determines The Shape of The Probability eighting
Function Under Uncertainty?Management Science 47(12), 1712–1726.
Kindleberger, C. P. and R. Z. Aliber (2011).Manias, panics and crashes: A history of financial
crises. Palgrave Macmillan.
King, M. A. and S. Wadhwani (1990). Transmission of volatility between stock markets.Review
of Financial studies 3(1), 5–33.
Kleiber, C. and S. Kotz (2003).Statistical Size Distributions in Economics and Actuarial Sci-
ences. Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Wiley-
Interscience.
Kliger, D. and O. Levy (2010). Overconfident investors and probability misjudgments.Journal of
Socio-Economics 39(1), 24–29.
Knight, F. B. (1962, May). On the Random Walk and Brownian Motion.Transactions of the
American Mathematical Society 103(2), 218–228.
Knight, F. H. (1921).Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. New York, NY: Hart, Shaffner & Marx.
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